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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The last four decades have witnessed a fundamental change in macroeconomic
modeling. This development has its origins in the 1970s when the existing conven-
tional quantitative macroeconomic models, rooted in Keynesian economic theory,
were heavily criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds (see, for exam-
ple, Lucas, 1976; Sims, 1980; Sargent, 1981). Existing mainstream macroeconomic
models, including the Wharton Econometric Forecasting Model and the Brook-
ings Model, showed a poor forecast performance, missing the economic reality of
stagﬂation (see Gal´ı and Gertler, 2007). As a result, the general applicability of
these models for forecasting and policy analysis was questioned. In his famous
critique of econometric policy evaluation, Lucas (1976) emphasized the lack of
structural invariance of the current macroeconomic models making them unﬁt to
predict the eﬀects of alternative policies:
“. . . [T]he ability to forecast the consequences of “arbitrary”, unan-
nounced sequences of policy decisions, currently claimed (at least im-
plicitly) by the theory of economic policy, appears to be beyond the
capability not only of the current-generation models, but of conceiv-
able future models as well” (Lucas, 1976, p. 41).
A response to this critique emerged in the form of the ﬁrst generation of
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. The development of
these models was a merit of the real business cycle (RBC) approach initiated by
the seminal work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983).
1
2“For the ﬁrst time, macroeconomists had a small and coherent dy-
namic model of the economy, built from ﬁrst principles with optimizing
agents, rational expectations, and market clearing, that could gener-
ate data that resembled observed variables to a remarkable degree”
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2010, p. 4).
Based on the frictionless neoclassical growth model, the RBC approach aimed
to explain economic ﬂuctuations as an optimal response of rational agents to
real disturbances, particularly technology shocks (see Rebelo, 2005). From this
paradigm, a distinct school of thought evolved becoming known as New Keynesian
macroeconomics. Originally derived as an extension to the standard real business
cycle framework, which features monetary neutrality due to the presence of ﬂexible
prices and wages, New Keynesian economics evolved into a progressive research
program, accounting for the real eﬀects of monetary policy.
“... [New Keynesian] models integrate Keynesian elements (imperfect
competition, and nominal rigidities) into a dynamic general equilib-
rium framework that until recently was largely associated with the
Real Business Cycle (RBC) paradigm. They can be used (and are be-
ing used) to analyze the connection between money, inﬂation, and the
business cycle, and to assess the desirability of alternative monetary
policies” (Gal´ı, 2002, p. 1).
DSGE models rapidly became a standard tool for quantitative policy analysis
in macroeconomics. While, as outlined in An and Schorfheide (2007), the quan-
titative evaluation of the early DSGE models was typically conducted without
formal statistical methods and instead relied on parameter calibration, i.e., the
choice of parameter values on the basis of microeconomic evidence or long-run
data properties (see Karagedikli et al., 2010), the predominance of calibration in
empirical DSGE analysis decreased considerably in the 1990s when advances in
computational power and the development of new econometric methods made the
estimation of DSGE models more accessible.
“There has been tremendous improvement over the last twenty years
in the mathematical, probabilistic, and computational tools available
to applied macroeconomists. This extended set of tools has changed
3the way researchers have approached the problem of estimating pa-
rameters, validating theories, or simply identifying regularities in the
data” (Canova, 2007, p. xi).
As a result, DSGE models not only became widely used for empirical research
in macroeconomics, but also for policy analysis and forecasting at policy-making
institutions.
“DSGE models are powerful tools that provide a coherent framework
for policy discussion and analysis. In principle, they can help to iden-
tify sources of ﬂuctuations; answer questions about structural changes;
forecast and predict the eﬀect of policy changes, and perform counter-
factual experiments” (Tovar, 2009, p. 1).
This thesis contributes to the evolving ﬁeld of applied macroeconomic research,
strengthening the idea of a fruitful symbiosis between theoretical models and
advanced econometric techniques.
1.2 Outline of the Thesis
The core of the dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter 2 provides a graph-
ical and formal representation of a basic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
economy and discusses the prerequisites needed for an empirical implementation.
The aim of this chapter is to present the core features of the models used in chap-
ter 3 and 4 of this work and to introduce the estimation techniques employed in
the remainder of the thesis.
In chapter 3 we estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model on French, German,
Italian, and Spanish data to check for the respective sets of parameters that are
stable over time, implementing the ESS procedure (“Estimate of Set of Stable
parameters”) developed by Inoue and Rossi (2011). This econometric technique
allows to identify the respective parameters of a DSGE model that have changed
at an unknown break date. In the case of France, Germany, and Italy our results
point to structural breaks after the beginning of the second stage of EMU in
the mid-1990s, while the estimates for Spain show a signiﬁcant break just before
the start of the third stage in 1998. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes in
4monetary policy behavior for France, Italy, and Spain, while we detect monetary
policy to be stable over time in Germany.
The incorporation of convex adjustment costs of capital accumulation into
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models has become standard practice in
the literature, since these frictions improve the ability of sticky-price models with
endogenous investment to match the key features of the data considerably. In
chapter 4, we use a Bayesian approach to investigate empirically how diﬀerent
ad-hoc speciﬁcations of adjustment costs aﬀect the ﬁt and the dynamics of a New
Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with real and nominal
frictions featuring several exogenous stochastic disturbances. We consider three
diﬀerent forms of quadratic adjustment costs: an investment adjustment cost spec-
iﬁcation and two versions of capital adjustment costs. Using both euro area and
US data, we detect in part marked diﬀerences between the estimated structural
parameters across the three model speciﬁcations. Further, the implementation of
either investment or capital adjustment costs aﬀects the empirical ﬁt and the dy-
namics of the respective model speciﬁcations substantially. Concerning the overall
empirical ﬁt, the model speciﬁcations with capital adjustment costs outperform
the model version featuring investment adjustment costs, although only the latter
is able to produce data-consistent hump-shaped investment dynamics in response
to exogenous shocks.
Chapter 5 concludes by summarizing the main results of this dissertation.
Chapter 2
DSGE Models: Basic Structure
and Empirical Implementation
2.1 Introduction
DSGE models have become the workhorse in modern macroeconomics, receiving
wide support not only among researchers, but also from policy making circles,
supporting, for instance, the monetary policy decision-making process at central
banks around the world (see Kremer et al., 2006; Tovar, 2009). The term DSGE
thereby refers to a special class of dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models
which feature a sound micro-founded general equilibrium framework, character-
ized by the optimizing behavior of rational agents subject to technology, budget,
and institutional constraints (see Smets et al., 2010). As outlined in Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde (2010), a crucial part of the recent popularity of DSGE models stems
from the ability to ﬁt these structural models to the data.
In this chapter, we present the general structure of DSGE models and discuss
prerequisites needed for an empirical implementation. We focus on a standard
New Keynesian model and describe basic procedures for constructing and solving
this prototype model. Further, we consider three empirical methods for DSGE
models. The purpose of this chapter, on the one hand, is to highlight the core
features of the models used in chapter 3 and 4 of this work. On the other hand,
we introduce the estimation methods employed in the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a graphical and formal
presentation of a standard DSGE framework. The formal description comprises of
5
6the theoretical setup, the log-linear approximation, and the solution of a standard
New Keynesian model. Section 2.3 discusses three common strategies used in the
empirical analysis of DSGE models: calibration, maximum likelihood estimation,
and Bayesian estimation. Technical details concerning the theoretical setup, the
log-linear approximation, and the model solution appear in the appendices.
2.2 The Basic Structure of DSGE Models
2.2.1 A Graphical Exposition
In presenting a general DSGE framework, we closely follow Sbordone et al. (2010)
and use a simpliﬁed diagram to illustrate the interactions among the diﬀerent
agents in a basic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium economy (see ﬁgure 2.1).
Demand Shocks Mark-up ShocksCost-push Shocks
Productivity Shocks
Expectations
Policy Shocks
Demand Supply
Monetary Policy
Y e, πe
Y = fY (Y e, i− πe, ...) π = fπ(πe, Y, ...)
i = f i(π − π∗, Y − Y ∗, ...)
Monetary
Figure 2.1: A basic DSGE framework.
The model economy can be characterized by three interrelated blocks: a de-
mand block arising from the optimal behavior of households, a supply block de-
scribing the optimal behavior of ﬁrms, and a monetary policy equation. Each of
these blocks is deﬁned by equations derived from the underlying microeconomic
structure of the model, i.e., explicit assumptions on the speciﬁc behavior of agents
as well as the technological, budget, and institutional constraints in the economy.
7As outlined in Sbordone et al. (2010), the demand block determines the real
activity Y as a function of the expected future real activity Y e and the real interest
rate, which, according to the Fisherian equation, equals the diﬀerence between
nominal interest rate r and the expected inﬂation rate πe. The demand block
exhibits a negative relationship between the real interest rate and real activity,
since a rise in the real interest rate increases savings and lowers consumption
(and investment). In contrast, the functional relation between real activity and
its expected value is assumed to be positive, capturing the willingness of people
to spend more in anticipation of thriving days.
The arrow pointing from the demand block to the supply block emphasizes
the importance of the real activity Y emerging from demand, since it is, together
with expected inﬂation πe, a key input for determining the inﬂation rate π. The
supply block captures a positive relationship between the rate of inﬂation and the
level of real activity, implicitly expressing the pressure of factor prices on producer
prices stemming from increased competition for scarce production factors. Fur-
ther, the supply block accounts for a positive relation between current inﬂation
and expected inﬂation.
Following Sbordone et al. (2010), the values of real activity and inﬂation
determined by the demand and supply block enter into the monetary policy block.
Monetary policy itself is often described by a central bank, which sets the short-
term nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type policy rule (see Taylor,
1993). The monetary authority adjusts the nominal interest rate r in response to
deviations of current inﬂation π and real activity Y from their respective target
values π∗ and Y ∗. The eﬀects of monetary policy on real activity and inﬂation
are stressed by the arrow running from the monetary policy block to the demand
block and then on to the supply block. Thus, the policy reaction function of the
monetary authority closes the model allowing for a complete description of the
relationship between the key variables: output Y , inﬂation π, and the nominal
interest rate r.
Note that the incorporation of expectations about future outcomes provides
the source of (forward-looking) dynamic interactions between the three interre-
lated blocks. To take into account the role of expectations, ﬁgure 2.1 explicitly
highlights the inﬂuence of expectations on real activity and inﬂation, especially
emphasizing the expectations channel of monetary policy.
The stochastic nature of DSGE models originates from exogenous processes,
8commonly called shocks. These shocks amount to ﬂuctuations of the model around
its deterministic steady state equilibrium, a perfectly predictable path, with nei-
ther booms nor busts. Although recent micro-founded DSGE models include
various types of shocks, ﬁgure 2.1 only contains some of the most common spec-
iﬁcations (represented as triangles, with arrows pointing to the blocks that are
directly aﬀected by a speciﬁc driving process).
2.2.2 A Formal Exposition
According to Clarida et al. (2002), Ambler (2007), Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007),
and Gal´ı (2008), New Keynesian models have become a fundamental tool for mon-
etary policy analysis by academic economists and central banks. As outlined in
Goodfriend and King (1997) and Goodfriend (2002), these models extend the neo-
classical RBC setup by introducing Keynesian features like imperfect competition
and sticky prices and hence provide a setting that allows monetary policy to be
central to macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
We subsequently present the micro-foundations of a standard, closed-economy
New Keynesian model in the spirit of Clarida et al. (1999), Gal´ı (2002), Wood-
ford (2003), or Ireland (2004). We select this standard framework for two reasons.
First, it closely mimics the basic structure outlined in the previous section. Sec-
ond, the model clearly outlines the core features of the more elaborated versions
applied in chapter 3 and 4 of this work.
2.2.2.1 Overview
The economy consists of a representative household, a representative ﬁnished
goods-producing ﬁrm, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1] and a monetary authority. The representative household consumes,
saves, and supplies labor to the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms. Final output
is produced by a representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm acting in a perfectly
competitive market. The ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm bundles the continuum
of intermediate goods manufactured by monopolistic competitors and sells it to
the household, who uses the ﬁnal good for consumption. The intermediate goods-
producing ﬁrms are owned by the household and each of them produces a distinct,
perishable intermediate good, also indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] during each period t =
0, 1, 2, .... The assumption of monopoly power of intermediate goods-producing
9ﬁrms allows to introduce nominal rigidities in the form of quadratic nominal price
adjustment costs. Finally, there is a monetary authority that conducts monetary
policy by setting the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule.
2.2.2.2 Households
The representative household of the economy enters period t holding Bt−1 one-
period bonds. During period t the household receives Wtlt total nominal factor
payments from supplying lt(i) units of labor at the nominal wage rate Wt to each
intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm i ∈ [0, 1]. For all t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the household’s
choices of lt(i) must satisfy
lt =
∫ 1
0
lt(i)di,
where lt denotes total hours worked. Further, the household receives nominal
dividends from each intermediate goods producing ﬁrm i ∈ [0, 1] aggregating to
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)di.
The household uses its funds to purchase new bonds at the nominal cost Bt/rt,
where rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate between time periods, and output
for consumption purposes from the ﬁnal goods sector at price Pt. We follow
Woodford (2003) and assume that prices are measured in terms of a unit of account
called “money”, but that the economy is cashless otherwise. Therefore, the budget
constraint of the representative household is given by
Bt−1 +Wtlt +Dt
Pt
≥ ct + Bt/rt
Pt
.
Furthermore, we impose a no-Ponzi-game condition preventing the household from
excessive borrowing. Subject to these constraints, the household seeks to maxi-
mize the stream of expected utility
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−σt
1− σ − χ
l1+ηt
1 + η
)
,
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor and χ > 0 measures the relative weight of
the disutility of labor. The parameter σ ≥ 0 denotes the inverse of the elasticity
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of intertemporal substitution for consumption while η ≥ 0 is the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply.1
To solve this optimization problem, we form the Lagrangian
max
ct,lt,Bt
Λ = E
∞∑
t=0
[
βt
(
c1−σt
1− σ − χ
l1+ηt
1 + η
)
−βtλt
(
ct +
Bt/rt
Pt
− Bt−1
Pt
− Wtlt
Pt
− Dt
Pt
)]
,
obtaining the ﬁrst-order conditions
Λct = c
−σ
t − λt = 0,
Λlt = −χlηt + λt
Wt
Pt
= 0,
ΛBt =
λt
Pt
− βrtEt
(
λt+1
Pt+1
)
= 0,
Λλt = ct +
Bt/rt
Pt
− Bt−1
Pt
− Wtlt
Pt
− Dt
Pt
= 0,
and a standard transversality condition for bonds. By rearranging the ﬁrst-order
conditions of the household’s decision problem concerning the choice of consump-
tion, labor supply, and bond holding we yield the following standard optimality
conditions:
Wt
Pt
= χ
lηt
c−σt
and
c−σt = βrtEt
(
c−σt+1
πt+1
)
,
where πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
. While the former equation describes the intratemporal op-
timality condition, setting the real wage equal to marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption, the latter represents the Euler equation for the
optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption.
1Note that σ = 1 implies a log utility for consumption, so that the model would be consistent
with a balanced growth path if secular technical progress was introduced (see King et al., 1988;
Gal´ı, 2002).
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2.2.2.3 Firms
The ﬁnal good yt is produced by a ﬁrm that acts in a perfectly competitive
environment, bundling the intermediate goods yt(i) subject to the constant returns
to scale technology
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
,
where θ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
yt(i). Proﬁt maximization leads to the demand function for intermediate goods
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt,
with Pt(i) denoting the price of intermediate good i and
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
]1/(1−θ)
.
Each intermediate good i is produced by a single monopolistically competitive
ﬁrm according to the constant returns to scale technology
yt(i) ≤ ztlt(i),
where the technology shock zt is assumed to follow the autoregressive process
ln(zt) = ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt
with 1 > ρz > 0 and εzt ∼ N(0, σ2z). Although each ﬁrm i exerts some market
power, it acts as a price taker in the factor markets. Moreover, the adjustment
of the ﬁrm’s nominal price Pt(i) is assumed to be costly, where the cost function
is convex in the size of the price adjustment. Following Rotemberg (1982), these
costs are deﬁned as
φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt,
where φP ≥ 0 governs the size of price adjustment costs and π denotes the gross
steady state rate of inﬂation targeted by the monetary authority. As outlined in
Ireland (1997), this speciﬁcation can be interpreted as the negative eﬀects of price
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changes on customer-ﬁrm relationships.2
The typical intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm’s optimization problem can be
split into two steps. First, each ﬁrm wants to minimize its costs Wtlt(i) subject
to the production technology yt(i) = ztlt(i). The Lagrangian of this problem can
be written in real terms as
min
lt(i)
Λ =
(
Wt
Pt
)
lt(i)− ϕt[ztlt(i)− yt(i)].
The ﬁrst-order conditions of the ﬁrm’s problem are
Λlt(i) = Wt/Pt − ϕtzt = 0
and
Λϕt = ztlt(i)− yt(i) = 0,
where the Lagrange multiplier ϕt has the interpretation of the ﬁrm’s real marginal
costs. Second, since the convex adjustment costs make the ﬁrm’s optimization
problem dynamic (see Ireland, 2003), each ﬁrm chooses yt(i) and Pt(i) to maximize
its total market value
E
∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Dt(i)/Pt]
subject to the demand function for intermediate goods, where λt measures the
period tmarginal utility to the representative household provided by an additional
unit of proﬁts. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts distributed to the household as dividends are
deﬁned in real terms by
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt(i)− ϕtyt(i)− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt.
2Alternative speciﬁcations of nominal price rigidities in the recent New Keynesian literature
include Taylor’s (1980) pricing contracts and Calvo’s (1983) random probability of price adjust-
ment (for an overview see Roberts, 1995). A detailed analysis of Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo
(1983) price setting mechanisms can be found in Lombardo and Vestin (2008) and Ascari et al.
(2011).
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The optimization problem of each ﬁrm takes the form
max
Pt(i)
E
∞∑
t=0
(
βtλt
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt − ϕt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt
−φ
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt
})
,
where
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt denotes revenues and ϕt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt +
φ
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i) − 1
]2
yt refers
to costs.
The ﬁrst-order condition of this problem is
λt
{
(1− θ)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt
Pt
+ ϕtθ
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ−1
yt
Pt
− φp
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]
yt
πPt−1(i)
}
+βEt
{
λt+1φp
[
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)2
]
yt+1
}
= 0.
If φP = 0, the above expression reduces to
Pt(i) =
θ
θ − 1ϕtPt,
which points out, that in the case of costless price adjustment, a representative
intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm sets its markup of price Pt(i) over (nominal)
marginal cost ϕtPt equal to θ/(θ − 1).
2.2.2.4 Monetary Authority
Following Clarida et al. (2000), Ireland (2000), Canova (2009), and Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2010), monetary policy can be described by a modiﬁed Taylor
rule of the form:
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ ln(υt).
The monetary authority gradually adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate
in response to deviations of current gross inﬂation πt =
Pt
Pt−1 and output yt from
their steady state values, where ρr, ωπ, and ωy are the parameters of the monetary
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policy rule.3 The monetary policy shock υt follows the autoregressive process
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt,
where 0 < ρυ < 1 and ευt ∼ N(0, σ2υ).
2.2.3 Approximating and Solving the Model
Empirical investigations using DSGE models require to ﬁnd a solution to the
dynamic system. Since most dynamic models do not have an exact analytical
closed-form solution, a tractable approximation needs to be derived (see Aruoba et
al., 2006). To reduce the computational burden, the majority of studies involving
either simulation or estimation use linear approximations of the original model
(see Iskrev, 2010), which then can be solved by various solution methods for
linear diﬀerence models under rational expectations.4 An extensive coverage of
approximation techniques and solution methods for DSGE models can be found in
Canova (2007), DeJong and Dave (2007), and McCandless (2008). In the following
sections we give a short presentation of the linearized standard New Keynesian
model and its solution, while a detailed description is provided in the appendices
A and B.
2.2.3.1 Log-linear Approximation
As outlined in Zietz (2008), log-linearization allows to transform a system of
nonlinear equations into a system that is linear in terms of the log-deviations of the
underlying variables from their steady state values. To log-linearize the standard
New Keynesian model we use a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of the model
around its steady state values.5 Letting v̂art = log
(
vart
var
)
denote the log-deviation
3Note that the gross steady state level of inﬂation π is determined by the inﬂation target of
the monetary authority.
4 Although, as outlined in Kim et al. (2008), linear approximations might be suﬃciently
accurate for a wide variety of purposes, using a linear approximation to the model economy
can be inappropriate. Examples include welfare comparisons across policies that do not have
ﬁrst-order eﬀects on the model’s deterministic steady state (see Kim and Kim, 2003; An 2007;
Kim et al., 2008). DeJong and Dave (2011) provide an overview of recent nonlinear solution
methods and their use in empirical applications.
5For the ease of exposition, we assume that the inﬂation target is zero, implying a gross
steady state inﬂation rate π equal to one.
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of some variable vart from its steady state var the model can be expressed as:
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
σ
(rˆt − Etπˆt+1) ,
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 +
θ − 1
φP
(η + σ)yˆt − θ − 1
φP
(1 + η)zˆt,
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr)(ωππˆt + ωyyˆt) + vˆt,
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + εzt,
and
vˆt = ρv vˆt−1 + εvt.
The ﬁrst equation is a so-called dynamic IS curve, capturing the features of ag-
gregate demand outlined in section 2.2.1, whereas the properties of aggregate
supply are described by the second equation, usually termed as New Keynesian
Phillips curve.6 Monetary policy is characterized by the third equation, which
is a Taylor-type policy reaction function. While these equations are often re-
ferred to as “three equation New Keynesian DSGE framework” (see, for example,
Schorfheide, 2008; Woodford, 2008; Christiano et al., 2010), the last two equa-
tions complete the model, describing the ﬁrst-order autoregressive structure of the
exogenous shocks.
2.2.3.2 Solution
Since the early work of Blanchard and Kahn (1980), several techniques for solving
linear diﬀerence models under rational expectations have emerged, including the
approaches of Anderson and Moore (1985), Uhlig (1999), Klein (2000), and Sims
(2002). Although these procedures diﬀer with respect to their speciﬁc methodol-
ogy, they all allow the solution of the underlying model to be written in state space
form, which enables the use of the Kalman ﬁlter to perform a likelihood-based
analysis of DSGE models.
Employing the approach of Klein (2000) on our standard New Keynesian model
6As shown in appendix A, the dynamic IS curve can be derived from the Euler equation of
the representative household (see section 2.2.2.2), while the New Keynesian Phillips curve is
obtained from solving the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm’s optimization problem under price
adjustment costs (see section 2.2.2.3).
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leads to a solution in state space form, characterized by a state equation
st+1 = Γ0(μ)st + Γ1(μ)εt+1
and an observation equation
ft = Γ2(μ)st,
where
st =
[
rˆt−1 zˆt vˆt
]′
contains the model’s state variables, including endogenous predetermined and
exogenous variables7,
εt+1 =
[
εzt+1 εvt+1
]′
consists of the serially and mutually uncorrelated innovations of the shocks, and
ft =
[
yˆt πˆt
]′
comprises the model’s ﬂow variables. The matrices Γ0(μ),Γ1(μ), and Γ2(μ) con-
tain (functions of) the model’s parameters μ.
2.3 Taking DSGE Models to the Data
An appealing feature of DSGE models is their applicability for empirical analysis,
making them a widely used tool for empirical research in macroeconomics as
well as quantitative policy analysis and forecasting at central banks all over the
world (see Schorfheide, 2011). In this section, we brieﬂy describe three common
empirical strategies for taking DSGE models to the data: calibration, maximum
likelihood estimation, and Bayesian estimation. For a more detailed description
of empirical methods for DSGE models, we refer to Canova (2007) and DeJong
and Dave (2007).
2.3.1 Calibration
Pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1982), calibration was the most popular
method for empirical analysis based on DSGE models until the late 1990s (see
7See appendix B for details.
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Karagedikli et al., 2010). According to Kydland and Prescott (1996), “basic”
calibration in the sense of an empirical methodology involves the following ﬁve
steps:8
1. Pose an economic question. Such a question can either deal with policy
evaluation issues or with the testing and development of theory.
2. Use a “well-tested theory”, i.e., an explicit set of instructions for building a
mechanical imitation system to answer the question.
3. Construct a model economy that is appropriate to address the question.
4. Calibrate the model economy by choosing values for certain key parameters
of the underlying preferences and technologies using evidence from other
empirical studies (see also Plosser, 1989).
5. Run the experiment. For this, the state space representation derived in
the previous section can be employed to assess theoretical implications of
changes in policy or the ability of a speciﬁc model to mimic features of the
real world.
Although, as outlined in Ruge-Murcia (2007), calibration is, in general, a
useful tool for understanding the dynamic properties of DSGE models, the ini-
tial predominance of the calibration approach in the quantitative evaluation of
DSGE models was partly due to the fact that “. . . macroeconomists were unsure
about how to compute their models eﬃciently, a necessary condition to perform
likelihood-based inference. Moreover, even if economists had known how to do so,
most of the techniques required for estimating DSGE models using a likelihood
approach did not exist” (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez, 2006, p. 1).
Calibration oﬀered a solution to this problem.
2.3.2 Estimation
According to Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2006), the predominance
of calibration in empirical DSGE analysis decreased considerably in the late 1990s.
8More advanced types of calibration are, for example, based on Bayesian Monte Carlo tech-
niques, taking into account the degree of uncertainty in parameter values (see DeJong et al.,
1996).
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Advances in computer power and the development of new econometric techniques
have facilitated the estimation of DSGE models, and henceforth, as described in
Ruge-Murcia (2007, p. 2622), lead to several beneﬁts compared to calibration:
• Rather than relying on (potentially inconsistent) estimates from micro-
studies to calibrate the model, parameter estimates can be obtained by
imposing the restrictions of the full model under consideration on the data.
• Bootstrapped conﬁdence bands can be computed to quantify the degree of
estimation uncertainty of impulse-responses.
• “. . . [S]tandard tools of model selection and evaluation can be readily ap-
plied.”
As outlined in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Tovar (2009), the empirical lit-
erature features various econometric techniques for estimating DSGE models,
including generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of equilibrium re-
lationships (see Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Burnside et al., 1993), mini-
mum distance estimation based on minimizing a weighted distance between struc-
tural vector autoregressive (SVAR) and DSGE model impulse-response functions
(see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Christiano et al., 2005), maximum like-
lihood (see Altug, 1989; Leeper and Sims, 1994; Ireland, 1997), and Bayesian
estimation (see DeJong et al., 2000b; Schorfheide, 2000; Otrok, 2001). Accord-
ing to Canova (2007), a key feature distinguishing these diﬀerent approaches is
the amount of information processed. While limited-information procedures like
GMM only exploit part of the information contained in a subset of the model’s
equilibrium conditions, full-information likelihood-based methods aim at estimat-
ing the entire DSGE model simultaneously. Tovar (2009, p. 14) points out, that
“[i]t is for this reason that the most important strand of the literature has focused
on estimation methods built around the implied likelihood function derived from
the DSGE model.” According to DeJong et al. (2000b), the distinction between
maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimation given a speciﬁc model hinges crit-
ically on whether the data or the model parameters are interpreted as random
variables.
Under the classical maximum likelihood approach to inference, “. . . the param-
eters are treated as ﬁxed and the data are treated as unknown in the sense that
their probability distribution (the likelihood) is the center of focus. The question
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is whether the observed data could plausibly have come from the model under a
particular parameterization” (DeJong et al., 2000b, p. 210). Therefore, maximum
likelihood estimation seeks to determine the parameter values that maximize the
likelihood of the observed data given a speciﬁc model, where “. . . the uncertainty
regarding the speciﬁc values estimated for the parameters is conveyed by report-
ing associated standard errors” (DeJong and Dave, 2007, p. 180). To test for
the empirical plausibility of a speciﬁc model, formal hypothesis procedures can be
applied within a maximum likelihood framework (see, for example, Ireland, 2003).
Bayesian analysis takes a diﬀerent point of view, since the observed data are
treated as ﬁxed whereas the unknown parameters are regarded as random vari-
ables. According to DeJong and Dave (2007), this probabilistic interpretation of
the model parameters allows for the formal incorporation of a priori information in
form of prior distributions speciﬁed for the parameters. These prior distributions
“. . . either reﬂect subjective opinions or summarize information derived from data
sets not included in the estimation sample” (Del Negro and Schorfheide, 2008, p.
1). Therefore, Bayesian estimation is sometimes described as a bridge between
estimation and calibration (see, for example, Kremer et al., 2006; Walsh, 2010),
since it combines the likelihood function, formed by the structure of the model
and the data, with the prior distributions (by employing Bayes’s theorem) to con-
struct a posterior distribution for the parameters of interest. Once the posterior
distribution of the parameters is derived, inference like point estimation or model
comparison can be performed (see Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2010).
2.4 Conclusion
DSGEmodels have become a standard tool of modern macroeconomics, capable to
bridge the gap between micro-founded macroeconomic theory and the data. This
appealing feature of DSGE models made them a widely used tool for empirical
research in macroeconomics as well as policy analysis and forecasting in central
banking (see Schorfheide, 2011).
In this chapter we describe the general structure of DSGE models and appro-
priate steps to take these models to the data. In particular, we consider a standard
New Keynesian model and expound the basic procedure for setting up and solv-
ing such a prototype DSGE model. Finally, we brieﬂy discuss three common
20
strategies used in the empirical analysis of DSGE models: calibration, maximum
likelihood estimation, and Bayesian estimation.
Appendices
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Appendix A
Equilibrium Conditions
The appendix presents the equation system of the standard New Keynesian DSGE
model.
A.1 The Economic Environment
• Households:
The representative household chooses {ct, lt, Bt}∞t=0 to maximize utility
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
c1−σt
1− σ − χ
l1+ηt
1 + η
)
,
subject to the budget constraint
Bt−1 +Wtlt +Dt
Pt
≥ ct + Bt/rt
Pt
.
Further, following Buiter and Sibert (2007), we prevent the household from
excessive borrowing by imposing the no-Ponzi-game condition
lim
t→∞
Bt
t∏
s=0
1
rs
≥ 0.
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Accordingly, the Lagrangian can be written as follows:
max
ct,lt,Bt
Λ = E
∞∑
t=0
[
βt
(
c1−σt
1− σ − χ
l1+ηt
1 + η
)
−βtλt
(
ct +
Bt/rt
Pt
− Bt−1
Pt
− Wtlt
Pt
− Dt
Pt
)]
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are obtained by setting the partial derivatives of
Λ with respect to ct, lt, Bt, and λt equal to zero, yielding
Λct = c
−σ
t − λt = 0, (2.1)
Λlt = −χlηt + λt
Wt
Pt
= 0, (2.2)
ΛBt =
λt
Pt
− βrtEt
(
λt+1
Pt+1
)
= 0, (2.3)
and
Λλt = ct +
Bt/rt
Pt
− Bt−1
Pt
− Wtlt
Pt
− Dt
Pt
= 0. (2.4)
Finally, we impose the standard transversality conditions to guarantee that
bonds do not grow too quickly:
lim
t→∞
βtλt
Bt
Pt
= 0.
• Finished goods-producing ﬁrms:
The representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm seeks to maximize its prof-
its
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
subject to the constant returns to scale technology
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
.
Therefore, the ﬁrm’s problem can be written as
max
yt(i)
Πt = Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di,
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which leads to the following ﬁrst-order condition characterizing the demand
for intermediate goods:
∂Πt
∂yt(i)
= yt(i)−
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt = 0.
By plugging this expression into the constant elasticity of scale (CES) ag-
gregator for intermediate goods we obtain the price aggregator
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
]1/(1−θ)
.
• Intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms:
The typical intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm optimizes along two dimen-
sions. First, each ﬁrm wants to minimize its costs subject to the production
technology. The Lagrangian of this problem can be written in real terms as
min
lt(i)
Λ =
(
Wt
Pt
)
lt(i)− ϕt[ztlt(i)− yt(i)],
where
ln(zt) = ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt. (2.5)
Therefore, we have the ﬁrst-order conditions
Λlt(i) =
Wt
Pt
− ϕtzt = 0 (2.6)
and
Λϕt = ztlt(i)− yt(i) = 0. (2.7)
Second, each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm seeks to maximize its present
discounted value of proﬁts
E
∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Dt(i)/Pt],
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by choosing {yt(i), Pt(i)}∞t=0 subject to the demand for intermediate goods
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt.
We can use the latter expression to rewrite the real value of dividends
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt(i)− ϕtyt(i)− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt (2.8)
as
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt − ϕt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt − φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt. (2.8
′)
Therefore, the ﬁrms’ intertemporal optimization problem can be written as
max
Pt(i)
E
∞∑
t=0
(
βtλt
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt − ϕt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt
−φ
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt
})
,
leading to the following ﬁrst-order condition:
λt
{
(1− θ)
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt
Pt
+ ϕtθ
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ−1
yt
Pt
− φp
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]
yt
πPt−1(i)
}
+βEt
{
λt+1φp
[
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)
− 1
] [
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)2
]
yt+1
}
= 0.
(2.9)
• The monetary authority sets the gross nominal interest rate according to
the modiﬁed Taylor rule
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+(1−ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ln(υt), (2.10)
where
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt. (2.11)
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A.2 The Nonlinear System
A.2.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
The model is characterized by the nonlinear diﬀerence equations (2.1) − (2.7),
(2.8′), (2.9)− (2.11). To close the model, two additional steps are required. First,
we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, where all intermediate goods-producing
ﬁrms make identical decisions. This implies Pt(i) = Pt, yt(i) = yt, lt(i) = lt,
and Dt(i) = Dt for all i ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2, .... Second, the market clearing
condition for the bond market, Bt = Bt−1 = 0 must hold for all t = 0, 1, 2, .... By
substituting these conditions into (2.1)− (2.11) we obtain:
c−σt = λt, (2.1)
χlηt = λt
Wt
Pt
, (2.2)
λt
Pt
= βrtEt
(
λt+1
Pt+1
)
, (2.3)
ct =
Wtlt
Pt
+
Dt
Pt
, (2.4)
ln(zt) = ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (2.5)
Wt
Pt
= ϕtzt, (2.6)
yt = ztlt, (2.7)
Dt
Pt
= yt − ϕtyt − φP
2
[
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
]2
yt, (2.8
′)
λt
[
(1− θ)yt + ϕtθyt − φp
(
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
)
Pt
πPt−1
yt
]
= −βEt
[
λt+1φp
(
Pt+1
πPt
− 1
)[
Pt+1
πPt
]
yt+1
]
,
(2.9)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ ln(υt), (2.10)
and
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt. (2.11)
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A.2.2 Change of Variables and System Reduction
We can rewrite the nonlinear system by deﬁning πt =
Pt
Pt−1 , wt =
Wt
Pt
, and dt =
Dt
Pt
.
In terms of these re-deﬁned variables (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4), (2.5)− (2.7), (2.8′),
and (2.9)− (2.11) become:
c−σt = λt, (2.1)
χlηt = λtwt, (2.2)
λt = βrtEt
(
λt+1
πt+1
)
, (2.3)
ct = wtlt + dt, (2.4)
ln(zt) = ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (2.5)
wt = ϕtzt, (2.6)
yt = ztlt, (2.7)
dt = yt − ϕtyt − φP
2
[πt
π
− 1
]2
yt, (2.8
′)
λt
[
(1− θ)yt + ϕtθyt − φp
(πt
π
− 1
)(πt
π
)
yt
]
= −βEt
[
λt+1φp
(πt+1
π
− 1
) [πt+1
π
]
yt+1
]
,
(2.9)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ ln(υt), (2.10)
and
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt. (2.11)
Following King and Watson (2002), we apply a system reduction and use
equation (2.1), (2.2), (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8′) to eliminate lt, wt, dt, and ϕt. The
reduced system can be written as
c−σt = βrtEt
(
c−σt+1
πt+1
)
, (2.3′)
yt = ct +
φP
2
[πt
π
− 1
]2
yt, (2.4
′)
ln(zt) = ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (2.5)
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c−σt
[
(1− θ)yt + χ
(
yt
zt
)1+η
cσt θ − φp
(πt
π
− 1
)(πt
π
)
yt
]
= −βEt
[
c−σt+1φp
(πt+1
π
− 1
) [πt+1
π
]
yt+1
]
,
(2.9′)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ ln(υt), (2.10)
and
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt. (2.11)
A.3 Steady States
In absence of the two shocks, i.e., εzt = εvt = 0 for all t = 0, 1, 2..., the economy
converges to a steady state in which each of the six variables of the reduced system
is constant. We use (2.5) and (2.11) to solve for
z = 1,
v = 1.
By assuming that the monetary authority targets zero inﬂation, implying a gross
steady state inﬂation rate π equal to one, (2.3′) can be used to solve for
r =
1
β
.
Use (2.4′) to solve for
c = y.
Finally use (2.4′), (2.5), and (2.9′) to solve for
y =
[
1
χ
(
θ − 1
θ
)] 1
η+σ
.
A.4 The Linearized System
The nonlinear system (2.3′), (2.4′), (2.5), (2.9′), (2.10), and (2.11) can be linearized
by taking a log-linear approximation of the model at steady state values. For a
detailed description of logarithmic approximations, we refer to Canova (2007),
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DeJong and Dave (2007), and Zietz (2008). Let v̂art ≡ log
(
vart
var
)
denote the
log-deviation of some variable vart from its steady state var, where log
(
vart
var
) ≈
vart−var
var
. A ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of equation (2.3′) − (2.11) at the
steady state gives:
cˆt = Etcˆt+1 − 1
σ
(rˆt − Etπˆt+1) , (2.3′)
yˆt = cˆt, (2.4
′)
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + εzt, (2.5)
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 +
(
θ − 1
φP
)
(σcˆt + ηyˆt)− (θ − 1)(1 + η)
φP
zˆt, (2.9
′)
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr)(ωππˆt + ωyyˆt) + vˆt, (2.10)
and
vˆt = ρvvˆt−1 + εvt. (2.11)
By using (2.4′) we can rewrite the linearized system as
yˆt = Etyˆt+1 − 1
σ
(rˆt − Etπˆt+1) , (2.3′′)
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + εzt, (2.5)
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 +
θ − 1
φP
(η + σ)yˆt − θ − 1
φP
(1 + η)zˆt, (2.9
′′)
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr)(ωππˆt + ωyyˆt) + vˆt, (2.10)
and
vˆt = ρvvˆt−1 + εvt. (2.11)
Appendix B
Solving the Model
B.1 Klein’s method
A solution of the model can be obtained by applying the approach of Klein (2000)
for solving linear diﬀerence models under rational expectations. Therefore, the
model is brought into the form:
AEts
0
t+1 = Bs
0
t + Cζt (2.12)
ζt = Pζt−1 + εt, (2.13)
where A, B, and C are coeﬃcient matrices, P contains the persistence param-
eters of the shocks, ζt consists of the model’s exogenous forcing variables while
the serially and mutually uncorrelated innovations are included in εt (see DeJong
and Dave, 2007). Similar to the approach of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) s0t can
be separated into
s0t = [s
0
1t s
0
2t]
′,
letting s01t denote a vector of predetermined and s
0
2t a vector of non-predetermined
variables, which implies that:
Etst+1 = [s
0
1t+1 Ets
0
2t+1]
′.
The solution method relies on decoupling the system into unstable and stable
portions, using a complex generalized Schur decomposition, and then solving the
two components in turn. If the number of unstable generalized eigenvalues of
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A and B is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables, the system is
said to be saddle-path stable and a unique solution exists. In contrast to the
method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980), which relies on a Jordan decomposition,
Klein’s procedure does not require invertibility of matrix A. The subsequent
sections follow the expositions in Klein (2000), DeJong and Dave (2007), and the
technical notes of Ireland (2011).1
B.2 Solution
Let
s0t =
[
rˆt−1 yˆt πˆt
]′
,
ζt =
[
zˆt vˆt
]′
,
P =
[
ρz 0
0 ρv
]
,
and
εt =
[
εzt εvt
]′
.
Then the coeﬃcient matrices A, B, and C of the model are:
A =
⎡⎢⎣ −
1
σ
1 1
σ
0 0 −β
1 0 0
⎤⎥⎦ ,
B =
⎡⎢⎣ 0 1 00 θ−1φP (η + σ) −1
ρr (1− ρr)ωy (1− ρr)ωπ
⎤⎥⎦ ,
and
C =
⎡⎢⎣ 0 0−θ−1φP (1 + η) 0
0 1
⎤⎥⎦ .
Following Klein (2000), we apply the complex generalized Schur decomposition
1The technical notes of Ireland (2011) are available at
http://www.irelandp.com/progs/nkp.zip.
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of A and B, which is given by
QAZ = S
and
QBZ = T
where Q and Z are unitary and S and T are upper triangular matrices. The
generalized eigenvalues of B and A can be recovered as the ratios of the diagonal
elements of T and S:
λ(B,A) = {tii/sii|i = 1, 2, 3}.
The matrices Q,Z, S, and T can always be arranged so that the generalized
eigenvalues are ordered in increasing value in moving from left to right. Note
that one variable in the vector s0t is predetermined and two variables are non-
predetermined. Given this setup, Blanchard and Kahn (1980) prove the following
three propositions.
• PROPOSITION 1: If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is
equal to the number of non-predetermined variables, then there is a unique
solution to the system.
• PROPOSITION 2: If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is
greater than the number of non-predetermined variables, then there is no
solution to the system.
• PROPOSITION 3: If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is less
than the number of non-predetermined variables, then there is an inﬁnite
number of solutions.
We proceed under the case of saddle-path stability, assuming exactly two gener-
alized eigenvalues to lie outside the unit circle and therefore allow for a unique
solution. The matrices Q,Z, S, and T are portioned, so that
Q =
[
Q1
Q2
]
,
34
where Q1 is 1× 3 and Q2 is 2× 3 and
Z =
[
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
,
S =
[
S11 S12
0(2×1) S22
]
,
T =
[
T11 T12
0(2×1) T22
]
,
where Z11, S11, and T11 are 1× 1 and Z12, S12, and T12 are 1× 2, Z21 is 2× 1,
and Z22, S22, and T22 are 2× 2. To “triangularize” the system we ﬁrst deﬁne the
vector of auxiliary variables as
s1t = Z
Hs0t ,
letting ZH denote the conjugate transpose of matrix Z, so that
s1t =
[
s11t
s12t
]
,
where
s11t = Z
H
11rˆt−1 + Z
H
21
[
yˆt
πˆt
]
(2.14)
is 1× 1 and
s12t = Z
H
12rˆt−1 + Z
H
22
[
yˆt
πˆt
]
(2.15)
is 2 × 1. Since Z is unitary, ZHZ = I or ZH = Z−1 and hence s0t = Zs1t . We
use this property to rewrite (2.12) as
AZEts
1
t+1 = BZs
1
t + Cζt.
Premultiplying this equation by Q gives[
S11 S12
0 S22
]
Et
[
s11t+1
s12t+1
]
=
[
T11 T12
0 T22
][
s11t
s12t
]
+
[
Q1
Q2
]
Cζt,
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or in matrix partitions,
S11Ets
1
1t+1 + S12Ets
1
2t+1 = T11s
1
1t + T12s
1
2t +Q1Cζt (2.16)
and
S22Ets
1
2t+1 = T22s
1
2t +Q2Cζt. (2.17)
Since the generalized eigenvalues of A and B corresponding to the diagonal ele-
ments of S22 and T22 all lie outside the unit circle, (2.17) can be solved forward
to obtain
s12t = −T−122 Rζt,
where the 2× 2 matrix R is given by “reshaping”2
vec(R) = vec
∞∑
j=0
(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j =
∞∑
j=0
vec[(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j]
=
∞∑
j=0
[P j ⊗ (S22T−122 )j ]vec(Q2C) =
∞∑
j=0
[P ⊗ (S22T−122 )]jvec(Q2C)
= [I(4×4) − P ⊗ (S22T−122 )]−1vec(Q2C).
Using this result together with equation (2.15) allows to solve for[
yˆt
πˆt
]
= −(ZH22)−1ZH12rˆt−1 − (ZH22)−1T−122 Rζt. (2.18)
Under the assumption that Z is unitary, i.e.,[
ZH11 Z
H
21
ZH12 Z
H
22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ZH
[
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
=
[
I(1×1) 0(1×22)
0(2×1) I(2×2)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
,
we ﬁnd
ZH12Z11 + Z
H
22Z21 = 0,
2As outlined in Hamilton (1994a) and DeJong and Dave (2007) the appearance of the vec
operator accommodates the VAR speciﬁcation for ζt. We use the relationship between vec
operator and Kronecker product: vec[(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j ] = [(P j)′ ⊗ (S22T−122 )j ]vec(Q2C). Note
that P ′ = P , since P is a diagonal matrix.
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−(ZH22)−1ZH12 = Z21Z−111 ,
ZH12Z12 + Z
H
22Z22 = I,
and
(ZH22)
−1 = Z22 + (ZH22)
−1ZH12Z12 = Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12,
which allows to rewrite (2.18) as[
yˆt
πˆt
]
= M1rˆt−1 +M2ζt, (2.18′)
with
M1 = Z21Z
−1
11
and
M2 = −[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 R.
Now we can solve (2.14) for s11t
s11t = (Z
H
11 + Z
H
21Z21Z
−1
11 )rˆt−1 − ZH21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 Rζt,
using
ZH11Z11 + Z
H
21Z21 = I,
ZH11 + Z
H
21Z21Z
−1
11 = Z
−1
11 ,
and
ZH21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12] = ZH21Z22 − ZH21Z21Z−111 Z12 = −Z−111 Z12,
so that
s11t = Z
−1
11 rˆt−1 + Z
−1
11 Z12T
−1
22 Rζt.
If we plug this expression result into equation (2.16) we get
rˆt = M3rˆt−1 +M4ζt, (2.19)
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where
M3 = Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11
and
M4 = Z11S
−1
11 (T11Z
−1
11 Z12T
−1
22 R+Q1C + S12T
−1
22 RP − T12T−122 R)− Z12T−122 RP.
Hence, the model’s solution can be written compactly in state space form by
combining (2.13), (2.18′), and (2.19) as
st+1 = Γ0st + Γ1εt+1, (2.20)
and
ft = Γ2st, (2.21)
where
st =
[
rˆt−1 zˆt vˆt
]′
,
ft =
[
yˆt πˆt
]′
,
εt =
[
εzt εvt
]′
,
Γ0 =
[
M3 M4
0(2×1) P
]
,
Γ1 =
[
0(1×2)
I(2×2)
]
,
and
Γ2 =
[
M1 M2
]
.
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Chapter 3
Testing for Parameter Stability in
DSGE Models. The Cases of
France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain
This chapter is joint work with Ju¨rgen Jerger. It presents an extended version
of Jerger and Ro¨he (2012). We expand the model presented in chapter 2 by
adding endogenous capital formation, capital adjustment costs, as well as prefer-
ence shocks and a shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment. Furthermore, we
introduce real money balances into the household’s utility function, to generate
an explicit role for money other than that of a pure unit of account.
3.1 Introduction
DSGE models emerged as a standard tool of modern macroeconometrics. The
attractiveness of this class of models lies in the symbiosis of theoretical macroe-
conomic models with the recent developments in macroeconometric analysis (see
DeJong and Dave, 2007). As outlined in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010), consid-
erable advances made in both theoretical and empirical DSGE research led to
a progressive discipline, reshaping our thinking about macroeconomic modeling
and economic policy advise. We contribute to this area of research by employing
an econometric technique, recently introduced by Inoue and Rossi (2011), to test
39
40
for parameter stability in a New Keynesian model estimated for the four largest
countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU): France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain. Therefore, we add to a vast literature that developed around the topic of
economic integration within Europe. One of the important aspects of this ongoing,
gradual integration process was the introduction of a common monetary policy
in the EMU. Evaluating the overall macroeconomic performance in 2008, the Eu-
ropean Commission (2008) summarizes that the record after almost one decade
of the EMU looks quite favorable. More detailed analyses of European economic
integration can be grouped into four distinct strands of literature. The ﬁrst looks
at the implications of a common currency for other economic institutions like
regulation or wage setting (see, for example, von Hagen, 1999; Cukierman and
Lippi, 2001; Jerger, 2002; Fratzscher and Stracca, 2009). A second one analyzes
the (change of) diﬀerent transmission channels of monetary policy (Angeloni and
Ehrmann, 2006; Hughes Hallett and Richter, 2009; Jarocinski, 2010). Thirdly,
the availability of micro-data, especially for loans and prices, led to a large lit-
erature studying the economically convergence across countries due to monetary
union (Fischer, 2012; Popov and Ongena, 2011). A fourth and relatively re-
cent literature uses DSGE models to characterize the euro area or the economies
in this region within some well-deﬁned theoretical framework (see, for example,
Smets and Wouters, 2003; Coenen and Wieland, 2005; Casares, 2007; Sahuc and
Smets, 2008).
In this chapter we contribute to the last strand and add the dimensions pa-
rameter stability over time and cross country comparisons. Therefore we employ
the ESS procedure (“Estimate of Set of Stable parameters”) introduced by Inoue
and Rossi (2011). The ESS procedure allows to pin down the subset of parameters
of a model that are stable for an unknown break date. Following Inoue and Rossi
(2011, p. 9), “. . . our analysis focuses on the situation in which there is a single,
unanticipated and once for all shift in some of the parameters of the structural
model at an unknown time, and in which there is an immediate convergence to a
rational-expectations equilibrium after the regime change.”
In the case of France, Germany, and Italy our results point to structural breaks
after the beginning of the second stage of EMU in the mid-1990s, while the esti-
mates for Spain show a signiﬁcant break just before the start of the third stage
in 1998. We identify signiﬁcant changes in monetary policy behavior for France,
Italy, and Spain, whereas monetary policy in Germany appears to be stable over
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time. We also ﬁnd signiﬁcant declines in capital and price adjustment costs in
France, Italy, and Spain.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
model. Section 3.3 discusses data issues. Section 3.4 outlines the ESS procedure.
Section 3.5 presents the results. Section 3.6 concludes. Technical details of the
model setup, its solution, and the construction of the likelihood appear in the
appendices.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview
The model we use for France, Germany, Italy, and Spain is similar to the stan-
dard closed-economy New Keynesian framework developed in Ireland (2003). The
model economy features a representative household, a representative ﬁnished
goods-producing ﬁrm, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1], and a monetary policy authority. During each period t = 0, 1, 2, ...,
the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms owned by the household produce a dis-
tinct, perishable intermediate good, also indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The solution
requires these ﬁrms to be treated symmetrically.
We choose a closed-economy approach, since openness complicates the mod-
eling of a capital formation process, which is a central part of the present model
(see also the discussion by DiCecio and Nelson, 2007, who apply a closed-economy
model to the UK, as well as the remarks of Obstfeld, 2002, and Neiss and Nelson,
2003 concerning the choice of closed-economy models).
We next characterize the decisions taken by households and ﬁrms before look-
ing at the behavior of the monetary authority and sketching the solution of the
model.1
3.2.2 Households
The representative household enters period t holding Mt−1, Bt−1, and kt units of
money, one-period bonds and physical capital. In addition to this endowment,
the household receives a lump sum transfer Tt from the monetary authority at
1 Appendices C and D provide a summary of the complete model and its solution.
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the beginning of period t. The household receives Wtlt + Qtkt total nominal
factor payments from supplying lt(i) units of labor and kt(i) units of capital to
each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm i ∈ [0, 1], letting Wt and Qt denote the
nominal wage rate for labor and the nominal rental rate for capital, respectively.
For all t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the household’s choices of lt(i) and kt(i) must satisfy
lt =
∫ 1
0
lt(i)di,
where lt denotes total hours worked
2, and
kt =
∫ 1
0
kt(i)di.
Finally, the household earns nominal dividends
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)di
from the ownership of the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms. Each source of
income is measured in units of money.
The household uses its funds to purchase new bonds at the nominal cost Bt/rt,
where rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate between time periods, or output
from the ﬁnal goods sector at price Pt. This good can be used for consumption
ct or investment it. In the latter case, quadratic capital adjustment cost given by
φK
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt
accrue to the household. The parameter φK ≥ 0 governs the size of these adjust-
ment costs. The capital accumulation process is given by
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit, (3.1)
with 0 < δ < 1 denoting the rate of depreciation and xt representing a shock to
the marginal eﬃciency of investment. This shock is speciﬁed as
ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + εxt, (3.2)
2The endowment of time is normalized to one.
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with 0 < ρx < 1 and εxt ∼ N(0, σ2x) as introduced by Greenwood et al. (1988).
The budget constraint of the representative household is given by
Mt−1 + Tt +Bt−1 +Wtlt +Qtkt +Dt
Pt
≥ ct+it+φK
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt+
Bt/rt +Mt
Pt
.
In addition, we impose a no-Ponzi-game condition to prevent the household from
excessive borrowing. Given these constraints, the household maximizes the stream
of expected utility
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
at
[
γ
γ − 1
]
ln
[
c
(γ−1)/γ
t + e
1/γ
t (Mt/Pt)
(γ−1)/γ
]
+ χ ln(1− lt)
}
,
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor and χ > 0 measures the relative weight of
leisure in the utility function. Further, it can be shown that γ is the absolute value
of the interest rate elasticity of money demand. The utility function contains two
preference shocks, which are both assumed to follow an autoregressive process. In
particular,
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat, (3.3)
whith 0 < ρa < 1 and εat ∼ N(0, σ2a) denotes an IS shock (McCallum and Nel-
son, 1999), whereas
ln(et) = (1− ρe) ln(e) + ρe ln(et−1) + εet (3.4)
represents a money demand shock with 0 < ρe < 1, e > 0 and εet ∼ N(0, σ2e).
3.2.3 Firms
The ﬁnal good yt is produced by a ﬁrm, acting in a perfectly competitive market,
which combines the intermediate goods yt(i) according to the constant returns to
scale technology
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
,
where θ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
yt(i). With Pt(i) denoting the price of intermediate good i, proﬁt maximization
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leads to the following demand function for intermediate goods
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt,
where
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
]1/(1−θ)
.
Each intermediate good i is produced by a single monopolistically competitive
ﬁrm according to the constant returns to scale technology
yt(i) ≤ kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α,
where 1 > α > 0 represents the elasticity of output with respect to capital. The
technology shock zt follows the autoregressive process
ln(zt) = (1− ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt (3.5)
with 1 > ρz > 0, z > 0 and εzt ∼ N(0, σ2z). Although each ﬁrm i enjoys some
market power on its own output, it is assumed to act as a price taker in the factor
markets. Furthermore, the adjustment of its nominal price Pt(i) is assumed to
be costly, where the cost function is convex in the size of the price adjustment.
Following Rotemberg (1982), these costs are deﬁned as
φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt,
where φP ≥ 0 governs the size of price adjustment costs and π denotes the gross
steady state rate of inﬂation targeted by the monetary authority. Due to these
convex adjustment costs, the ﬁrm’s optimization problem becomes dynamic. It
chooses lt(i), kt(i), yt(i), and Pt(i) to maximize its total market value
E
∞∑
t=0
βtλt
[
Dt(i)
Pt
]
subject to the demand function for intermediate goods, where λt measures the
period tmarginal utility to the representative household provided by an additional
unit of proﬁts. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts distributed to the household as dividends, are
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deﬁned in real terms by
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt(i)− Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt.
3.2.4 Monetary policy
Similar to Ireland (2001), monetary policy is represented by a generalized Taylor
rule of the form
ln(rt/r) = ωτ ln(τt/τ) + ωπ ln(πt/π) + ωy ln(yt/y) + ln(υt),
encompassing the standard Taylor (1993) rule (when ωτ = 0), where the monetary
authority changes interest rates in response to inﬂation and output deviations.3 If
ωτ is non-zero, monetary policy can be considered to inﬂuence a linear combination
of the interest rate rt and the money growth rate τt = Mt/Mt−1 in response to
deviations of gross inﬂation and detrended output from their steady state values.4
The latter speciﬁcation allows for two alternative interpretations. On the one
hand, the central bank responds to money growth because it wishes to protect
the economy from the eﬀects of money demand shocks, on the other hand, the
monetary authority reacts since money growth is a predictor of future inﬂation
(see Christensen and Dib, 2008) and has a predictive value beyond the other
variables contained in the Taylor (1993) rule.
The monetary policy shock υt follows the autoregressive process
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt, (3.6)
where 0 < ρυ < 1 and ευt ∼ N(0, σ2υ).
This characterization of the monetary authority does not even ask the question
of optimal monetary policy. Being aware that there are a lot of alternative speci-
ﬁcations of monetary reaction functions and that it might be doubtful to assume
an identical speciﬁcation of the monetary policy function for the four economies
under consideration we would like to stress that we are much more interested
3The above Taylor rule is a simpliﬁed version of the monetary policy rule presented in chapter
2 with ρr = 0, i.e., no interest smoothing.
4Note that the steady state money growth rate τ is assumed to be determined by the monetary
authority.
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in examining the statistical relationship between short term interest rates, inﬂa-
tion, money growth, and the output gap in four diﬀerent countries than in issues
regarding the speciﬁcation of monetary policy.
3.2.5 Solution and Estimation
The model is characterized by a set of nonlinear diﬀerence equations, namely the
ﬁrst-order conditions for the three agents’ problems, the laws of motion for the
ﬁve exogenous shocks, and the monetary policy rule. Two additional steps are
required to close the model. First, to get from sectoral to aggregate variables,
symmetric behavior within the intermediate sector is assumed, implying Pt(i) =
Pt, yt(i) = yt, lt(i) = lt, kt(i) = kt, and Dt(i) = Dt for all i ∈ [0, 1]. Second, the
market clearing conditions for both the money market Mt = Mt−1 + Tt and the
bond market Bt = Bt−1 = 0 must hold for all t = 0, 1, 2....
Since the model is nonlinear, no exact analytical closed-form solution exists
in general. An approximation is obtained by computing the steady state, log-
linearizing the system around the steady state, and then applying the method
of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) to solve linear diﬀerence models under rational
expectations (see appendices C and D). The solution takes on the form of a state
space representation with a state equation
st+1 = Γ0(μ)st + Γ1(μ)εt+1
and an observation equation
ft = Γ2(μ)st,
where the vector st contains the model’s state variables including the current
capital stock, lagged real balances and the ﬁve exogenous shocks. The vector εt+1
consists of the mutually as well as serially uncorrelated innovations εat+1, εet+1,
εxt+1, εzt+1, ευt+1 while the vector ft comprises the model’s ﬂow variables including
current values of consumption, investment, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate.
The matrices Γ0(μ), Γ1(μ), and Γ2(μ) contain (functions of) the parameters μ
of the model. These parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood. As
outlined in Canova (2007, p. 123), “. . . the likelihood function of a state space
model can be conveniently expressed in terms of one-step-ahead forecast errors,
conditional on the initial observations, and of their recursive variance, both of
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which can be obtained with the Kalman ﬁlter.”5 Because likelihoods can have
several peaks we use multiple starting values as well as diﬀerent numerical search
algorithms to circumvent stalling at a local peak.6
3.3 Data
To estimate the structural parameters of the model we use French, German, Ital-
ian, and Spanish quarterly (seasonally adjusted) data for consumption, invest-
ment, money balances, inﬂation, and the interest rate.7 While French, German,
and Italian time series data run from 1980:Q1 to 2008:Q3, we decided to follow
Burrriel et al. (2010) and drop the data before 1987:Q1 for Spain because the
changes in the structure of the Spanish economy were too substantial in the early
1980s. Consumption and investment are measured by real personal consumption
and real gross ﬁxed capital formation in per capita terms. Real money balances
are constructed by dividing the monetary aggregate M3 (again per capita) by
the consumer price index, which we use to construct a measure of inﬂation. The
interest rate is measured by the three month money market rate.8
Following Fagan et al. (2005), we deal with the break in the series for Ger-
many due to re-uniﬁcation by re-scaling the West German series for consumption,
investment, and money prior to re-uniﬁcation by the ratio of the values for West
Germany and Germany at re-uniﬁcation. We detrend the time series for (logs
of) consumption, investment and M3 applying the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ﬁlter,
although we are aware of the potential problem of spuriousness, as pointed out in
DeJong and Dave (2007) and Canova and Ferroni (2011).9
Despite its relative simplicity the model contains a large number of parameters
that are diﬃcult to estimate precisely on only ﬁve time series. Hence, a number
of parameters had to be ﬁxed prior to estimation. The value of χ is set to 1.5
5For a detailed description of the Kalman ﬁlter we refer to appendix E.
6Therefore, we implement Christopher Sims’ hybrid optimization algorithm “csminwel”,
which combines the derivative-based Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shannon (BFGS) method with
a simplex algorithm (see DeJong and Dave, 2007 and Heer and Maussner, 2009 for details). The
“csminwel” program is available at http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/optimize/.
7Since the model contains as many structural shocks as observable variables the problem of
stochastic singularity is avoided (see Ingram, Kocherlakota and Savin, 1994).
8Appendix F presents the data sources.
9To facilitate the process of parameter estimation, we follow DeJong and Dave (2007, Chap-
ter 11.2.5) and perform further data alignment by scaling the ﬁltered series using their (relative)
means.
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which implies that the representative household’s labor supply in the steady state
amounts to one-third of its time. In addition, the depreciation rate δ is set to
0.025, corresponding to an annual depreciation rate of about 10 percent and θ
is ﬁxed at 6, implying a steady state markup of prices over marginal cost of 20
percent. Lastly, we set the elasticities of output with respect to capital of each
country equal to their respective average capital income share, calculated from
OECD data. The steady state money growth rate of each country is set equal to
the average rate of inﬂation for the whole sample under consideration.
3.4 Estimating the Set of Stable Parameters: The
ESS Procedure
In this section we outline the ESS procedure developed by Inoue and Rossi (2011),
which allows to identify the subset of parameters of a model that are stable over
time. They propose the following recursive procedure. First, test the joint null
hypothesis that all parameters are stable, using a consistent test for structural
breaks. Following Inoue and Rossi (2011), we employ Andrews’ (1993) Quandt
Likelihood Ratio (QLR) stability test. If the null hypothesis is not rejected, then
all the parameters belong to the set of stable parameters. If it is, the p-values of
the individual test statistics are calculated to test whether each of the parameters
is stable. Then the parameter with the lowest p-value is eliminated from the set of
stable parameters, since this is the one that is most likely to be unstable. Second,
it is tested whether the remaining parameters are jointly stable. If they are, then
the set of stable parameters includes those parameters; otherwise, eliminate the
parameter with the second lowest p-value from the set, and continue this procedure
until the joint test on the remaining parameters does not reject stability.
Two speciﬁc features of the ESS procedure have to be emphasized:
(i) The individual tests do not rely on the assumption that the other parameters
are constant over time.
”
If the parameters that are assumed to be constant
are in reality time-varying, [a “one at a time” approach] may incorrectly
attribute the time variation to the wrong source“ (Inoue and Rossi, 2011, p.
1186). Therefore, the individual tests allow all the other parameters to be
time-varying.
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(ii) The ESS approach overcomes the problem of size distortions, which arises
“... in existing tests for structural breaks when used repeatedly to test struc-
tural changes in more than one subset of parameters” (Inoue and Rossi, 2011,
p. 1203).10
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Full Sample Estimates
Here we ﬁrst report the estimates for the whole sample before moving to the
identiﬁcation of parameter instabilities in section 3.5.2.
For each country table 3.1 presents the full sample maximum likelihood es-
timates of the parameters as well as the respective standard errors. The latter
are computed using a parametric bootstrapping technique as in Cho and Moreno
(2006) or Ireland (2007). According to Ireland (2007), this procedure simulates
the estimated model for each country to generate 1000 samples of artiﬁcial data
for real personal consumption, real gross ﬁxed capital formation, real money bal-
ances, inﬂation, and the short term interest rate, each containing the same number
of observations as the original samples of the four EMU countries, and then re-
estimates the model 1000 times using these artiﬁcial data sets. For a detailed
description of the parametric bootstrapping analysis we refer to Efron and Tib-
shirani (1993). The absolute value of the maximized log likelihood function is
indicated by |L|.
To compare parameter estimates of the full samples across countries, we em-
ploy the Andrews and Fair (1988) Wald test. The Wald statistic can be written
as
W =
(ai − aj)2
σ2ai + σ
2
aj
,
where a and σa denote the point estimate of a parameter and the associated boot-
strapped standard deviation, respectively, for country i, j ∈ {France, Germany,
Italy, Spain}, i 	= j. The test statistic W follows a χ2(1) distribution under the
null hypothesis of ai = aj. For a detailed discussion on the use of the bootstrap
10For a more detailed description of the methodology, including a formal description of the
algorithm and proofs, we refer to Inoue and Rossi (2011) as well as to their not-for-publication
appendix; see http://econ.duke.edu/ brossi/NotforPublicationAppendixInoueRossi2009.pdf.
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France Germany Italy Spain
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
β 0.9905 0.0112 0.9921 0.0008 0.9998 0.0410 0.9932 0.0277
γ 0.0152 0.0091 0.0738 0.0079 0.0067 0.0157 0.0366 0.0334
φP 10.2132 2.7778 13.9927 0.3103 46.7997 14.2531 27.0936 6.9245
φK 26.5408 4.1028 30.2681 0.4301 35.4014 6.2435 20.5672 3.4103
ωτ 0.2009 0.0411 0.4362 0.0078 0.5647 0.1378 0.3163 0.0832
ωπ 0.9391 0.1491 1.6001 0.0020 1.0750 0.4163 0.8161 0.0901
ωy -0.1011 0.0842 -0.0024 0.0039 -0.1673 0.1378 -0.0711 0.0495
e 4.1884 0.0202 2.9638 0.0001 3.7456 0.9409 4.3559 0.0056
z 4214.3794 0.0001 4184.4958 0.0001 3189.9297 0.0080 1866.9879 0.0001
ρa 0.9678 0.0357 0.9003 0.0025 0.8587 0.0782 0.9731 0.0221
ρe 0.8778 0.0552 0.8796 0.0023 0.9877 0.0350 0.9360 0.0373
ρx 0.9615 0.0381 0.9061 0.0008 0.9873 0.0386 0.9294 0.1063
ρz 0.9125 0.0318 0.9162 0.0019 0.9871 0.0626 0.9210 0.0518
ρυ 0.4826 0.0096 0.2397 0.0108 0.1425 0.3356 0.3818 0.0121
σa 0.0124 0.0012 0.0149 0.0010 0.0258 0.0178 0.0189 0.0020
σe 0.0096 0.0007 0.0145 0.0012 0.0135 0.0030 0.0102 0.0003
σx 0.0236 0.0201 0.0816 0.0065 0.2162 0.1450 0.0182 0.0094
σz 0.0090 0.0012 0.0141 0.0010 0.0334 0.0052 0.0140 0.0014
σv 0.0041 0.0007 0.0070 0.0005 0.0105 0.0028 0.0069 0.0008
|L| 2195.2950 2038.4201 1891.2450 1553.1251
Table 3.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Full Samples.
in hypothesis testing we refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2005).11
Turning to our results, we ﬁrst note that the estimates for the discount factor
β are below unity, but exceed 0.99 for all of the four economies.
The money demand equation derived from the household’s optimization prob-
lem implies an interest elasticity for real money holdings of −γ. We ﬁnd small
values of this elasticity with the correct sign for all regions, although the estimates
for Italy and Spain turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant. These results are in
line with a large empirical literature detecting small interest rate elasticities of
(broad) money demand (see Browne et al., 2005).
Next, we turn to the estimates for the rigidity parameters. For all countries,
both the adjustment cost parameters for capital φK deﬁned in section 3.2.2 and
prices φP deﬁned in section 3.2.3 are signiﬁcant. The latter is signiﬁcantly higher
in Italy and Spain compared to France and Germany at the 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Our ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by the results of analysis on consumer
price changes conducted by Dhyne et al. (2006), identifying Italy to have the
lowest incidence of price changes, whereas France shows the highest frequency of
price changes among the four regions.
11A full set of the test statistics is available from the authors upon request.
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Turning to the monetary policy reaction function, our estimates of ωπ and ωτ
are non-zero for all four countries, allowing at least for two possible interpreta-
tions of monetary policy (see section 3.2.4). Compared to France and Spain ωπ
is signiﬁcantly higher in Germany (at the 1% level). This result might reﬂect the
well-documented higher pre-occupation with inﬂation in this country. The point
estimate of ωπ for Italy is also well below the estimate for Germany, although in-
signiﬁcantly so. Concerning the positive estimates of ωτ our results are consistent
with the ﬁndings of Andre´s et al. (2006) for the euro area. It is important to note
that for each of the four countries the estimates of ωτ and ωπ sum up to a value
greater than unity. Hence, the monetary policy rule is consistent with a unique
rational expectations equilibrium (see Clarida et al., 2000). For all countries the
estimates of ωy are negative. However, they are insigniﬁcant, which makes it dif-
ﬁcult to interpret this result as a hint for the presence of an endogenous money
channel.
The estimates of e and z are not interesting from an economic policy point
of view; they simply allow the steady state values of real balances and output in
the model to match the average values of these variables in the data (see Ireland,
1997).
The estimates of ρa, ρe, ρx, ρz, and ρυ indicate a high persistence of the
ﬁrst four shocks, whereas the monetary policy shock is less persistent and even
statistically insigniﬁcant for Italy. In the case of France, Germany, and Italy, the
estimated standard deviations of the innovations are dominated by the ones of
the investment shock, although the estimate of σx turns out to be insigniﬁcant for
Italy. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Justiniano et al. (2010) for the
US. Hence, the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock is identiﬁed as the most
important driver of business cycle ﬂuctuations. For Spain the preference shock is
the most volatile followed by the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock.
3.5.2 Testing for Parameter Instability
For each country tables G.1 – G.4 report the parameter estimates and standard
deviations in both sub-samples, while tables G.5 – G.8 show the p-values of the
QLR test on individual parameters as well as the p-values at each step of the ESS
procedure. The set of stable parameters at the 10% signiﬁcance level is denoted
by S. To structure the following discussion, it is useful to divide the parameters
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into three groups:
(i) private sector parameters: β, γ, φP , φK ;
(ii) monetary policy parameters: ωτ , ωπ, ωy;
(iii) shock parameters: e, z, ρa, ρe, ρx, ρz, ρυ, σa, σe, σx, σz, and συ.
In the case of France, the QLR stability test indicates a signiﬁcant break in
1994:Q3. Concerning the private sector parameters, table G.5 reports instabilities
of γ and φP . The estimates of γ are lower in both sub-samples than in the full
sample, the estimate for the 1980:Q1 to 1994:Q2 period is insigniﬁcant, however.
Table G.1 shows a sharp decline of the price rigidity parameter φP . Further, we
ﬁnd signiﬁcant changes in the monetary policy parameters ωy and ωπ, both in-
creasing in absolute values. Concerning the shock parameters, the ESS procedure
identiﬁes only the technology shock to be stable with respect to both persistence
and volatility. The direction of change in the persistence of the remaining shocks
is ambiguous, while we ﬁnd an overall decline in the volatilities σa, σe, σx, and συ.
For Germany we locate a break in 1994:Q2.12 As reported in table G.6, the
set of stable parameters S contains (σx, σe, ωτ , ωπ, ρe, ρa, ρz, ωy, ρx). Most inter-
estingly, we ﬁnd monetary policy to be constant over time. This result suggests
no discernible diﬀerence between the monetary policy conducted in the 1980:Q2
to 1994:Q1 period by the German Bundesbank and the 1994:Q2 to 2008:Q3 pe-
riod, although the latter is aﬀected by the inception of EMU and the monetary
policy strategy of the ECB. Further, we ﬁnd instabilities in all of the private sec-
tor parameters, as well as the persistence of the monetary policy shock and the
volatilities of the preference shock at, the technology shock zt and the monetary
policy shock υt. Concerning the direction of change, only the volatility of the
monetary policy shock increases, while the volatilities of the other shocks decline
or stay constant over time.
We detect a signiﬁcant break in 1994:Q4 for Italy. With respect to the private
sector parameters, table G.7 shows instabilities of γ, φP , and φK . According to
12We cannot rule out a test bias due to the treatment of re-uniﬁcation outlined in section 3.
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table G.3 the interest elasticity of money demand turns out to increase over time,
while we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant decline in capital and price adjustment costs after the
break. Concerning the monetary policy parameters, ωy appears to be stable over
time, whereas ωτ and ωπ both change signiﬁcantly. More speciﬁcally, table G.3
presents a sharp decline of ωτ and a substantial increase of ωπ in the 1994:Q4 to
2008:Q3 period. With exception of ρx, we ﬁnd the persistence parameters to be
unstable. While ρa and ρv increase, ρe and ρz turn out to decrease after the break.
Regarding the volatilities of the ﬁve shocks, the ESS procedure identiﬁes σa and
σe to be stable, whereas σv, σx and σz decrease over time.
Turning to Spain, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant break in 1998:Q1. Moreover, we detect
instabilities in the private sector parameters (γ, φP , φK), the monetary policy
parameters (ωτ , ωπ) and the shock parameters (e, z, ρz, ρυ, σa, σe, σx, σz, and συ).
While ωτ decreases, ωπ is signiﬁcantly higher after the break (see table G.4).
Furthermore, we observe a sharp decline in capital and price adjustment costs.
Regarding the persistence of the technology shock and the money policy shock,
table G.4 shows a decrease in both, while the latter declines sharply after the
break. With the exception of the money demand shock, we also ﬁnd a decrease
in the volatilities of the shocks at, xt, zt, and υt.
3.6 Conclusions
Despite some skepticism voiced in the literature DSGE models became a corner-
stone of modern macroeconometrics leading to a high acceptance both in academia
and central banking (see Tovar, 2009). Being ﬁrmly rooted in microeconomic
foundations, this class of models is able to identify structural characteristics of
economies that are not easily recovered from a necessarily parsimonious set of
macroeconomic time series. Apart from their frequent use as a tool for the de-
scription and evaluation of monetary policy, DSGE models enable cross-country
comparisons of such characteristics without having to resort to micro-data (see
Smets and Wouters, 2005).
In this chapter, we apply a New Keynesian model to French, German, Italian,
and Spanish data and formally test for parameter stability over time. Parameter
instabilities are detected by the ESS procedure developed by Inoue and Rossi
(2011). This procedure allows to identify the parameters of the model that have
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changed at an unknown break date. In the cases of France, Germany, and Italy
our results point to structural breaks in the mid-1990s after the beginning of the
second stage of EMU, while the estimates for Spain show a signiﬁcant break just
before the start of the third stage of EMU in 1998. An interesting result is that
France, Italy, and Spain show signiﬁcant changes in monetary policy behavior
after the break dates, while monetary policy in Germany is found to be stable
over time. Furthermore, France, Italy, and Spain exhibit a signiﬁcant decline in
capital and price adjustment costs after the break. Moreover, we ﬁnd at least four
out of the ﬁve shocks to be either constant or declining after the break date for
all economies under consideration.
On a methodological level, we demonstrate that the use of DSGEmodels is able
to sheds some light on the process of economic integration in Europe by allowing to
look at the stability of structural and policy parameters both across countries and
across time. This process yields numerous explanations for changes of allegedly
“deep” parameters questioning the full compliance with the well-known Lucas
(1976) critique. However, as set out in Inoue and Rossi (2011, p. 1195), “. . . the
deﬁnition of structural parameters (in the sense of the Lucas critique) is that these
parameters are policy invariant, not necessarily time invariant.” Therefore, future
research faces an important challenge in developing techniques able to identify
the speciﬁc factors responsible for parameter instabilities, allowing to assess the
applicability of the respective DSGE setting for policy analysis and forecasting.
Appendices
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Appendix C
Equilibrium Conditions
The appendix contains a detailed description of the estimated DSGE model. The
exposition is based on the technical notes of Ireland (2003).1
C.1 The Economic Environment
• Households:
The representative household chooses {ct, lt,Mt, Bt, kt+1, it}∞t=0 to maximize
utility
E
∞∑
t=0
βt{at[γ/(γ − 1)] ln[c(γ−1)/γt + e1/γt (Mt/Pt)(γ−1)/γ ] + χ ln(1− lt)},
subject to the budget constraint
Mt−1 + Tt +Bt−1 +Wtlt +Qtkt +Dt
Pt
≥ ct+it+φk
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt+
Bt/rt +Mt
Pt
,
and the law of motion for capital
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit. (3.1)
1The technical notes are available at http://www.irelandp.com/progs/endogenous.zip.
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Further, following Buiter and Sibert (2007), we prevent the household from
excessive debts by imposing the no-Ponzi-game condition:
lim
t→∞
Bt
t∏
s=0
1
rs
≥ 0.
Accordingly the Lagrangian can be written as follows:
Λ = E
∞∑
t=0
(
βt
{
at [γ/(γ − 1)] ln
[
c
(γ−1)/γ
t + e
1/γ
t
(
Mt
Pt
)(γ−1)/γ]
+ χ ln(1− lt)
}
−βtλt
{
ct +
[
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt
xt
]
+
φK
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt +
Bt/rt +Mt
Pt
−
(
Mt−1 + Tt +Bt−1 +Wtlt +Qtkt +Dt
Pt
)})
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are obtained by setting the partial derivatives of
Λ with respect to ct, lt,Mt, Bt, kt+1, and λt equal to zero, yielding
Λct = at − λtc1/γt
[
c
(γ−1)/γ
t + e
1/γ
t
(
Mt
Pt
)(γ−1)/γ]
= 0, (3.7)
Λlt = χ− λt
(
Wt
Pt
)
(1− lt) = 0, (3.8)
ΛMt =
(
Mt
Pt
)1/γ [
c
(γ−1)/γ
t + e
1/γ
t
(
Mt
Pt
)(γ−1)γ] [
λt − βEt
(
λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
)]
− ate1/γt = 0,
(3.9)
ΛBt = λt − βrtEt
(
λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
)
= 0, (3.10)
59
Λkt+1 = λt
[
1
xt
+ φK
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)]
−
{
βEt
[
λt+1
(
Qt+1
Pt+1
+
1− δ
xt+1
)]
−
(
βφK
2
)
Et
[
λt+1
(
kt+2
kt+1
− 1
)2]
+ βφKEt
[
λt+1
(
kt+2
kt+1
− 1
)(
kt+2
kt+1
)]}
= 0,
(3.11)
and
Λλt = ct +
[
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt
xt
]
+
φK
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt +
Bt/rt +Mt
Pt
−
(
Mt−1 + Tt +Bt−1 +Wtlt +Qtkt +Dt
Pt
)
= 0.
(3.12)
Note that we can rewrite (3.9) by using (3.7) and (3.10) to obtain
ctet −
(
Mt
Pt
)(
1− 1
rt
)γ
= 0. (3.9′)
Finally, we impose the standard transversality conditions to guarantee that
money, bonds and capital do not grow too quickly:
lim
t→∞
βtλt
Mt
Pt
= 0,
lim
t→∞
βtλt
Bt
Pt
= 0,
lim
t→∞
βtλtkt+1 = 0.
• Finished goods-producing ﬁrms:
The representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm seeks to maximize its prof-
its
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
subject to the constant returns to scale technology
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
.
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Therefore, the ﬁrm’s optimization problem can be written as
max
yt(i)
Πt = Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di,
which leads to the following ﬁrst-order condition characterizing the demand
for intermediate goods:
∂Πt
∂yt(i)
= yt(i)−
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt = 0.
By plugging this expression into the constant elasticity of substitution ag-
gregator of intermediate goods we obtain the price aggregator
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
]1/(1−θ)
.
• Intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms:
Each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm seeks to maximize its present dis-
counted value of proﬁts
E
∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Dt(i)/Pt],
by choosing {lt(i), kt(i), yt(i), Pt(i)}∞t=0 subject to the Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology constraint
yt(i) ≤ kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α
and the above demand for intermediate goods
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt.
We can use the latter expression to rewrite the real value of dividends
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt(i)−
[
Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
]
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt
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as
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt −
[
Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
]
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt.
(3.13)
Therefore, the Lagrangian for the ﬁrms’ intertemporal optimization problem
can be written as:
Λ = E
∞∑
t=0
(
βtλt
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt −
[
Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
]
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt
}
−βtξt
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt − kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α
})
.
Setting the partial derivatives of Λ with respect to lt(i), kt(i), Pt(i), and ξt
equal to zero leads to the ﬁrst order conditions:
Λlt(i) =
λtWtlt(i)
Pt
− (1− α)ξtkt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α = 0, (3.14)
Λkt(i) =
λtQtkt(i)
Pt
− αξtkt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α = 0, (3.15)
ΛPt(i) = φPλt
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
][
Pt
πPt−1(i)
]
− (1− θ)λt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
− θξt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ−1
− βφPEt
{
λt+1
[
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)
− 1
][
Pt+1(i)Pt
πPt(i)2
](
yt+1
yt
)}
= 0,
(3.16)
and
Λξt =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt − kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α = 0. (3.17)
• The monetary authority sets the gross nominal interest rate according to
the generalized Taylor rule:
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ωτ ln
(
τt
τ
)
+ ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)
+ ln(υt). (3.18)
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C.2 The Nonlinear System
C.2.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
The dynamic system is described by the nonlinear diﬀerence equations (3.1) −
(3.8), (3.9′), (3.10) − (3.18). To close the model, we complete the following two
steps. First, we consider a symmetric equilibrium where all intermediate goods-
producing ﬁrms make identical decisions. This assumption implies Pt(i) = Pt,
yt(i) = yt, lt(i) = lt, kt(i) = kt, and Dt(i) = Dt for t = 0, 1, 2... and all i ∈ [0, 1].
Second, the market clearing condition for both the bond market, Bt = Bt−1 = 0,
and the money market, Mt = Mt−1 + Tt, must hold for all t = 0, 1, 2.... By
substituting these conditions into (3.1)− (3.18) and deﬁning the average product
of labor as nt = yt/lt and the money growth rate as τt =
Mt
Mt−1 we get:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit, (3.1)
ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + εxt, (3.2)
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat, (3.3)
ln(et) = (1− ρe) ln(e) + ρe ln(et−1) + εet, (3.4)
ln(zt) = (1− ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (3.5)
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt, (3.6)
at = λtc
1/γ
t
[
c
(γ−1)/γ
t + e
1/γ
t
(
Mt
Pt
)(γ−1)/γ]
, (3.7)
χ = λt
(
Wt
Pt
)
(1− lt), (3.8)
ctet =
(
Mt
Pt
)(
1− 1
rt
)γ
, (3.9′)
λt = βrtEt
(
λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
)
, (3.10)
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λt
[
1
xt
+ φK
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)]
= βEt
[
λt+1
(
Qt+1
Pt+1
+
1− δ
xt+1
)]
−
(
βφK
2
)
Et
[
λt+1
(
kt+2
kt+1
− 1
)2]
+ βφKEt
[
λt+1
(
kt+2
kt+1
− 1
)(
kt+2
kt+1
)]
,
(3.11)
ct +
[
kt+1 − (1− δ)kt
xt
]
+
φK
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt =
(
Wtlt +Qtkt +Dt
Pt
)
, (3.12)
Dt
Pt
= yt − Wtlt +Qtkt
Pt
− φP
2
(
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
)2
yt, (3.13)
λt
(
Wt
Pt
)
lt = (1− α)ξtkαt [ztlt]1−α, (3.14)
λt
(
Qt
Pt
)
kt = αξtk
α
t [ztlt]
1−α, (3.15)
φPλt
[
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
][
Pt
πPt−1
]
= (1− θ)λt + θξt
+ βφPEt
[
λt+1
(
Pt+1
πPt
− 1
)(
Pt+1
πPt
)(
yt+1
yt
)]
,
(3.16)
yt = k
α
t [ztlt]
1−α, (3.17)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ωτ ln
(
τt
τ
)
+ ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)
+ ln(υt), (3.18)
nt =
yt
lt
, (3.19)
and
τt =
Mt
Mt−1
. (3.20)
Note that we can rewrite (3.12) by using (3.13) to obtain:
yt = ct + it +
φK
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt +
φP
2
[
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
]2
yt. (3.12
′)
Further, (3.17) can be used to rewrite (3.14) and (3.15) as
λt
(
Wt
Pt
)
lt = (1− α)ξtyt (3.14′)
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and
λt
(
Qt
Pt
)
kt = αξtyt. (3.15
′)
C.2.2 Change of Variables
We can rewrite the nonlinear system by deﬁning πt =
Pt
Pt−1 , mt =
Mt
Pt
, wt =
Wt
Pt
, qt =
Qt
Pt
, and dt =
Dt
Pt
. With these re-deﬁned variables, (3.1)−(3.8), (3.9′), (3.10), (3.11),
(3.12′), (3.13), (3.14′), (3.15′), (3.16)− (3.20) become:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit, (3.1)
ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + εxt, (3.2)
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat, (3.3)
ln(et) = (1− ρe) ln(e) + ρe ln(et−1) + εet, (3.4)
ln(zt) = (1− ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (3.5)
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt, (3.6)
at = λtc
1/γ
t
[
c
(γ−1)/γ
t + e
1/γ
t m
(γ−1)/γ
t
]
, (3.7)
χ = λtwt(1− lt), (3.8)
ctet = mt
(
1− 1
rt
)γ
, (3.9′)
λt = βrtEt
(
λt+1
πt+1
)
, (3.10)
λt
[
1
xt
+ φK
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)]
= βEt
[
λt+1
(
qt+1 +
1− δ
xt+1
)]
−
(
βφK
2
)
Et
[
λt+1
(
kt+2
kt+1
− 1
)2]
+ βφKEt
[
λt+1
(
kt+2
kt+1
− 1
)(
kt+2
kt+1
)]
,
(3.11)
yt = ct + it +
φK
2
(
kt+1
kt
− 1
)2
kt +
φP
2
(πt
π
− 1
)2
yt, (3.12
′)
dt = yt − wtlt − qtkt −
(
φP
2
)(πt
π
− 1
)2
yt, (3.13)
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λtwtlt = (1− α)ξtyt, (3.14′)
λtqtkt = αξtyt, (3.15
′)
φPλt
(
πt
π
− 1
)(
πt
π
)
= (1− θ)λt + θξt
+ βφPEt
[
λt+1
(
πt+1
π
− 1
)(
πt+1
π
)(
yt+1
yt
)]
,
(3.16)
yt = k
α
t [ztlt]
1−α, (3.17)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ωτ ln
(
τt
τ
)
+ ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)
+ ln(υt), (3.18)
nt =
yt
lt
, (3.19)
and
τt =
(
mt
mt−1
)
πt. (3.20)
C.3 Steady States
In absence of the ﬁve shocks, i.e., εxt = εat = εet = εzt = εvt = 0 for all t =
0, 1, 2, ..., the economy converges to a steady state, where each of the 20 variables
is constant. We use (3.2), (3.3), (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) to solve for
x = 1,
a = 1,
e = e,
z = z,
v = 1.
Assuming that the steady state money growth rate τ is determined by policy,
(3.10) and (3.20) can be used to solve for
π = τ
and
r =
π
β
.
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Next, (3.11) and (3.16) can be used to solve for
q =
1
β
− 1 + δ
and
ξ =
[
(θ − 1)
θ
]
λ.
Equations (3.7) and (3.9′) can be used to solve for
c =
[
1 + e
(
r
r − 1
)γ−1]−1(
1
λ
)
and
m = e
(
r
r − 1
)γ
c.
Use (3.1), (3.12′), (3.15′), and (3.16) to solve for
y =
[
1− δ
(
α
q
)(
θ − 1
θ
)]−1
.
Use (3.15′) and (3.16) to solve for
k =
(
α
q
)(
θ − 1
θ
)
y.
Equations (3.1), (3.13), (3.14′),(3.17), and (3.19) can be used to solve for
i = δk,
l =
1
z
( y
kα
)1/(1−α)
,
w = (1− α)
(
θ − 1
θ
)(y
l
)
,
d = y − wl− qk,
and
n =
y
l
.
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Finally, (3.8), (3.14′), and (3.16) can be used to solve for
λ =
χ+ (1− α)
[
1 + e
(
r
r−1
)γ−1]−1 [( θ
θ−1
)− δ (α
q
)]−1
(1− α)z (θ−1
θ
)1/(1−α) (α
q
)α/(1−α) .
C.4 The Linearized System
To linearize the nonlinear system (3.1) − (3.20), we perform a log-linear ap-
proximation of the model at steady state values.2 Let v̂art ≡ log
(
vart
var
)
de-
note the log-deviation of some variable vart from its steady state var, where
log
(
vart
var
) ≈ vart−var
var
. A ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of equation (3.1)− (3.8),
(3.9′), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12′), (3.13), (3.14′), (3.15′), (3.16)− (3.20) at the steady
state gives:
kkˆt+1 = (1− δ)kkˆt + ixˆt + iˆit, (3.1)
xˆt = ρxxˆt−1 + εxt, (3.2)
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + εat, (3.3)
eˆt = ρeeˆt−1 + εet, (3.4)
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + εzt, (3.5)
vˆt = ρv vˆt−1 + εvt, (3.6)
γraˆt = γrλˆt + r [1 + (γ − 1)λc] cˆt + (r − 1)λmeˆt + (γ − 1)(r − 1)mmˆt, (3.7)
λwllˆt = χλˆt + χwˆt, (3.8)
(r − 1)cˆt + (r − 1)eˆt = (r − 1)mˆt + γrˆt, (3.9′)
λˆt = rˆt + Etλˆt+1 − Etπt+1, (3.10)
λˆt− xˆt−φkkˆt = Etλˆt+1+βqEtqˆt+1−β(1− δ)Etxˆt+1+βφKEtkˆt+2− (1+β)φKkˆt+1,
(3.11)
yyˆt = ccˆt + iˆit, (3.12
′)
ddˆt = yyˆt − wlwˆt − wllˆt − qkqˆt − qkkˆt, (3.13)
2Canova (2007), DeJong and Dave (2007), and Zietz (2008) provide a detailed description of
logarithmic approximations.
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λˆt + wˆt + lˆt = ξˆt + yˆt, (3.14
′)
λˆt + qˆt + kˆt = ξˆt + yˆt, (3.15
′)
φP πˆt = (1− θ)λˆt + (θ − 1)ξˆt + βφPEtπˆt+1, (3.16)
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)zˆt + (1− α)lˆt, (3.17)
rˆt = ωτ τˆt + ωππˆt + ωyyˆt + vˆt, (3.18)
nˆt = yˆt − lˆt, (3.19)
and
τˆt = mˆt − mˆt−1 + πˆt. (3.20)
To facilitate the model’s solution we follow Ireland (2003) and use (3.20) to rewrite
(3.7) and (3.9′) as
γraˆt = γrλˆt + r[1 + (γ − 1)λc]cˆt + (r − 1)λmeˆt
+ (γ − 1)(r − 1)λmτˆt + (γ − 1)(r − 1)λmmˆt−1 − (γ − 1)(r − 1)λmπˆt
(3.7′)
and
(r − 1)eˆt + (r − 1)cˆt = (r − 1)τˆt + (r − 1)mˆt−1 − (r − 1)πˆt + γrˆt. (3.9′′)
Further, we make use of (3.1) and (3.2) to rewrite (3.11) as
λˆt −
{
1 + β [δφK − (1− δ)] ρx
}
xˆt − φK kˆt
= Etλˆt+1 + βqEtqˆt+1 + φK [β(1− δ)− (1 + β)] kˆt+1
+ βδφKEtiˆt+1.
(3.11′)
Appendix D
Solving the Model
To solve the linear diﬀerence model under rational expectations described by equa-
tions (3.1)−(3.6), (3.7′), (3.8), (3.9′′), (3.10), (3.11′), (3.12′), (3.13),(3.14′),(3.15′),(3.16)−
(3.20), we apply the method proposed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980). The sub-
sequent sections follow the expositions in Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Farmer
(1999), the technical notes of Ireland (2003), and DeJong and Dave (2007).
D.1 Blanchard and Kahn’s Method
A solution to the linear diﬀerence model under rational expectations can be ob-
tained by making use of the approach developed by Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
Therefore, a vector s0t is deﬁned which can be separated into
s0t = [s
0
1t s
0
2t]
′,
letting s01t denote a n × 1 vector of predetermined and s02t a m × 1 vector of
non-predetermined variables, which implies that:
Etst+1 = [s
0
1t+1 Ets
0
2t+1]
′.
Next, to apply Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) procedure, the model is written
as
Ets
0
t+1 = As
0
t +Bζt (3.21)
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with
ζt = Pζt−1 + εt, (3.22)
where A and B are (n +m) × (n +m) and (n +m) × k coeﬃcient matrices, P
is k × k matrix containing the persistence parameters of the shocks, ζt is a k × 1
vector consisting of the model’s exogenous forcing variables while the serially
and mutually uncorrelated innovations are included in the k × 1 vector εt. The
solution method relies on decoupling (3.21) into unstable and stable portions,
using a Jordan decomposition, and then solving the two components in turn.
If the number of unstable eigenvalues (with absolute value greater than one) of
matrix A is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables, the system is
said to be saddle-path stable and a unique solution exists (see Blanchard and
Kahn, 1980).1
D.2 System Reduction
The solution of the system comprising (3.21) and (3.22) can be simpliﬁed by
applying a system reduction ﬁrst. According to King and Watson (2002, p. 2)
the idea of a system reduction is to isolate a “... reduced-dimension, nonsingular
dynamic system in a subset of variables of the full vector of endogenous variables.
Once the rational expectations solution to this smaller system is obtained, it is
easy to also calculate the solution for the remaining variables as these are governed
by dynamic identities.”
Let
f 0t =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt lˆt nˆt τˆt wˆt qˆt dˆt rˆt
]′
,
s0t =
[
kˆt mˆt−1 πˆt λˆt ξˆt
]′
,
and
ζt =
[
aˆt eˆt xˆt zˆt vˆt
]′
.
Then, the linearized equilibrium conditions (3.1), (3.10), (3.11′), (3.16), and (3.20)
can be written in matrix form as
Ω0Ets
0
t+1 + Ω1Etf
0
t+1 = Ω2s
0
t + Ω3f
0
t + Ω4ζt (3.23)
1A detailed presentation of the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions is given in appendix B.2.
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with
Ω0 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
k 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0
φK [β(1− δ)− (1 + β)] 0 0 1 0
0 0 βφP 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
Ω1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 βδφK 0 0 0 0 βq 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
Ω2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(1− δ)k 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1 0
−φK 0 0 1 0
0 0 φP θ − 1 −(θ − 1)
0 1 −1 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
Ω3 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
and
Ω4 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 i 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 − β [δφK − (1− δ)] ρx 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Likewise, (3.7′), (3.8), (3.9′′), (3.12′), (3.13), (3.14′), (3.15′), (3.17), (3.18), and
(3.19) can be written as
Ω5f
0
t = Ω6s
0
t + Ω7ζt (3.24)
with
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Ω5 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
y −c −i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 r [1 + (γ − 1)λc] 0 0 0 (γ − 1)(r − 1)λm 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 λwl 0 0 −χ 0 0 0
0 r − 1 0 0 0 −(r − 1) 0 0 0 −γ
y 0 0 −wl 0 0 −wl −qk −d 0
1 0 0 −(1 − α) 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 −1 0 0 −1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0
ωy 0 0 0 0 ωτ 0 0 0 −1
1 0 0 −1 −1 0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
Ω6 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 0 0
0 −(γ − 1)(r − 1)λm (γ − 1)(r − 1)λm −γr 0
0 0 0 χ 0
0 r − 1 −(r − 1) 0 0
qk 0 0 0 0
α 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1
1 0 0 1 −1
0 0 −ωπ 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
and
Ω7 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 0 0 0
γr −(r − 1)λm 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 −(r − 1) 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1− α 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1
0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Finally, (3.2)− (3.6) can directly be written as
ζt = Pζt−1 + εt (3.22)
with
P =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρa 0 0 0 0
0 ρe 0 0 0
0 0 ρx 0 0
0 0 0 ρz 0
0 0 0 0 ρv
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
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To cast (3.23) and (3.24) in the form of (3.21), we start by iterating forward
equation (3.22) j periods which implies:
P jζt = Etζt+j .
2 (3.22′)
Rewriting (3.24) as
f 0t = Ω
−1
5 Ω6s
0
t + Ω
−1
5 Ω7ζt (3.24
′)
and substituting this expression together with (3.22′) into (3.23) yields
Ω0Ets
0
t+1 +Ω1Et
(
Ω−15 Ω6s
0
t+1 +Ω
−1
5 Ω7ζt+1
)
= Ω2s
0
t +Ω3
(
Ω−15 Ω6s
0
t +Ω
−1
5 Ω7ζt
)
+Ω4ζt(
Ω0 +Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
Ets
0
t+1 +Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω7Etζt+1 =
(
Ω2 +Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
s0t +
(
Ω4 +Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω7
)
ζt(
Ω0 +Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
Ets
0
t+1 +Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω7Pζt =
(
Ω2 +Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
s0t +
(
Ω4 +Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω7
)
ζt(
Ω0 +Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
Ets
0
t+1 =
(
Ω2 +Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
s0t
+
(
Ω4 +Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω7 − Ω1Ω−15 Ω7P
)
ζt.
If Ω0 + Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6 is nonsingular, we can rewrite the expression above as
Ets
0
t+1 =
(
Ω0 + Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)−1 (
Ω2 + Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
s0t
+
(
Ω0 + Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)−1 (
Ω4 + Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω7 − Ω1Ω−15 Ω7P
)
ζt,
which is in the same form as (3.21) with
A =
(
Ω0 + Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)−1 (
Ω2 + Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)
and
B =
(
Ω0 + Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6
)−1 (
Ω4 + Ω3Ω
−1
5 Ω7 − Ω1Ω−15 Ω7P
)
so that
Ets
0
t+1 = As
0
t +Bζt (3.21)
or
Et
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
kˆt+1
mˆt
πˆt+1
λˆt+1
ξˆt+1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ = A
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
kˆt
mˆt−1
πˆt
λˆt
ξˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+B
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
aˆt
eˆt
xˆt
zˆt
vˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
2To derive (3.22′) we use the Law of Iterated Expectations: Et[Et+1(·)] = Et(·).
74
It should be emphasized, that the transformation of the linearized model into
(3.21) and (3.22) hinges critically on the invertibility of Ω0 + Ω1Ω
−1
5 Ω6.
D.3 Solution
Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) solution strategy relies on simplifying the model
Ets
0
t+1 = As
0
t +Bζt (3.21)
with
ζt = Pζt−1 + εt (3.22)
by transforming it into canonical form. As outlined in DeJong and Dave (2007),
the method begins with a Jordan decomposition of A such that
A = M−1NM,
where the diagonal elements of N , consisting of the eigenvalues of A, are ordered
in increasing absolute value and the columns of M−1 are the eigenvectors of A.
We proceed under the case of saddle-path stability and assume that m = 3,
i.e., the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle equals the number non-
predetermined variables in s0t and therefore allow for a unique solution. Thus, N
can be written as
N =
[
N1 0
0 N2
]
,
where the eigenvalues of the 2 × 2 matrix N1 are on or inside the unit circle and
the eigenvalues of the 3 × 3 matrix N2 lie outside the unit circle. M and B are
decomposed accordingly, so that
M =
[
M11 M12
M21 M22
]
and
B =
[
B1
B2
]
,
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where M11 is a 2× 2, M12 is a 2× 3, M21 is a 3× 2, M22 is a 3× 3, B1 is a 2× 5,
and B2 is a 3× 5 matrix. Now (3.21) can be rewritten as
Ets
0
t+1 = M
−1NMs0t +
[
B1
B2
]
ζt. (3.21
′)
Pre-multiplying (3.21′) by M gives[
M11 M12
M21 M22
]
Ets
0
t+1 =
[
N1 0
0 N2
][
M11 M12
M21 M22
]
s0t +
[
M11 M12
M21 M22
][
B1
B2
]
ζt
or in terms of matrix partitions
Ets
1
1t+1 = N1s
1
1t +Q1ζt (3.25)
and
Ets
1
2t+1 = N2s
1
2t +Q2ζt, (3.26)
where
s11t = M11
[
kˆt
mˆt−1
]
+M12
⎡⎢⎣ πˆtλˆt
ξˆt
⎤⎥⎦ , (3.27)
s12t = M21
[
kˆt
mˆt−1
]
+M22
⎡⎢⎣ πˆtλˆt
ξˆt
⎤⎥⎦ , (3.28)
Q1 = M11B1 +M12B2,
and
Q2 = M21B1 +M22B2.
Since the eigenvalues of N2 all lie outside the unit circle, (3.26) can be solved
forward. Using the result of this forward iteration together with (3.22′) we obtain
s12t = −N−12 Rζt, (3.29)
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where the 3× 5 matrix R is obtained by “reshaping”3
vec(R) = vec
∞∑
j=0
N−j2 Q2P
j =
∞∑
j=0
vec
(
N−j2 Q2P
j
)
=
∞∑
j=0
[
P j ⊗ (N−12 )j] vec(Q2) = ∞∑
j=0
(
P ⊗N−12
)j
vec(Q2)
=
[
I(15×15) − P ⊗N−12
]−1
vec(Q2).
Substituting (3.29) into (3.28) gives⎡⎢⎣ πˆtλˆt
ξˆt
⎤⎥⎦ = S1
[
kˆt
mˆt−1
]
+ S2ζt, (3.30)
where
S1 = −M−122 M21
and
S2 = −M−122 N−12 R.
We can next substitute (3.30) into (3.27) to solve for
s11t = (M11 +M12S1)
[
kˆt
mˆt−1
]
+M12S2ζt. (3.31)
Substituting (3.31) into (3.25) gives[
kˆt+1
mˆt
]
= S3
[
kˆt
mˆt−1
]
+ S4ζt, (3.32)
where
S3 = (M11 +M12S1)
−1N1 (M11 +M12S1)
3According Hamilton (1994a) and DeJong and Dave (2007), the appearance of the vec oper-
ator accommodates the VAR speciﬁcation for ζt. In particular, we use the relationship between
vec operator and Kronecker product: vec
(
N−j2 Q2P
j
)
=
[
(P j)′ ⊗N−j2
]
vec(Q2). Note that
P ′ = P , since P is a diagonal matrix.
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and
S4 = (M11 +M12S1)
−1 (Q1 +N1M12S2 −M12S2P ) .
Finally, by using (3.30), (3.24′) can be written as
f 0t = Ω
−1
5 Ω6s
0
t + Ω
−1
5 Ω7ζt
= Ω−15 Ω6
[
I(2×2)
S1
][
kˆt
mˆt−1
]
+ Ω−15 Ω6
[
0(2×5)
S2
]
ζt + Ω
−1
5 Ω7ζt,
or simply
f 0t = S5
[
kˆt
mˆt−1
]
+ S6ζt, (3.33)
where
S5 = Ω
−1
5 Ω6
[
I(2×2)
S1
]
and
S6 = Ω
−1
5 Ω6
[
0(2×5)
S2
]
+ Ω−15 Ω7.
Hence, the model’s solution can be written compactly in state space form by
combining (3.22), (3.30), (3.32), and (3.33) as
st+1 = Γ0st + Γ1εt+1 (3.34)
and
ft = Γ2st, (3.35)
where
st =
[
kˆt mˆt−1 aˆt eˆt xˆt zˆt vˆt
]′
,
ft =
[
yˆt cˆt iˆt lˆt nˆt τˆt wˆt qˆt dˆt rˆt πˆt λˆt ξˆt
]′
,
εt =
[
εat εet εxt εzt εvt
]′
,
Γ0 =
[
S3 S4
0(5×2) P
]
,
Γ1 =
[
0(2×5)
I(5×5)
]
,
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and
Γ2 =
[
S5 S6
S1 S2
]
.
Appendix E
Estimation
E.1 Empirical State Space Model
Since the model is estimated using an observed sample X including consump-
tion, investment, money, inﬂation, and interest rates, we can deﬁne a sequence of
observations {Xt}Tt=1 with a measured data vector
Xt =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt
iˆt
mˆt
πˆt
rˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
To distinguish the theoretical model from the empirical model, we rewrite (3.34)
and (3.35) as
st+1 = Ψ0st +Ψ1εt+1 (3.36)
and
Xt = Ψ2st, (3.37)
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where Γo = Ψ0, Γ1 = Ψ1 and Ψ2 is formed from the rows (·) of Γ0 and Γ2 as
Ψ2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Γ2(2)
Γ2(3)
Γ0(2)
Γ2(11)
Γ2(10)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Given the empirical state space model, the Kalman ﬁlter can be used to estimate
the model parameters with maximum likelihood and to draw inferences about the
unobserved components of the state vector st exploiting the information contained
in the ﬁve observable series (see Ireland, 2004).
E.2 Kalman Filter
As stated, for example, in Ruge-Murcia (2007) the maximum likelihood estimation
of a DSGE model in state space form calls for the construction and evaluation of
the likelihood function
L(μ|X) = p(X|μ) =
T∏
t=1
p(Xt|μ),
letting X denote the T observations of a vector of observable variables Xt given
the model’s parameters μ. According to Hamilton (1994a) the Kalman ﬁlter can
be used to calculate the likelihood function for such a state space system. More
precisely, as outlined in Canova (2007, p. 123), “. . . the likelihood function of a
state space model can be conveniently expressed in terms of one-step-ahead fore-
cast errors, conditional on the initial observations, and of their recursive variance,
both of which can be obtained with the Kalman ﬁlter.” While a general and de-
tailed treatment of the Kalman ﬁlter can be found in Harvey (1993), Hamilton
(1994a), and Hamilton (1994b), we only give a brief exemplary exposition of the
Kalman ﬁlter by applying the recursive algorithm originally developed by Kalman
(1960) and Kalman and Bucy (1961) to the empirical state space model formed
by state equation (3.36) and observation equation (3.37):
st+1 = Ψ0st +Ψ1εt+1, (3.36)
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Xt = Ψ2st. (3.37)
Note that st is a vector of possibly unknown state variables, Xt denotes a vector
of observed variables, Ψ0, Ψ1, and Ψ2 depend on the structural parameters of the
model and the vector εt+1 comprises the serially uncorrelated innovations
εt+1 =
[
εat+1 εet+1 εxt+1 εzt+1 εvt+1
]′
,
which are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and diagonal co-
variance matrix
Σε = Eεt+1ε
′
t+1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2a 0 0 0 0
0 σ2e 0 0 0
0 0 σ2x 0 0
0 0 0 σ2z 0
0 0 0 0 σ2v
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
E.2.1 Kalman Filter Recursion
In order to outline the Kalman ﬁlter recursion, we follow the expositions of Hamil-
ton (1994a) and Lu¨tkepohl (2005). Let
st|j = E(st|X1, ..., Xj),
Σs(t|j) = E(st − st|j)(st − st|j)′,
Xt|j = E(Xt|X1, ..., Xj),
ΣX(t|j) = E(Xt −Xt|j)(Xt −Xt|j)′.
Further, the initial state s0 and the conditional distribution of s given X are
assumed to be normally distributed with s0 ∼ N (μs0,Σ0) and (s|X) ∼ N (μs,Σ),
respectively. Given the previous conditions, the normality assumption implies
(st|X1, ..., Xt−1) ∼ N (st|t−1,Σs(t|t− 1)) for t = 2, ..., T,
(st|X1, ..., Xt) ∼ N (st|t,Σs(t|t)) for t = 1, ..., T,
(Xt|X1, ..., Xt−1) ∼ N (Xt|t−1,ΣX(t|t− 1)) for t = 2, ..., T.
According to in Lu¨tkepohl (2005) the conditional means and covariance ma-
trices can be obtained by the subsequent Kalman ﬁlter recursions:
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• Initialization:
s0|0 = μs0,Σs(0|0) = Σ0.
• Prediction step (1 ≤ t ≤ T ):
st|t−1 = Ψ0st−1|t−1,
Σs(t|t− 1) = Ψ0Σs(t− 1|t− 1)Ψ′0 +Ψ1ΣεΨ′1,
Xt|t−1 = Ψ2st|t−1,
ΣX(t|t− 1) = Ψ2Σs(t|t− 1)Ψ′2,
ut = Xt −Xt|t−1.
• Correction step (1 ≤ t ≤ T ):
st|t = st|t−1 +Υtut,
Σs(t|t) = Σs(t|t− 1)−ΥtΣX(t|t− 1)Υ′t,
where the Kalman gain Υt is deﬁned as
Υt = st|t−1Ψ′2ΣX(t|t− 1)−1 .
As outlined in Lu¨tkepohl (2005) the recursions proceed by performing the
prediction step for t = 1. Then, the correction step is performed for t = 1. Next,
the prediction and correction steps are repeated for t = 2 and so on.
E.2.2 Log Likelihood Function
The observation vector estimation errors {ut}Tt=1 can be used to form the Gaussian
log likelihood function for {Xt}Tt=1:
lnL(μ|X) =
T∑
t=1
ln p(Xt|μ)
= −5T
2
ln(2π)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
ln |ΣX(t|t− 1)| − 1
2
T∑
t=1
u′tΣX(t|t− 1)−1ut.
Appendix F
Data sources
All data have been retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The original
sources are detailed below.
• France:
Real personal consumption: EUROSTAT
Gross ﬁxed capital formation: EUROSTAT
Money balances (M3): Banque de France
Consumer price index: OECD
Interest rate (Pibor): OECD
Population: National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE)
• Germany:
Real personal consumption: Federal Statistical Oﬃce
Gross ﬁxed capital formation: Federal Statistics Oﬃce
Money balances (M3): Deutsche Bundesbank
Consumer price index: OECD
Interest rate (Fibor): OECD
Population: Federal Statistics Oﬃce
• Italy:
Real personal consumption: Oxford Economics
Gross ﬁxed capital formation: Oxford Economics
Money balances (M3): Oxford Economics
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Consumer price index: Oxford Economics
Interest rate (three-month money market rate): Oxford Economics
Population: Oxford Economics
• Spain:
Real personal consumption: EUROSTAT
Gross ﬁxed capital formation: EUROSTAT
Money balances (M3): Banco de Espan˜a
Consumer price index: OECD
Interest rate (three-month money market rate): OECD
Population: EUROSTAT
Appendix G
Tables
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1980:Q1 - 1994:Q2 1994:Q3 - 2008:Q3
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
β 0.9906 0.0013 0.9913 0.0024
γ 0.0000 0.0007 0.0043 0.0014
φP 10.3880 0.5796 3.2691 0.3101
φK 30.0492 0.5400 28.8285 2.1778
ωτ 0.2980 0.0081 0.2792 0.0188
ωπ 1.1974 0.0095 1.4680 0.0807
ωy -0.0075 0.0115 -0.1417 0.0605
e 4.4410 0.0006 4.3587 0.0115
z 4185.6183 0.0001 4181.1612 0.0001
ρa 0.8963 0.0065 0.8507 0.0137
ρe 0.9000 0.0071 0.8132 0.0128
ρx 0.9011 0.0078 0.9817 0.0067
ρz 0.8995 0.0188 0.9222 0.0061
ρυ 0.4999 0.0076 0.1976 0.0249
σa 0.0202 0.0004 0.0082 0.0002
σe 0.0096 0.0001 0.0089 0.0001
σx 0.0554 0.0069 0.0324 0.0021
σz 0.0080 0.0003 0.0082 0.0002
συ 0.0057 0.0001 0.0044 0.0003
Table G.1: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: France.
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1980:Q1 - 1994:Q1 1994:Q2 - 2008:Q3
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
β 0.9917 0.0001 0.9926 0.0001
γ 0.0757 0.0001 0.0731 0.0001
φP 13.9735 0.0128 14.0138 0.0143
φK 29.9619 0.1973 30.5119 0.1615
ωτ 0.4368 0.0007 0.4353 0.0008
ωπ 1.5998 0.0007 1.6005 0.0005
ωy -0.0025 0.0008 -0.0023 0.0030
e 2.9640 0.0001 2.9633 0.0001
z 4195.9727 0.0001 4158.7916 0.0001
ρa 0.9000 0.0007 0.9001 0.0006
ρe 0.8795 0.0007 0.8800 0.0006
ρx 0.9061 0.0006 0.9061 0.0005
ρz 0.9162 0.0006 0.9162 0.0004
ρυ 0.2400 0.0002 0.2388 0.0004
σa 0.0186 0.0011 0.0105 0.0009
σe 0.0150 0.0009 0.0134 0.0006
σx 0.0850 0.0036 0.0777 0.0031
σz 0.0170 0.0008 0.0113 0.0007
συ 0.0063 0.0001 0.0075 0.0001
Table G.2: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Germany.
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1980:Q1 - 1994:Q3 1994:Q4 - 2008:Q3
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
β 0.9992 0.0100 0.9975 0.0036
γ 0.0054 0.0057 0.0350 0.0057
φP 64.6013 4.7897 31.7841 1.8189
φK 33.1134 0.8700 14.5576 1.4126
ωτ 0.6722 0.0287 0.0538 0.0096
ωπ 0.8736 0.0287 1.6598 0.2561
ωy -0.1286 0.0302 -0.1627 0.0832
e 3.9728 0.0855 3.2327 0.5237
z 3343.6115 0.0006 3336.9033 0.0013
ρa 0.8379 0.0108 0.9935 0.0142
ρe 0.9929 0.0093 0.9093 0.0119
ρx 0.9952 0.0085 0.9891 0.0077
ρz 0.9953 0.0195 0.8519 0.0062
ρυ 0.0899 0.0662 0.5551 0.0022
σa 0.0291 0.0076 0.0119 0.0005
σe 0.0153 0.0021 0.0110 0.0001
σx 0.2501 0.0364 0.0192 0.0017
σz 0.0533 0.0017 0.0101 0.0003
συ 0.0128 0.0015 0.0034 0.0006
Table G.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Italy.
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1987:Q1 - 1997:Q4 1998:Q1 - 2008:Q3
Parameter Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
β 0.9929 0.0067 0.9957 0.0020
γ 0.0189 0.0069 0.0518 0.0075
φP 66.9756 3.5472 2.7164 0.3119
φK 26.8170 0.7038 7.4710 0.4382
ωτ 0.4707 0.0313 0.2367 0.0171
ωπ 0.6868 0.0339 1.2448 0.0480
ωy -0.0646 0.0098 -0.1006 0.0140
e 4.6627 0.0034 4.1651 0.0035
z 1932.4221 0.0001 1771.8852 0.0001
ρa 0.9542 0.0123 0.9411 0.0147
ρe 0.9440 0.0098 0.9648 0.0071
ρx 0.9625 0.0142 0.9903 0.0122
ρz 0.9477 0.0122 0.7833 0.0173
ρυ 0.4565 0.0027 0.0333 0.0025
σa 0.0235 0.0006 0.0079 0.0002
σe 0.0084 0.0001 0.0107 0.0002
σx 0.0389 0.0086 0.0083 0.0004
σz 0.0227 0.0008 0.0073 0.0002
συ 0.0071 0.0003 0.0054 0.0002
Table G.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Spain.
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Model Individual ESS
Parameters p-value p-value
z 0 0
σa 0 0
ρυ 0 0
φP 0 0
ρx 0 0
e 0 0
ρe 0 0
συ 0 0
σe 0 0
ωπ 0.0503 0
σx 0.0723 0
ρa 0.1106 0
γ 0.2181 0
ωy 0.5459 0
ρz 1 1
ωτ 1 1
σz 1 1
φK 1 1
β 1 1
Set of stable parameters (90% probability level):
S = {ρz, ωτ , σz, φK , β}
Table G.5: The table shows the p-values of Andrews’(1993) QLR test on individual
parameters for France. In addition the set of stable parameters is reported as well
as the p-values at each step of Inoue and Rossi’s (2011) ESS procedure.
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Model Individual ESS
Parameters p-value p-value
z 0 0
γ 0 0
e 0 0
β 0 0
συ 0 0
σa 0 0
σz 0 0
ρυ 0.1515 0
φK 0.5622 0
φP 0.6054 0
σx 1 0.5929
σe 1 0.4773
ωτ 1 1
ωπ 1 1
ρe 1 1
ρa 1 1
ρz 1 1
ωy 1 1
ρx 1 1
Set of stable parameters (90% probability level):
S = {σx, σe, ωτ , ωπ, ρe, ρa, ρz, ωy, ρx}
Table G.6: The table shows the p-values of Andrews’(1993) QLR test on individual
parameters for Germany. In addition the set of stable parameters is reported as
well as the p-values at each step of Inoue and Rossi’s (2011) ESS procedure.
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Model Individual ESS
Parameters p-value p-value
z 0 0
σz 0 0
ωτ 0 0
φK 0 0
ρa 0 0
ρv 0 0
ρz 0 0
φP 0 0
σx 0 0
συ 0 0
ρe 0 0
γ 0.0180 0
ωπ 0.1498 0
σa 0.4892 0.6207
σe 0.6370 0.7320
e 1 1
ρx 1 1
ωy 1 1
β 1 1
Set of stable parameters (90% probability level):
S = {σa, σe, e, ρx, ωy, β}
Table G.7: The table shows the p-values of Andrews’(1993) QLR test on individual
parameters for Italy. In addition the set of stable parameters is reported as well
as the p-values at each step of Inoue and Rossi’s (2011) ESS procedure.
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Model Individual ESS
Parameters p-value p-value
z 0 0
ρυ 0 0
e 0 0
σa 0 0
φK 0 0
σz 0 0
φP 0 0
σe 0 0
ωπ 0 0
ρz 0 0
ωτ 0 0
συ 0 0
σx 0.0249 0
γ 0.0066 0
ωy 0.5959 0.6288
ρe 0.8332 1
ρx 1 1
ρa 1 1
β 1 1
Set of stable parameters (90% probability level):
S = {ωy, ρe, ρx, ρa, β}
Table G.8: The table shows the p-values of Andrews’(1993) QLR test on individual
parameters for Spain. In addition the set of stable parameters is reported as well
as the p-values at each step of Inoue and Rossi’s (2011) ESS procedure.
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Chapter 4
Comparing Quadratic Costs of
Capital Accumulation: An
Empirical Assessment
4.1 Introduction
Over the last three decades DSGE models have become the paradigm for monetary
policy and business cycle analysis, both in academic and policy making circles (see
Canova and Ferroni, 2011). The origin of this class of models dates back to the
work of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983), who develop a
small scale frictionless neoclassical framework in which utility-maximizing rational
agents operate subject to budget constraints, technological restrictions, and Hicks-
neutral technology shocks. As outlined in Shea (1998), this so-called real business
cycle (RBC) model was seminal in several ways. First, the Schumpeterian idea
that random changes in productivity (technology shocks) can generate business
cycle ﬂuctuations was reintroduced. Second, these business cycle ﬂuctuations
were seen as optimal responses of rational agents to erratic changes in technology,
leaving no need for government policy interventions. Third, business cycles were
explained in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework in which optimal
behavior of agents can explicitly be derived from microeconomic ﬁrst principles
by specifying preferences, technologies, budget and resource constraints, and the
institutional environment.
Since the pioneering contribution of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long
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and Plosser (1983), the DSGE research program broadened considerably, generat-
ing a wide set of extensions of the basic RBC model, including New Keynesian fea-
tures like monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities (see Woodford, 2003).
Also the initial view of technology shocks as the ultimate source of business cycle
ﬂuctuations has soon been challenged by a number of studies, leading to the in-
corporation of a variety of economic disturbances into mainstream DSGE models
(see Danthine and Donaldson, 1993 and Gal´ı and Rabanal, 2004 for an overview).
A prominent candidate shock is the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock.
Even though already Keynes (1936, p. 313) assumed that the phenomenon of the
business cycle is “. . . mainly due to the way in which the marginal eﬃciency of
capital ﬂuctuates . . .”, Greenwood et al. (1988) were the ﬁrst to provide a theoret-
ical and quantitative analysis of the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock in a
single-shock dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework of the RBC type.
Employing a model with variable capacity utilization, Greenwood et al. (1988)
conclude that their calibrated RBC model is able to match the observed cycli-
cal ﬂuctuations in US data as well as DSGE models purely driven by technology
shocks.
Based on these investigations, DeJong et al. (2000a) choose a multiple-shock
approach to analyze the relative importance of a total factor productivity shock
and a marginal eﬃciency of investment shock in explaining US business cycle
ﬂuctuations. Using Bayesian estimation techniques, DeJong et al. (2000a, p. 328)
ﬁnd both shocks to play an important role in driving aggregate ﬂuctuations with
the total factor productivity shock having “. . . a greater initial impact on output
and investment . . .”, whereas the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock shows
“. . . a more lasting impact.”
Also, Justiniano et al. (2010) adopt this empirical approach and estimate a
multiple-shock DSGE model with New Keynesian features by employing Bayesian
inference methods. The estimated medium-scale model contains a host of nominal
and real frictions, like imperfect competition, sticky prices, habit formation in
consumption, variable capacity utilization, and investment adjustment costs as
well as several shocks including a marginal eﬃciency of investment shock. As a
result, Justiniano et al. (2010, p. 144) ﬁnd, “. . . that investment shocks – shocks
to the marginal eﬃciency of investment – are the main drivers of movements in
hours, output and investment over the [US] cycle . . .”, whereas the incorporation
of frictions such as convex investment adjustment costs plays “. . . a crucial role in
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turning investment shocks into a viable driving force of ﬂuctuations” (Justiniano
et al., 2010, p. 133).
The inclusion of adjustment costs into New Keynesian models to constrain
physical capital accumulation has become standard practice in the recent DSGE
literature, since, as outlined in Ireland (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007),
these frictions improve the ability of sticky-price models with endogenous invest-
ment to match the key features of the data substantially. A familiar way to model
these real rigidities is to assume that capital owners are subject to quadratic ad-
justment costs (see, for example, Kim, 1998; Ireland, 2003; Zanetti, 2007 and
Cogley and Yagihashi, 2010). As described in Groth and Kahn (2010), these con-
vex adjustment costs speciﬁcations can be classiﬁed into either costs to adjusting
the level of capital (capital adjustment costs) or costs to changing the level of
investment (investment adjustment costs). In particular, the latter speciﬁcation
becomes widely used in the context of monetary policy analysis, since, as argued
by Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), and Christiano et al. (2010,
p. 49), adjustment costs as a function of the change in investment are able to “. . .
reproduce VAR-based evidence that investment has a humped-shaped response
to a monetary policy shock.”1
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate empirically how these diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of quadratic adjustment costs aﬀect the ﬁt and the dynamics of a
DSGE model with real and nominal frictions featuring several exogenous stochas-
tic disturbances. Speciﬁcally, a preference shock, a monetary policy shock, and
a shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment compete with a standard RBC
technology shock in driving aggregate ﬂuctuations. We consider three diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of quadratic costs of capital accumulation. Thus, each variant of ad-
justment costs deﬁnes a distinct version of the underlying New Keynesian model.
Following DeJong et al. (2000a) and Justiniano et al. (2010), we use a Bayesian
approach to estimate and compare the diﬀerent model versions for both the euro
area and the US.
The main results of the analysis are as follows. First, we ﬁnd in part marked
diﬀerences between the estimated structural parameters across the three model
speciﬁcations. In particular, the estimates of persistence and volatility of the
marginal eﬃciency of investment shock vary with the choice of investment or cap-
1Groth and Khan (2010) outline further arguments made in favor of investment adjustment
costs in the recent DSGE literature.
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ital adjustment costs. The use of Monte Carlo ﬁltering techniques allows us to
take a closer look at the causes of these diﬀerences. Second, the implementa-
tion of either investment or capital adjustment costs aﬀects the dynamics of the
respective model speciﬁcations substantially. Our results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of
Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007, p. 589), who point out that
“. . . modeling capital adjustment costs as a function of the change in investment
rather than its level introduces additional dynamics in the [model’s] investment
equation, which is useful in capturing the hump-shaped response of investment to
various shocks.” Third, despite the ability of investment adjustment to generate
hump-shaped investment responses, the posterior odds comparison, which evalu-
ates the relative empirical ﬁt of a DSGE model, provides decisive evidence in favor
of the model speciﬁcations featuring capital adjustment costs. To further evaluate
where the model speciﬁcations fail to match the data, we compare the model ver-
sions’ implied characteristics to the actual data using standard moment criteria.
Consistent with the results from the posterior odds analysis, we obtain a better
ﬁt of the model versions with capital adjustment costs than with the speciﬁcation
including investment adjustment costs. Our ﬁndings appear to be qualitatively
robust across both data sets. We conclude that using estimated DSGE models
with quadratic costs of capital accumulation for policy analysis should be done
with caution, since the results could be inﬂuenced by the choice of either invest-
ment or capital adjustment costs both having in common the lack of an explicit
microfoundation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents
the theoretical setup of the three model speciﬁcations. Section 4.3 describes the
solution of the model versions and the estimation technique applied. Section
4.4 introduces the concepts of Monte Carlo ﬁltering and regionalized sensitivity
analysis. Section 4.5 explains the data and the priors used. Section 4.6 exposes the
use of Bayesian posterior odds analysis for model evaluation. Section 4.7 discusses
the results obtained from the Bayesian estimation, the MCF analysis, the posterior
odds comparison, the moment analysis, the impulse response analysis, and the
variance decomposition. Section 4.8 concludes. Technical details concerning the
theoretical setup, the model solution, and the construction of the likelihood appear
in the appendices.
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4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Overview
The model economy is a simple cashless closed-economy New Keynesian model
featuring a representative household, a representative ﬁnished goods-producing
ﬁrm, a continuum of intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and
a monetary authority. We consider three versions of the model that diﬀer only
with respect to the particular speciﬁcation of capital accumulation costs. The
representative household consumes, saves, and supplies labor and capital services
to the intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms. Moreover, the household is assumed to
face convex adjustment costs of capital accumulation. We consider three diﬀerent
quadratic speciﬁcations frequently used in the recent DSGE literature. The ﬁnal
output is produced by a representative ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm acting in
a perfectly competitive market. The ﬁnished goods-producing ﬁrm bundles the
continuum of intermediate goods manufactured by monopolistic competitors and
sells it to the household who divides the ﬁnal good between consumption an
investment. The intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms are owned by the household
and each of them produces a distinct, perishable intermediate good, also indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1] during each period t = 0, 1, 2, .... The assumption of monopoly power
of intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms allows nominal rigidities to arise in the
form of quadratic nominal price adjustment costs. Finally, there is a monetary
authority, which conducts monetary policy by setting the nominal interest rate
according to a Taylor-type rule. We next characterize the decisions taken by
households and ﬁrms before looking at the behavior of the monetary authority
and sketching the solution of the model.2
4.2.2 Households
The representative household enters period t holding Bt−1 nominal one-period
bonds and kt units of physical capital. During period t the household receives
Wtlt+Qtkt total nominal factor payments from supplying lt(i) units of labor and
kt(i) units of capital to each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm i ∈ [0, 1]. Wt and
Qt denote the nominal wage rate for labor and the nominal rental rate for capital,
2Appendices H and I provide a summary of the complete model and its solution.
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respectively. For all t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the household’s choices of lt(i) and kt(i) must
satisfy
lt =
∫ 1
0
lt(i)di,
where lt denotes total hours worked,
3 and
kt =
∫ 1
0
kt(i)di.
Further, the household receives nominal dividends from each intermediate goods
producing ﬁrm i ∈ [0, 1] aggregating to
Dt =
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)di.
The household uses its funds to purchase new bonds at the nominal cost Bt/rt,
where rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate between time periods, and output
from the ﬁnal goods sector at price Pt. Following Woodford (2003), we assume
that prices are measured in terms of a unit of account called “money”, but the
economy is cashless otherwise. The ﬁnal good can be used for consumption ct or
investment it. In the latter case convex (quadratic) adjustment costs accrue to the
household measured in terms of the ﬁnished good. As outlined in Kim (2000, p.
335) quadratic costs are justiﬁed on the basis that “. . . it is easier to absorb new
capacity into the ﬁrm at a slow rate.” We consider three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of
quadratic adjustment costs S indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which are frequently used
in the recent DSGE literature, namely:
i)
S1(it−1, it) = g1(it−1, it)it =
φ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
it,
employed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005), Del Negro and Schorfheide (2008),
and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010)
ii)
S2(it, kt) = g2(it, kt)kt =
φ
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2
kt,
3The endowment of time is normalized to one. Therefore, 1− lt denotes leisure.
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as in Ireland (2003), Dellas (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008), and Cogley
and Yagihashi (2010)
iii)
S3(it, kt) = g3(it, kt)it =
φ
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2
it,
similar in spirit to the speciﬁcations used in Kim (1998), Kim (2000), and
Groth and Khan (2010).
Letting the function gj(·, ·) parameterize the adjustment costs, it holds that
gj(·, ·) = g′j(·, ·) = 0 and g′′j (·, ·) > 0 in the steady state. Therefore, as described
in Christiano et al. (2005), the adjustment costs will only depend on the second-
order derivative. The parameter φ ≥ 0 governs the size of these adjustment costs.
Note that each adjustment cost speciﬁcation Sj deﬁnes a distinct version Mj of
the model.4
The capital accumulation process is given by
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit,
with 0 < δ < 1 denoting the rate of depreciation and xt representing a shock to
the marginal eﬃciency of investment introduced by Greenwood et al. (1988). The
shock is speciﬁed as
ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + εxt, (4.1)
with 0 < ρx < 1 and εxt ∼ N(0, σ2x).
The budget constraint of the representative household is given by
Bt−1 +Wtlt +Qtkt +Dt
Pt
≥ ct + it + Sj(·, ·) + Bt/rt
Pt
.
Moreover, we impose a no-Ponzi-game condition to prevent the household to make
excessive debts. Facing these constraints, the household maximizes the stream of
expected utility
E
∞∑
t=0
βtat
[
log(ct − hct−1)− χ l
1+η
t
1 + η
]
,
4Since g2 equals g3, we a priori expect M2 and M3 to share the same dynamics, whereas
diﬀerences presumably occur in the estimated magnitude of the parameter φ.
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where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, 0 ≤ h < 1 is the parameter that controls
the “degree” of habit persistence, χ > 0 measures the relative weight of leisure,
and η ≥ 0 denotes the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. The expected
utility function is subject to an intertemporal preference shock, which is assumed
to follow the autoregressive process
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat, (4.2)
where 0 < ρa < 1 and εat ∼ N(0, σ2a). Following Primiceri et al. (2006), we refer to
at as a “discount factor shock”, aﬀecting both the marginal utility of consumption
and the marginal disutility of hours worked.
4.2.3 Firms
The ﬁnal good yt is produced by a ﬁrm in a perfectly competitive environment,
bundling together the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods yt(i) according to the
constant returns to scale technology
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
,
where θ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
yt(i). Letting Pt(i) denoting the price of intermediate good i, the following demand
function for intermediate goods is obtained from proﬁt maximization:
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt,
with
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
]1/(1−θ)
.
Each intermediate good i is produced by a single monopolistically competitive
ﬁrm having access to the constant returns to scale technology
yt(i) ≤ kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α,
where 1 > α > 0 represents the elasticity of output with respect to capital. The
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technology shock zt follows the autoregressive process
ln(zt) = (1− ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (4.3)
with 1 > ρz > 0, z > 0, and εzt ∼ N(0, σ2z). While each ﬁrm i exerts some market
power, it acts as a price taker in the factor markets. Furthermore, the adjustment
of the ﬁrm’s nominal price Pt(i) is assumed to be costly, where the cost function
is convex in the size of the price adjustment. According to Rotemberg (1982),
these costs are deﬁned as
φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt,
where φP ≥ 0 governs the size of price adjustment costs and π denotes the gross
steady state rate of inﬂation targeted by the monetary authority. Following Ire-
land (1997), this speciﬁcation accounts for the negative eﬀects of price changes on
customer-ﬁrm relationships. As a consequence of these convex adjustment costs,
the ﬁrm’s optimization problem becomes dynamic. In accordance with Ireland
(2003), each ﬁrm chooses lt(i), kt(i), yt(i), and Pt(i) to maximize its total market
value
E
∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Dt(i)/Pt]
subject to the demand function for intermediate goods, where λt measures the
period tmarginal utility to the representative household provided by an additional
unit of proﬁts. The ﬁrm’s proﬁts are distributed to the household as dividends,
which are deﬁned in real terms by
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt(i)− Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt.
4.2.4 Monetary Authority
Following Clarida et al. (2000), Ireland (2000), Canova (2009), and Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2010), monetary policy is conducted through setting the short-
term nominal gross interest rate rt according to a modiﬁed Taylor rule (see Taylor,
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1993):
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ ln(υt).
The monetary authority gradually adjusts the nominal interest rate in response
to deviations of current gross inﬂation πt =
Pt
Pt−1 and output yt from their steady
state values, where ρr, ωπ and ωy are the parameters of the monetary policy rule.
5
The monetary policy shock υt follows the autoregressive process
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt, (4.4)
where 0 < ρυ < 1 and ευt ∼ N(0, σ2υ).
4.3 Solution and Estimation
Each version Mj of the model is characterized by a set of nonlinear diﬀerence
equations, encompassing the ﬁrst-order conditions for the three agents’ problems,
the laws of motion for the four exogenous shocks, and the monetary policy rule. To
close the model, we complete the following two steps. First, we assume symmetric
behavior within the intermediate sector to get from sectoral to aggregate variables,
which implies Pt(i) = Pt, yt(i) = yt, lt(i) = lt, kt(i) = kt, and Dt(i) = Dt, for
t = 0, 1, 2... and all i ∈ [0, 1]. Second, for all t = 0, 1, 2..., the market clearing
conditions for the bond market Bt = Bt−1 = 0 must hold.
The empirical implementation requires additional preparation of the underly-
ing model. Since the model is nonlinear, no exact analytical closed-form solution
can be derived in general. Therefore, an approximate solution is obtained by
computing the steady state, log-linearizing the system around the steady state,
and then applying a complex generalized Schur decomposition to solve the lin-
ear diﬀerence model under rational expectations (see appendices H and I).6 The
5Note that the gross steady state level of inﬂation π is assumed to be determined by the
monetary authority.
6As outlined in Adjemian et al. (2011), the core of the DYNARE solution algorithm for
computing the solution of a linear rational expectations model is predicated on a complex
generalized Schur decomposition as presented in Klein (2000).
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solution can be written in state space form with a state equation
st+1 = Γ0(μ)st + Γ1(μ)εt+1
and an observation equation
ft = Γ2(μ)st,
where the vector st contains the model’s state variables, the vector εt+1 consists
of the serially and mutually uncorrelated innovations7, and the vector ft com-
prises the model’s ﬂow variables. The matrices Γ0(μ),Γ1(μ), and Γ2(μ) contain
(functions of) the model’s parameters μi, i = 1, 2, . . . , k. These parameters are
estimated using Bayesian methods. In contrast to classical statistical inference,
where the parameters of interest are considered as ﬁxed, but unknown quantities,
the Bayesian approach assigns a probabilistic interpretation to the model’s pa-
rameters under consideration (see Robert, 2001; DeJong and Dave, 2007). Hence,
as stated in An and Schorfheide (2007), the Bayesian framework allows to in-
corporate information about the model’s parameters that is not contained in the
estimation sample through re-weighting the likelihood function of a model by a
prior density. Therefore, according to DeJong and Dave (2007), the likelihood
function has to be formed at ﬁrst, providing the foundation for both classical and
Bayesian approaches to statistical inference. As outlined in Canova (2007, p. 123),
“. . . the likelihood function of a state space model can be conveniently expressed
in terms of one-step-ahead forecast errors, conditional on the initial observations,
and of their recursive variance, both of which can be obtained with the Kalman
ﬁlter.”8
If
L(μ|X) ≡ p(X|μ) =
T∏
t=1
p(Xt|μ)
represents the likelihood function of the model, letting X denote the T observa-
tions of anm×1 vector of observable variables Xt and μ deﬁne a k×1 vector of the
model’s parameters, then, according to the Bayes theorem, for any speciﬁcation
7Speciﬁcally, we assume εt ∼ N(0,
∑
ε(μ)).
8See appendix J for a detailed presentation of the Kalman ﬁlter.
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of the prior distribution p(μ)9, the posterior distribution of the model is given by
p(μ|X) = p(μ)p(X|μ)
p(X)
=
p(μ)L(μ|X)
p(X)
∝ p(μ)L(μ|X),
where the unnormalized posterior density p(μ)L(μ|X) is referred to as the poste-
rior kernel K.10 Since, as described in Canova (2009), an analytical computation
of the posterior is practically impossible when μ has many dimensions, we use a
Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) method to obtain draws from the unknown
posterior distribution. “[This] method involves simulating from a complex and
generally multivariate target distribution . . . indirectly, by generating a Markov
chain with the target density as its stationary density” (Brooks and Gelman, 1998,
p. 434).
Speciﬁcally, we employ a Random-Walk Metropolis (RWM)-algorithm which
was ﬁrst applied to deliver draws from the posterior distribution of DSGE model
parameters by Schorfheide (2000) and Otrok (2001). According to An and Schorfheide
(2007) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde (2010) the RWM-algorithm can be characterized
by the following steps:
1. Employ a numerical optimization routine to maximize the log posterior ker-
nel lnK(μ|X) = ln p(μ)+lnL(μ|X) with respect to μ. Let μ˜ be the posterior
mode.
2. To initialize the procedure draw μ0 from the symmetric jumping distribution
N(μ˜, c
∑˜
), where
∑˜
deﬁnes the inverse of the Hessian computed at the
posterior mode μ˜ and c denotes a scale factor.11 Alternatively, specify a
starting value directly.
3. For t = 1, . . . , nsim draw a proposal μ
∗ from the jumping distribution
J(μ∗|μt−1) = N(μt−1, c∑˜). The jump from μt−1 is accepted (μt = μ∗) if
9Subsequently, we assume that the prior distribution can be factored as p(μ) =
∏k
i=1 p(μi).
10As stated in Hamilton (1994a) and DeJong and Dave (2007), p(X), which assigns probabili-
ties to speciﬁc values ofX , can be regarded as a constant from the perspective of the distribution
of μ.
11According to Otrok (2001), a suitable jumping distribution should be both easy to simulate
from and symmetric. These requirements are satisﬁed by the multivariate normal distribution.
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ϑt drawn from the uniform distribution U(0, 1) satisﬁes ϑt ≤ min{r, 1},
with r = p(μ
∗|X)
p(μt−1|X) =
K(μ∗|X)
K(μt−1|X) , and rejected otherwise (μ
t = μt−1).
4. Approximate the posterior expected value of a function g(μ) by 1
nsim
∑nsim
t=1 g(μ
t),
where the Ergodic theorem implies that lim
nsim→∞
1
nsim
∑nsim
t=1 g(μ
t)
a.s.−→ E[g(μ)]
(for details see Canova, 2007).
Following DeJong et al. (2000b), diﬀerent speciﬁcations of g(μ) can be considered.
If, for example, g(μ) deﬁnes the identity function, then the sequence of accepted
drawings {μt} can be used to approximate the posterior mean of μ. Alternatively,
g(μ) “. . . might be an indicator for a small interval, in which case the function
of interest is the (average) value of the posterior on that interval” (see DeJong et
al., 2000b, p. 213).
For a more detailed description of MCMC methods we refer to Gelman et
al. (2003) and Geweke (2005). The estimation procedure is implemented using
DYNARE, which is a public domain toolbox for the simulation and estimation of
DSGE models. To maximize the posterior kernel we employ Christopher Sim’s
hybrid optimization algorithm “csminwel”, which combines the derivative-based
Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shannon (BFGS) method with a simplex algorithm.12
As proposed by Roberts et al. (1997), the scale factor c is chosen to ensure an
acceptance rate around 25%. We simulate ﬁve chains13 of 100000 draws each,
and discarded the ﬁrst 50% as burn-in to eliminate any dependence of the chain
from its starting values. The stationarity of the chains was monitored using the
convergence checks proposed by Brooks and Gelman (1998).
4.4 Monte Carlo Filtering and Regionalized Sen-
sitivity Analysis
4.4.1 Methodology
According to Ratto (2008), a number of issues regularly arises concerning the
estimation and evaluation process of DSGE models, especially when these models
12For a detailed presentation of simplex and BFGS methods we refer to DeJong and Dave
(2007) and Heer and Maussner (2009).
13Note that only one chain is used for inference, whereas the remaining chains are employed
to diagnose MCMC convergence.
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feature a complex structure and a rich parametrization:
i) Which portion of the prior parameter space violates the Blanchard-Kahn
(1980) conditions, leading to indeterminacy or instability of the model?14
ii) Which of the structural parameters mostly drive the ﬁt of a particular ob-
served times series?
iii) Are there any conﬂicts or trade-oﬀ’s between the ﬁt of one observed time
series versus another?
As shown in Ratto (2008), Monte Carlo ﬁltering (MCF) and regionalized (or
generalized) sensitivity analysis (RSA) can be used to answer these questions.
Subsequently, we give a brief general description of both techniques before we
focus on the application of these tools in a DSGE context. A detailed treatment
of MCF and RSA can be found in Saltelli et al. (2004) and Saltelli et al. (2008).
According to Young et al. (1996) and Saltelli (2002), MCF denotes a pro-
cess of rejecting sets of model simulations that do not fulﬁll certain pre-speciﬁed
characteristics. More precisely, following Giglioli et al. (2004, p. 279), MCF is
performed by “. . . mapping the space of the input factors into one or more model
outputs, censoring the model output set into acceptable/non-acceptable (or be-
havioral or non-behavioral), and mapping back the acceptable (or behavioral) set
into the space of input factors.” Hence, two tasks are required for an MCF exercise
(see Saltelli et al., 2008, p. 154):
• “[A] qualitative deﬁnition of the system behavior (a set of constraints:
thresholds, ceilings, time bounds etc. based on available information on
the system);
• [A] binary classiﬁcation of model outputs based on the speciﬁed behavior
deﬁnition (qualiﬁes a simulation as behavioral, B, if the model output lies
within constraints, non-behavioral, B¯, otherwise).”
RSA, originally developed in the context of environmental models by Spear
and Hornberger (1980), goes one step further by using the output of a MCF
experiment for sensitivity analysis purposes (see Giglioli et al., 2004; Pappenberger
et al., 2008). As in MCF, for a given vector of input factors, model output is
14A detailed description of the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions is given in appendix I.
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categorized (ﬁltered) into either behavioral B or non-behavioral B¯. “The [B− B¯]
categorization is mapped back onto the [input factors], each of which is thus also
partitioned into [an acceptable and a non-acceptable sub-sample]” (Saltelli et al.,
2008, p. 185). Then, for each input factor, the sets of model inputs being classiﬁed
as part of the behavioral subset B are compared with the sets of model inputs
in subset B¯, qualiﬁed as non-behavioral. Speciﬁcally, following Saltelli (2002), a
statistical hypothesis test is applied to check, whether the two subsets are samples
from the same distribution. An input factor is regarded as key factor in driving
the model behavior, when the generated sample distributions are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent (see Ratto, 2008).
4.4.2 Mapping Stability
As outlined in Riggi and Tancioni (2010), the identiﬁcation of the stability domain
of the model under consideration is a fundamental issue in Bayesian DSGE model
estimation, because it allows to initialize the estimation within the portion of
the parameter space that satisﬁes the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions for a
unique stable solution. Since for most DSGE models an analytical derivation of
the stability properties is very diﬃcult if not impossible, RSA provides a valuable
tool to detect the stability region of a model (see Ratto, 2008). Following Saltelli
et al. (2004) and Ratto (2008), the steps for the analysis are as follows:
• Initially, N Monte Carlo runs are performed, sampling the model parameters
from their prior distributions and propagating them through the model.15
Therefore, each Monte Carlo run is associated with a speciﬁc vector of values
of the input parameters.
• Depending on whether or not Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions are sat-
isﬁed, the model output is is categorized into either behavioral or non-
behavioral and then mapped back onto the input parameters, each of which
is thus also partitioned into an acceptable and a non-acceptable sub-sample.
Target stable behavior is classiﬁed as B, unacceptable behavior, i.e., insta-
bility or indeterminacy, is classiﬁed as B¯. Hence, given the total number N
15In the applications presented below, the samples are generated using Sobol’ quasi-Monte
Carlo (LPτ ) sequences, which allow better eﬃciency properties compared to traditional pseudo-
random Monte Carlo sampling (see Ratto, 2008; Saltelli et al., 2008). For a detailed description
of quasi-Monte Carlo techniques we refer to Judd (1998), Sobol’ (1998), and Saltelli et al. (2008).
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of Monte Carlo runs, two subsets are obtained: (μi|B) of n elements and
(μi|B¯) of n¯ elements, where n+ n¯ = N . According to Saltelli et al. (2008, p.
185), “[i]n general, the two sub-samples will come from diﬀerent unknown
probability density functions fn(μi|B) and fn¯(μi|B¯).”
• To detect the parameters that are mostly responsible for driving the DSGE
model into the target stable behavior, the distributions fn(μi|B) and fn¯(μi|B¯)
are compared for each parameter independently, using a nonparametric test
statistic of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov type. Since we are dealing with empir-
ical distributions, the Smirnov two-sample test (two-sided version) is per-
formed (see Conover, 1999; Saltelli et al., 2004), to compare the null hy-
pothesis that the distributions fn(μi|B) and fn¯(μi|B¯) are identical against
the alternative hypothesis that the distributions are diﬀerent:
H0 : fn(μi|B) = fn¯(μi|B¯)
H1 : fn(μi|B) 	= fn¯(μi|B¯).
The test statistic dn,n¯ is deﬁned as the greatest absolute vertical distance
between the cumulative probability functions Fn(μi|B) and Fn¯(μi|B¯), i.e.,
dn,n¯(μi) = sup |Fn(μi|B)− Fn¯(μi|B¯)|.
Hence, the test is able to answer the following question (see Saltelli et al.,
2004, p. 154): “At what signiﬁcance level α does the computed values of
dn,n¯ determine the rejection of H0?” According to Ratto (2008, p. 118), the
smaller α (or, equivalently, the larger dn,n¯), “. . . the more important is the
parameter in driving the behavior of the DSGE model”.
4.4.3 Mapping the Fit
While the estimation procedure outlined in section 4.3 selects values for the struc-
tural parameters that allow an overall optimal ﬁt of the model with respect to a
multivariate data set, MCF techniques can be used to map the ﬁt of each singu-
lar time series in complex multivariate systems, i.e., MCF can detect “. . . which
parameter values would be selected if one single observed series at a time were to
be ﬁtted” (Ratto, 2008, p. 125).
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According to Ratto (2008), the MCF procedure is initialized, sampling the
model parameters μi, i = 1, 2, . . . , k, from their respective posterior distributions.
Each Monte Carlo run is associated with a speciﬁc vector of values of the model
parameters. Let Xt = [x˜1t, ..., x˜mt]
′ encompass all observed times series x˜j with
j = 1, 2, . . . , m. Then, for each observed time series a binary classiﬁcation of the
structural parameters into either B or B¯ is performed, where, based on the root
mean squared error (RMSE) of the one-step-ahead model prediction, B labels the
parameter values that produce the smallest 10 percent RMSEs. This procedure
leads to m distinct ﬁltering rules, each rule identifying the structural parameters
that provide optimal ﬁt for a speciﬁc observed series. Hence, given the total
number m of observed time series x˜j , we obtain m distinct empirical distributions
fx˜j(μi|B) for each parameter μi. Therefore, MCF enables to identify the presence
of trade-oﬀs or conﬂicts for structural parameters when taking the DSGE model
to the data. Following Ratto (2008, p. 126), trade-oﬀ’s for a given parameter are
detected, if the following two conditions are fulﬁlled:
• “[A]t least two distributions fx˜j (μi|B) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
posterior distribution
• and such distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to each other.”
If only the ﬁrst condition holds, there are likely to be conﬂicts between the prior
distribution and the likelihood.
4.5 Data and Priors
To estimate the structural parameters of the model speciﬁcations we use quarterly
(seasonally adjusted) euro area and US data from 1980:Q1 to 2006:Q4.16 Follow-
ing Canova and Ferroni (2012), we decide to stop at 2006 to avoid complications
stemming from the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The euro area data come from the Area
Wide Model (AWM) database (see Fagan et al. 2005) and the Euro Area Real-
Time Database (RTDB), whereas the US data are taken from the FRED database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.17 We treat four variables as directly
16We veriﬁed that our main results are robust to extending the US data back to 1948 (see
table L.1).
17Appendix K presents the data sources.
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observed: real consumption, real investment, gross domestic product (GDP) price
inﬂation, and the short-run interest rate.18 The series for consumption and in-
vestment are expressed in per capita terms.19 We detrend all time series applying
the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ﬁlter, although being aware of the potential problem
of spuriousness, as discussed in DeJong and Dave (2007) and Canova and Fer-
roni (2011).20 By detrending inﬂation and the short-run interest rate, we follow
Coenen and Wieland (2005), Juillard et al. (2006), Casares (2007), Canova and
Ferroni (2012) and eliminate the downward trend in both series that occurs over
the sample.21
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 present the prior distributions of the parameters, which are
selected according to the following rule:
• Beta distributions are chosen for parameters that must lie in an interval
[0, 1] (ρr, ρa, ρz, ρx, ρv, h and α);
• gamma distributions are used for parameters that must be positive (φp, φ,
ln(z));
• inverse gamma distribution are selected for the standard deviation of the
shocks (σa, σz , σx and σv);
• and normal distributions are picked for all other parameters (ωπ and ωy).
We follow Sahuc and Smets (2008) and assume a prior mean of 0.75 for ρr, ρa, ρz,
and ρx, setting each standard deviations to 0.15. Regarding ρv and h we chose
prior means of 0.5 and standard deviations of 0.1 and 0.2, respectively. With
respect to α, we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and set a prior with a mean
of 0.3 and a standard deviation of 0.05. For the parameter φP , we assume a
prior mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. Regarding the adjustment cost
parameter φ, the prior mean is set to 4 (M1), 30 (M2), and 1500 (M3) with a
prior standard deviation equal to one-fourth of the respective mean. Concerning
18Note that the model contains as many structural shocks as observable variables, so that the
problem of stochastic singularity is avoided (see Ingram et al., 1994).
19Concerning the euro area time series on population, quarterly data is interpolated from the
annual series using cubic spline interpolation.
20 To facilitate the process of parameter estimation, we follow the procedure suggested in
DeJong and Dave (2007, Chapter 11.2.5) and perform further data alignment by scaling the
ﬁltered series using their (relative) means.
21The use of original (not detrended) or quadratically detrended series of inﬂation and short-
run interest rates did not alter our results substantially.
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ln(z), we chose a prior mean of 8.13 for the euro area and 9.18 for the US, both
with a standard deviation of 1.22 For σa, σz, σx, and σv we follow Canova (2009)
and assume priors with a mean of 0.01 and a standard deviation of 0.5. The prior
distributions of the reaction coeﬃcients ωπ and ωy are centered on the prior mean
values 1.3 and 0.125 with standard deviations equal to 0.3 and 0.2, respectively.
Since the model contains several parameters that are diﬃcult to estimate pre-
cisely, we decide to ﬁx them prior to estimation (i.e. impose dogmatic priors).
The discount factor β is set equal to 0.99 following standard practice. We set η
to a standard intermediate value of 1.35 (see Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, 2010), while
χ is calibrated to assure that the representative household’s labor supply in the
steady state amounts to one-third of its time. In addition, the depreciation rate δ
is set to 0.025, corresponding to an annual depreciation rate of about 10 percent
and θ is ﬁxed at 6, implying a steady state markup of prices over marginal cost
of 20 percent. Finally, the respective steady state inﬂation rate is set equal to the
average rate of inﬂation for the whole sample under consideration.
To identify which portion of the prior parameter space violates the Blanchard-
Kahn (1980) conditions, leading to indeterminacy or instability of the three model
speciﬁcations, we employ the RSA procedure based on a sample of size 2048 for
both regions.23 The RSA analysis shows that for all model speciﬁcations and
both regions 85.1 percent of the prior space is stable, while 14.9 percent of the
prior domain gives indeterminacy. Hence, the RSA results suggest a well-deﬁned
prior space, ensuring that the subsequent posterior update is not aﬀected by a
considerable portion of violations of Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions (see Ratto
et al., 2009). Figures L.1 − L.6 show, that indeterminacy is essentially driven by
the monetary policy parameter ωπ. The Smirnov test statistic dn,n¯(ωπ) rejects the
null hypothesis based on a signiﬁcance level α = 1%. The cumulative distributions
for stable behavior are shifted to the right, indicating that the model speciﬁcation
are most likely to have a unique stable solution if ωπ > 1, i.e., when the Taylor
principle is satisﬁed.
22We set the prior means of ln(z) so that the steady state values of ct and it in the model
match the respective average values of consumption and investment in the data.
23The RSA is performed using the Sensitivity Analysis Toolbox for DYNARE, a collection of
MATLAB routines developed by Marco Ratto (2009).
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4.6 Posterior Odds Comparison
According to Geweke (1999), Bayesian inference provides a framework to assess
the empirical performance of several competing models by comparing the dif-
ferent speciﬁcations through their posterior odds ratio. Moreover, as shown by
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2004), asymptotically, the best model
under the Kullback-Leibler distance will have the highest posterior probability,
with the former measure having a complete axiomatic foundation that justiﬁes
why it is precisely the criterion a rational agent should use to choose between
models (even if these models are misspeciﬁed and/or nonnested).24
To derive the posterior odds ratio, we follow DeJong and Dave (2007) and
rewrite the posterior to emphasize that the probability assigned to a given value
of μ is conditional not only on the observations X, but also on the speciﬁc versions
Mj of the model.25 For a given model speciﬁcation Mj, the posterior can be
written as
p(μMj |X,Mj) =
p(μMj |Mj)L(μMj |X,Mj)
p(X|Mj) ,
letting the notation μMj accentuate the potential for μ to be speciﬁc to a particular
version of the model Mj. Integrating this expression over μMj gives∫
p(μMj |X,Mj)dμMj︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
=
∫
p(μMj |Mj)L(μMj |X,Mj)
p(X|Mj) dμMj ,
which can be rewritten to form an expression for the marginal likelihood associated
with model speciﬁcation Mj:
p(X|Mj) =
∫
p(μMj |Mj)L(μMj |X,Mj)dμMj .
The marginal likelihood is the probability that the model speciﬁcation assigns to
having observed the data.
As stated in DeJong and Dave (2007), just as the Bayes theorem can be used
to derive the conditional probability associated with μMj , it can also be applied
24As stated in Canova (2007), the Kullback-Leibler distance measures the discrepancy between
the model distribution and the true distribution of the data.
25For the sake of consistency with section 4.2, we refer to speciﬁc versions of the model rather
than to speciﬁc models.
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to calculate the conditional probability with respect to a particular version of the
model Mj:
p(Mj|X) = p(Mj)p(X|Mj)
p(X)
=
p(Mj)
[∫
p(μMj |Mj)L(μMj |X,Mj)dμMj
]
p(X)
,
where p(Mj) denotes the prior probability assigned to a particular version of the
model Mj. Taking the ratio of conditional probabilities for two model speciﬁca-
tions Mj and Mj′ with j, j ′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} gives the posterior odds ratio:
POMj,Mj′ =
p(Mj|X)
p(Mj′|X)
=
p(Mj)[
∫
p(μMj |Mj)L(μMj |X,Mj)dμMj ]
p(Mj′)[
∫
p(μMj′ |Mj′)L(μMj′ |X,Mj′)dμMj′ ]
,
where
p(Mj)
p(Mj′)
is called the prior odds ratio and
[
∫
p(μMj |Mj)L(μMj |X,Mj)dμMj ]
[
∫
p(μMj′ |Mj′)L(μMj′ |X,Mj′)dμMj′ ]
is referred to as the Bayes factor. As stated in Kass and Raftery (1995, p. 777),
the Bayes factor represents “a summary of the evidence by the data in favor of
one scientiﬁc theory, represented by a statistical model, as opposed to another.”
Note that the Bayes factor corresponds to the posterior odds ratio if the prior
odds ratio is set to unity, i.e., either model speciﬁcation is equally probable a
priori. To interpret the Bayes factor, Jeﬀreys (1961) suggests the following rule
of thumb:
i) a Bayes factor between 1 and 3 provides very slight evidence,
ii) a Bayes factor between 3 and 10 provides slight evidence,
iii) a Bayes factor between 10 and 32 provides strong evidence,
iv) a Bayes factor between 32 and 100 provides very strong evidence and
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v) a Bayes factor above 100 provides decisive evidence
in favor of speciﬁcation Mj against Mj′.
Further, relaxing the assumption of a unity prior odds ratio, posterior odds
can be used to compare a set of model speciﬁcations by computing their posterior
probabilities. Following Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rub´ıo-Ramirez (2004) and An
and Schorfheide (2007), the posterior probability of M1 against M2 and M3 is
given by
ppost1 =
1
POM1,M1 + POM2,M1 + POM3,M1
.26
As outlined in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Canova (2007), the practical
diﬃculty in implementing posterior odds comparisons is the computation of the
marginal likelihood because the integral
p(X|Mj) =
∫
p(μMj |Mj)L(μMj |X,Mj)dμMj
typically has no analytical solution. Since there are several approaches to com-
pute marginal likelihoods, usually relying on approximations or simulation-based
methods, we decide to choose Geweke’s (1999) modiﬁed harmonic mean estimator
to calculate the marginal likelihood based on the output of the RWM-algorithm.27
The theoretical foundation of this approach is the harmonic mean identity, which
implies that the reciprocal of the integrated likelihood is equal to the posterior har-
monic mean of the likelihood (see Raftery et al., 2007). Following Canova (2006)
and An and Schorfheide (2007), the modiﬁed harmonic mean estimator can be
described as follows: For each version of the model Mj, the marginal likelihood
p(X|Mj) is approximated using[
1
nsim
nsim∑
t=1
f(μtMj)
p(μtMj |Mj)L(μtMj |X,Mj)
]−1
,
where every single vector μtMj comes from the RWM iterations, denoting the draw
t of the parameters μ of model speciﬁcation Mj and f is a truncated normal dis-
26The computation of ppost2 and ppost3 proceeds in the same manner.
27While DYNARE allows to choose between a Laplace-approximation method and the modi-
ﬁed harmonic mean estimator, we prefer the latter, motivated by the results of Adolfson et al.
(2007), who ﬁnd the modiﬁed harmonic mean estimator to be numerically stable in the RWM
case.
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tribution, which, to make the numerical approximation eﬃcient, should be chosen
so that the summands are of equal magnitude. For a more detailed discussion of
the modiﬁed harmonic mean estimator we refer to Geweke (1999).
4.7 Results
4.7.1 Bayesian Estimation
Table 4.1 and 4.2 present the parameter estimates of the three model speciﬁcations
across the two data sets. Each table lists posterior means, posterior standard de-
viations, and highest posterior density (HPD) intervals containing the 90 percent
highest posterior density.28 The respective prior and posterior distributions of the
parameters are graphed in ﬁgures L.7 − L.12.
For both regions, ﬁgures L.7−L.12 show the data to be reasonably informative
about the shock parameters, since their prior and posterior distributions appear
to be relatively distinct. The posterior means of ρa, ρz , and ρv indicate the three
shocks to be quite persistent across all model speciﬁcations M1 −M3, whereas
the monetary policy shock appears to be less persistent than the preference and
the technology shock. Contrary to these results, ρx diﬀers substantially in magni-
tude between M1 on the one hand and M2 and M3 on the other hand, since, for
both regions, the respective HPD intervals do not overlap. While the latter speci-
ﬁcations exhibit a high persistence of the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock,
the estimated mean of the persistence parameter is considerably lower under M1.
Except for ρz, we ﬁnd the persistence parameters of the shocks to be relatively
higher in the euro area. For example, the posterior mean of the autoregressive
parameter ρa is almost two times higher in the euro area than in the US (across
all model speciﬁcations), which is broadly consistent with the ﬁndings reported
in Smets and Wouters (2005).
Further diﬀerences between M1 and the speciﬁcations M2/M3 appear when
turning to the estimated standard deviations of the innovations. Except for σv,
the standard deviations of the innovations appear to be higher under model spec-
iﬁcation M1 in both the euro area and the US. For both regions, the posterior
28For a detailed description of HPD intervals and their construction we refer to Gill and King
(2003), whereas the computation of posterior standard deviations is outlined in DeJong and
Dave (2007).
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means of σa and σz increase by at least one respective posterior standard devi-
ation under M1, while in the case of σx the HPD intervals of M2 and M3 do
not even overlap with the intervals of M1. Despite these diﬀerences, M1 −M3
coincide in detecting the shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment to be the
most volatile followed by the technology and the preference shock, whereas the
monetary policy shock features the lowest volatility. Our estimates are in line
with the results of Adolfson et al. (2008) and Gelain et al. (2012) for closed
economy DSGE models of the euro area featuring adjustment costs of the form
S1, both ﬁnding the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock to be relatively low
in persistence but high in volatility. For the US, our results coincide with the
ﬁndings of Ireland (2003) and Justiniano et al. (2010), who both obtain relatively
large estimates of σx, implementing adjustment cost speciﬁcations of the form S2
and S1, respectively. Overall, we ﬁnd the standard deviations of the innovations
(σa, σz , σx, and σv) to be relatively higher in the US than in the euro area.
Compared to the results of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Adjemian et al.
(2007) for the euro area, we obtain smaller values of the degree of backward-
looking behavior of consumption across all model speciﬁcations, whereas our esti-
mates for the US, which appear to be higher than in the euro area, are in line with
the ﬁndings of Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2005), and Ireland
(2007). Further, we ﬁnd the posterior mean of h under M1 to exceed the esti-
mated means under M2 and M3 by more than one posterior standard deviation
in case of the euro area, while these diﬀerences become less apparent for the US.
Regarding the price adjustment cost parameter φP , we ﬁnd the posterior means
ofM2 andM3 to increase by at least one posterior standard deviation under M1,
both in the euro area and the US. Concerning its magnitude, our estimates of the
price adjustment cost parameter are consistent with the results of Gerali et al.
(2010) for the euro area and Ireland (2001) for the US. Moreover, the degree of
price stickiness seems to be higher in the US than in the euro area, although this
result is in line with the ﬁndings of Smets and Wouters (2005) it is at odds with
the micro-evidence on price stickiness presented in A´lvarez et al. (2006).
Turning ﬁrst to the results for the euro area, the data point to lower adjustment
costs S1 than were embodied in the prior, since we ﬁnd the posterior distribution
for φ to be left-shifted relative to the prior distribution with a posterior mean lying
more than one posterior standard deviation below its prior mean. Concerning
adjustment cost speciﬁcations S2 and S3, the respective prior and posterior means
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of φ appear to be similar in size, whereas the posterior distributions are more
tightly distributed than the priors.
In case of the US, we ﬁnd the data to be quite informative about the ad-
justment costs parameter across all speciﬁcations S1 − S3, since the posterior
distributions for φ are left-shifted relative to the prior distributions with the re-
spective posterior means lying partly more than one posterior standard deviation
below their prior means. For S1, our results are in line with Levin et al. (2005)
and Zubairy (2010), whereas our ﬁndings for S2 are consistent with the estimates
of Ireland (2003). By broadening the scope of the analysis across data sets, we
perceive adjustment costs to be higher in the euro area than in the US.
The estimates of α, measuring share of capital in the production function for
intermediate goods, are almost exactly 0.3 across all model speciﬁcations for both
regions. As shown in ﬁgures L.7−L.12 the respective posterior distributions of α
are centered very close to the prior, but are much more tightly distributed, both
which is due to the data alignment described in section 4.5.
Turning to the monetary policy reaction function estimated for the euro area,
we ﬁnd the respective posterior means of ωπ and ωy to be approximately equal
across the model speciﬁcations M1 − M3, whereas the posterior mean of the
interest-rate-smoothing parameter ρr under M1 exceeds the respective estimates
under M2 and M3 by more than two posterior standard deviations. The esti-
mated means of ωπ are in line with results for the euro area documented by Smets
and Wouters (2003), Adolfson et al. (2008), and Sahuc and Smets (2008), while
we ﬁnd smaller values for the posterior mean of ρr. Like in Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Adolfson et al. (2008), we obtain small estimates of the posterior mean
of ωy, albeit our results all show a negative sign.
In case of the US a similar pattern occurs, since the respective posterior means
of ωπ and ωy are approximately equal across the model speciﬁcations M1 −M3,
whereas the posterior mean of the interest-rate-smoothing parameter ρr underM1
exceeds the respective estimates under M2 and M3 by more than one posterior
standard deviation. In accordance with the results for the euro area, we ﬁnd small
values of the posterior mean of ωy, although the estimates turn out to be positive
for the US. The posterior means of ωπ and ωy are consistent with the estimates
provided in Smets and Wouters (2007) and Sahuc and Smets (2008), while we ﬁnd
smaller values for the posterior mean of ρr. By comparing the estimated policy
rules across regions, it turns out that the interest rate persistence is higher and
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the response to inﬂation is stronger in the US.
Finally, we ﬁnd the estimates of ln(z) to be almost equal across all model
speciﬁcations within each region. Note that ln(z) has no impact on the dynamics
of the model speciﬁcations, since it only serves to determine steady states (see
section 4.5). As displayed in ﬁgures L.7 − L.12 prior and posterior distribution
are almost indistinguishable, indicating that the data are uninformative regarding
the location of ln(z).
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4.7.2 Monte Carlo Filtering Analysis
To identify the presence of trade-oﬀs or conﬂicts for the structural parameters
when taking the three model speciﬁcations to the data, we apply the MCF proce-
dure described in section 4.4.3 combined with a Smirnov two-sample test.29 The
Smirnov test answers the question: “At what signiﬁcance level α can the null hy-
pothesis that fx˜j(μi|B) equals the respective posterior distribution be rejected?”30
Figures L.13− L.36 present the cumulative empirical probability distributions of
the ﬁltered samples corresponding to the best ﬁt for each observed time series (c,
i, π, r) and the respective cumulative posterior probability distributions (base),
while the tables L.2 − L.7 contain the p-values (in percent) of the Smirnov two-
sample test.
In section 4.7.1, we found that the most remarkable diﬀerences between spec-
iﬁcation M1 on the one hand and M2 and M3 on the other hand occur with
respect to the parameters ρx and σx, capturing the persistence and volatility of
the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock. We detected the posterior means of
ρx under speciﬁcation M2 and M3 to be considerably higher than under M1,
whereas the estimates of σx turned out to be markedly lower. In the remain-
der of this section we will use the MCF analysis to identify the causes of these
diﬀerences.
Concerning ρx, the three speciﬁcations diﬀer markedly with regard to the
cumulative empirical probability distributions Fr(ρx|B). We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between Fr(ρx|B) and the cumulative posterior distribution (euro area)
or even support for smaller values of the persistence parameter (US) in case ofM1,
while observations of r clearly support larger values of ρx, i.e., a more persistent
shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment, in speciﬁcations M2 and M3.
This provides an explanation for the relative higher estimates of the marginal
eﬃciency of investment shock’s persistence under speciﬁcation M2 and M3 com-
pared to M1.
Turning to σx, the model versions diﬀer especially regarding the relative loca-
tion of Fi(σx|B) and Fπ(σx|B) with respect to the particular cumulative posterior
29We perform the MCF analysis using the Sensitivity Analysis Toolbox for DYNARE, a
collection of MATLAB routines developed by Marco Ratto (2009). The MCF procedure is
based on a sample of size 6000.
30Recall from section 4.4.3, that B labels the parameter values producing the smallest 10
percent RMSEs.
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distributions. For the euro area, the observations for i signiﬁcantly prefer larger
values of σx under M1, whereas in case of M2 and M3, i data support smaller
values than the ones implied by the posterior distribution. With regard to the US,
the preferences of the observations are qualitatively consistent across all model
speciﬁcations, although the p-values show that the preferences of i and π obser-
vations for lower values of σx are considerably stronger under M2 and M3 than
under M1. Hence, the MCF results give a clue why speciﬁcations M2 and M3
exhibit a lower volatility of the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock than M1.
4.7.3 Model Evaluation
4.7.3.1 Bayesian Model Comparison
To assess the overall time series ﬁt of the three model speciﬁcations under con-
sideration, we list the respective prior probabilities, marginal log likelihoods and
posterior probabilities in table 4.3. By assigning equal probabilities to the model
speciﬁcations a priori, the exponentiated diﬀerences of marginal log likelihoods
can be interpreted as posterior odds.31
Euro Area
M1 M2 M3
Prior probability 1/3 1/3 1/3
Marginal log likelihood 1790.2238 1800.6993 1800.6304
Posterior probability 0.0000 0.5172 0.4828
US
M1 M2 M3
Prior probability 1/3 1/3 1/3
Marginal log likelihood 1606.2136 1617.3322 1616.0600
Posterior probability 0.0000 0.7811 0.2189
Table 4.3: Prior probabilities, marginal log likelihoods and posterior probabilities
across model speciﬁcations and regions.
31The posterior odds of model speciﬁcation Mj versus Mj′ with j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} can be
obtained by multiplying the prior odds, which are unity in the case of equal prior probabilities,
with the Bayes factor exp [ln p(Mj |X)− ln p(Mj′ |X)].
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For both data sets we ﬁnd M2 to perform best in explaining the data showing
the highest posterior probability, whereas speciﬁcation M1, gaining the lowest
marginal log likelihood, turns out to have a zero posterior probability. More
speciﬁcally, the posterior odds provide very slight evidence in favor of M2 against
M3 and decisive evidence in favor of M2 against M1 for the euro area. In case
of the US, Jeﬀreys’ (1961) rule of thumb indicates slight evidence in favor of M2
against M3 and decisive evidence in favor of M2 against M1.
As discussed in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2008), policymakers are often
interested in how theoretical models compare with more densely parameterized
and less restrictive reference models. Hence, in line with Schorfheide (2000),
Smets and Wouters (2003), and Juillard et al. (2008), we broaden the scope of
the analysis by comparing the three model speciﬁcations with Bayesian vector
autoregressive (BVAR) models at various lag lengths (lags 1 to 4).32 Concerning
the prior distributions of the BVARs we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) and
use a modiﬁed version of the so-called Minnesota prior, which originally dates
back to Litterman (1980) and Doan et al. (1984).33 The prior is made of two
components, with a dummy observation prior, constructed according to Sims’
version of the Minnesota prior (see Doan et al.), being augmented by Jeﬀrey’s
improper prior. For a detailed description of the BVAR setup we refer to Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005).34
Table 4.4 displays prior probabilities, marginal log likelihoods and posterior
probabilities of the three model speciﬁcations and the four BVARs.35 For both
data sets our three model speciﬁcations do not compare favorably to the best
ﬁtting BVAR. In contrast to large-scale DSGE models as developed by Smets
and Wouters (2007) or Ratto et al. (2009), which are able to outperform BVAR
models, our deliberately stylized speciﬁcations lack of features like wage and price
indexation or the usage of a large set of shocks. Although to some extent criticized
32Pre-samples are used to initialize the BVARs.
33Since, as outlined in Lu¨tkepohl (2005), the Minnesota prior was primarily suggested for
certain non-stationary processes, we slightly modify the prior, following the approach of Lubik
and Schorfheide (2005).
34As outlined in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2011), the Minnesota prior depends on several
hyperparameters. According to Smets and Wouters (2007) and Ratto et al. (2009), we set
the prior decay and tightness parameters to 0.5 and 3, respectively. Further, the parameter
determining the weight on own-persistence (sum-of-coeﬃcients on own lags) is set at 2 and the
parameter determining the degree of co-persistence is set at 5.
35The marginal likelihoods of the BVARs are computed using the MATLAB codes provided
by Christopher Sims, which are available at http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/VARtools/.
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Euro Area
M1 M2 M3 BVAR(1) BVAR(2) BVAR(3) BVAR(4)
Prior probability 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
Marginal log likelihood 1790.2238 1800.6993 1800.6304 1807.1802 1813.9321 1808.1124 1803.7778
Posterior probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0012 0.9958 0.0030 0.0000
US
M1 M2 M3 BVAR(1) BVAR(2) BVAR(3) BVAR(4)
Prior probability 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
Marginal log likelihood 1606.2136 1617.3322 1616.0600 1636.0099 1647.9345 1656.7848 1660.5414
Posterior probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0228 0.9772
Table 4.4: Cross-validation: BVARs and model speciﬁcations.
(see, for example, Chari et al., 2009), we would expect that the implementation
of these features would improve the macroeconomic ﬁt of our model speciﬁcations
considerably.
4.7.3.2 Standard Moment Criteria
To understand why model speciﬁcation M1 ﬁts the data worse than M2 and M3,
we present some selected unconditional second moments of the data and compare
them with their theoretical counterparts implied by the diﬀerent model versions.
Tables L.8 and L.9 report standard deviations and ﬁrst-order autocorrelations of
consumption, investment, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate derived from
the data and the moments obtained from the three model speciﬁcations. Follow-
ing Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2008) and Gabriel et al. (2012), the model implied
statistics were computed by simulating the model speciﬁcations at the respec-
tive posterior means obtained from estimation. As outlined in Rabanal (2007),
likelihood-based methods try to ﬁt all second moments of the data, so this selec-
tion is just illustrative of where the model speciﬁcations fail.
Turning to the standard deviations ﬁrst, we ﬁnd the data to exhibit a higher
volatility in consumption, investment, and the nominal interest rate for the US
than for the euro area. Although the three model speciﬁcations are able to match
the empirical observation that investment is more volatile than consumption, all
speciﬁcations generate too much volatility of consumption compared to the data.
In line with the Bayesian model comparison, we detect marked diﬀerences be-
tween M1 on the one hand and M2 and M3 on the other hand in ﬁtting the
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data. Speciﬁcally, M2 and M3 outperform M1 in matching the volatility of con-
sumption, investment and inﬂation in the data for both regions. Most noticeably,
speciﬁcation M1 performs relatively poorly in capturing the standard deviation of
investment, since the volatility implied by the model speciﬁcation departs consid-
erably from its counterpart in the data. Model version M1 is able to outperform
the two other speciﬁcations only in capturing the volatility of the nominal interest
rate in the data with respect to the euro area.
Concerning ﬁrst-order autocorrelations all model speciﬁcations appear to match
the serial correlations of the data well. The most notable discrepancies between
model speciﬁcation and data can be found for the euro area, since actual inﬂation
turns out to have a much lower ﬁrst-order autocorrelation than implied by the
model speciﬁcations.
4.7.3.3 Impulse Response Analysis
To gain insight into the dynamic properties of the three model speciﬁcations, we
compare impulse response functions (IRFs) of output, consumption, investment,
hours, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate with respect to the four structural
shocks (see ﬁgures L.37 − L.44).36 Following Levin et al. (2005), all impulse
responses are computed by simulating the model speciﬁcations at the posterior
means reported in table 4.1 and 4.2.
First of all, the respective model speciﬁcations show similar qualitative re-
sponses across the data sets. However, to some extent we ﬁnd marked diﬀerences
between the IRFs of speciﬁcation M1 on the one hand and M2 and M3 on the
other hand within the data sets.
In accordance with the results of Smets and Wouters (2003) and Peersman
and Straub (2006), a positive preference shock crowds out investment, but has
a positive impact on consumption and output. Further, the increase in capacity
necessary to satisfy demand causes a rise in hours worked. Figures L.37 and
L.41 show that the increase of overall demand puts upward pressure on inﬂation.
Consequently, the movements in output and inﬂation lead to a rise in the nominal
interest rate under the estimated monetary policy rule. While the responses of
output, consumption, hours, inﬂation, and the interest rate turn out to be quite
36The impulse responses are the log-deviations from the steady state to a one-standard devi-
ation innovation. A detailed description of the computation of IRFs can be found in Hamilton
(1994a), Lu¨tkepohl (2005), and Canova (2007).
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similar across the three model speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd marked diﬀerences with
respect to investment. In contrast to M2 and M3, investment declines in a
hump-shaped pattern under M1.
Figures L.38 and L.42 report the impulse responses to the marginal eﬃciency
of investment shock. We ﬁnd the dynamics to be fairly similar across the model
speciﬁcations. In accordance with the results of Peersman and Straub (2006)
and Justiniano et al. (2010), output, investment, and hours rise after a positive
impulse. With respect to consumption, we ﬁnd an initially negative response,
followed by a rise after a few quarters. Inﬂation and the nominal interest rate both
rise in response to a positive marginal eﬃciency of investment shock. Justiniano
et al. (2009) therefore attest the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock to have
the typical features of a demand shock, which moves quantities and prices in the
same direction, leading to a tightening of monetary policy.
Although the shape of the IRFs diﬀers to some extend considerably between
M1 and the model versions M2/M3, all model speciﬁcations predict a rise in
output, consumption, and investment after a positive technology shock (see ﬁg-
ures L.39 and L.43). Once again, we ﬁnd hump-shaped investment dynamics
under M1. Further, consistent with empirical evidence presented in Gal´ı (1999),
the presence of nominal price rigidities causes a decrease in hours worked in re-
sponse to a positive technology shock. In all model speciﬁcations inﬂation falls
contemporaneously following a positive technology shock, because the increase in
productivity lowers real marginal costs. Likewise, the nominal interest rate falls
in the three model speciﬁcations, since, according to the estimated Taylor-type
rules, monetary policy responds more strongly to inﬂation than to output.
Finally, ﬁgures L.40 and L.44 depict the eﬀects of an unpredicted monetary
policy disturbance. The shock leads to a rise in the nominal short-term inter-
est rate, which induces a fall in output, consumption, investment, hours, and
inﬂation. As discussed in Christiano et al. (2005), the investment adjustment
cost speciﬁcation under M1 generates a hump-shaped response of aggregate in-
vestment to the monetary policy shock, and therefore improves the ability of the
model speciﬁcation to reproduce VAR-based evidence.
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4.7.3.4 Variance Decomposition
To shed further light on the dynamics of our three model speciﬁcations, we ex-
amine the relative importance of the four structural shocks for the ﬂuctuations of
output, consumption, investment, hours worked, inﬂation, and the nominal inter-
est rate.37 To that eﬀect, we compute the fraction of the forecast error variance of
the six variables attributable to each type of shock .38 Tables L.10−L.15 present
the forecast error variance decompositions across model speciﬁcations and regions
at the one-year, three-year, and inﬁnite horizon. 39
Turning to the euro area ﬁrst, we ﬁnd the technology shock to represent the
dominant force of movements in output and consumption for all three model
speciﬁcations at all horizons. However, the role of the four shocks in explaining
the ﬂuctuations of investment, hours worked, inﬂation, and the nominal interest
rate diﬀer to some extend considerably between M1 on the one hand and M2
and M3 on the other hand at the diﬀerent horizons. The marginal eﬃciency of
investment shock, for instance, accounts for the largest part of the conditional
variance in forecasting investment in the short run (up to one year) under M2
and M3, while we ﬁnd the technology shock to be relatively more important in
driving the short term movements in investment under M1. Further, we ﬁnd
that hours worked are mainly driven by the technology shock over the medium
(three-year horizon) to the long run (inﬁnite horizon) under M1, whereas the
monetary policy shock explains more than 60 percent of the forecast error variance
of hours worked under M2 and M3 at all horizons. We partly attribute this high
contribution of the monetary policy shock to the relatively lower estimates of
habit persistence under M2 and M3, since, following Bouakez et al. (2005), a
higher degree of habit formation induces agents to adjust their labor supply more
gradually in response to monetary policy shocks. Although the monetary policy
shock is also the most important driving force behind short, medium and long run
ﬂuctuations of inﬂation across all model speciﬁcations, the policy shock turns out
to be relatively more important under M2 and M3 than under M1. According
to all model speciﬁcations, the preference shock represents a dominant source
37Following Rabanal (2009), the variance decomposition is performed evaluating the model
(speciﬁcation) parameters at their posterior means.
38For a detailed description of the computation of forecast error variance decompositions, we
refer to Hamilton (1994a), Lu¨tkepohl (2005), or Canova (2007).
39Note that as the horizon increases, the conditional variance of the forecast error of a given
variable converges to the unconditional variance of that variable (see Bouakez et al., 2005).
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of movements in the nominal interest at all horizons, while the technology shock
appears to be relatively more important for explaining ﬂuctuations in the nominal
interest rate under M1 than under M2 and M3.
By analyzing the forecast error variances decomposition for the US, we also
ﬁnd the technology shock to explain most of the ﬂuctuations in output and con-
sumption across all model speciﬁcations at all horizons. Although the three model
speciﬁcations likewise coincide in attributing most of the short run movements in
investment to the marginal eﬃciency shock of investment, M1, M2 and M3
clearly diﬀer at higher horizons, since the technology shock explains most of the
investment forecast error variance under M1, while the investment ﬂuctuations
under M2 and M3 continue to be mainly driven by the investment shock (even
though the contribution of the technology shock increases over the medium to the
long run). The case is similar for hours worked, as we ﬁnd the technology shock
to play a more important role under M1 than under M2 and M3 at all horizons,
albeit the marginal eﬃciency shock of investment represents the dominant source
of movements in hours worked across all three speciﬁcations. Focusing on the
sources of inﬂation ﬂuctuation, it turns out that the marginal eﬃciency of invest-
ment shock and the monetary policy shock are about equally important under
M1, both constituting the two most important driving forces behind short and
medium run ﬂuctuations, while the technology shock accounts for most of the
inﬂation forecast error variance in the long run. Under M2 and M3, in contrast,
the monetary policy shock accounts for most of the forecast error variance of in-
ﬂation at all horizons, although the investment shock and the technology shock
play a supporting role in driving inﬂation ﬂuctuations. According to all model
speciﬁcations, the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock represents an important
source of movements in the nominal interest rate at all horizons. Furthermore, the
contribution of the technology shock to the forecast error variance of the nominal
interest rate increases across all model speciﬁcations over the medium to the long
run. Moreover, we ﬁnd the monetary policy shock to be relatively more important
than the preference shock in explaining the ﬂuctuations of the nominal interest
rate under M1, while the reverse holds under speciﬁcation M2 and M3.
Overall, also the forecast error variance decomposition reveals to some extent
remarkable diﬀerences between speciﬁcation M1 and model versions M2 andM3.
In addition, it appears that the technology shock explains most of the ﬂuctua-
tions in output and consumption in both regions. However, we ﬁnd the marginal
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eﬃciency of investment shock to play a more important role in business cycle
ﬂuctuations in the US than in the euro area. According to tables L.10 − L.15,
the preference shock represents a dominant source of movements in the nominal
interest in the euro area, whereas the same holds for the shock to the marginal
eﬃciency of investment in case of the US. Finally, we identify the monetary pol-
icy shock to be much more important in explaining the forecast error variance of
hours worked and inﬂation in the euro area than in the US.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we use a Bayesian approach to analyze the impact of diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of quadratic adjustment costs on the ﬁt and the dynamics of a New
Keynesian model using both euro area and US data. The underlying dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model features real and nominal frictions as well as
several exogenous stochastic disturbances, namely a preference shock, a technol-
ogy shock, a shock to the marginal eﬃciency of investment, and a monetary policy
shock. We consider three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of quadratic adjustment costs:
an investment adjustment cost speciﬁcation and two forms of capital adjustment
costs. Therefore, each variant of quadratic adjustment costs deﬁnes a distinct
version of our New Keynesian DSGE model.
We ﬁnd to some extent noticeable diﬀerences between the estimated struc-
tural parameters across the three model versions. The estimates of persistence
and volatility of the marginal eﬃciency of investment shock turn out to vary
substantially with the choice of investment or capital adjustment costs.
Moreover, the implementation of either investment or capital adjustment costs
aﬀects the dynamics of the respective model speciﬁcations considerably. Our re-
sults are in line with the ﬁndings of Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and
Wouters (2007), who show that sticky-price models incorporating investment ad-
justment costs are able to produce data-consistent hump-shaped investment dy-
namics. However, despite the ability of investment adjustment costs to generate
hump-shaped investment responses to various shocks, the Bayesian posterior odds
comparison indicates that the two model speciﬁcations with capital adjustment
costs outperform the model version incorporating investment adjustment costs in
terms of overall empirical ﬁt.
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To further evaluate where the model speciﬁcations fail to match the data,
we compare the model version’s implied characteristics with the actual data using
standard moment criteria. In line with the results from the posterior odds analysis,
the model versions with capital adjustment costs provide a better ﬁt to the data
than the speciﬁcation including investment adjustment costs. Our ﬁndings appear
to be qualitatively robust across both data sets.
Therefore, using estimated DSGE models with quadratic costs of capital accu-
mulation for policy analysis should be done with caution, since the results could
be aﬀected by the choice of either investment or capital adjustment costs both be-
ing modeling shortcuts. Hence, our results give further evidence to encourage the
eﬀorts of a sound microfoundation of adjustment costs for capital accumulation
as recently put forward by Wang and Wen (2012).
Appendices
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Appendix H
Equilibrium Conditions
The appendix outlines the complete system of equations of the three DSGE model
speciﬁcations.
H.1 The Economic Environment
• Households:
The representative household chooses {ct, lt, Bt, kt+1, it}∞t=0 to maximize util-
ity
E
∞∑
t=0
βtat
[
log(ct − hct−1)− χ l
1+η
t
1 + η
]
,
subject to the budget constraint
Bt−1 +Wtlt +Qtkt +Dt
Pt
≥ ct + it + Sj(·, ·) + Bt/rt
Pt
and the law of motion for capital
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit.
According to Buiter and Sibert (2007), we prevent the household to make
excessive debts by imposing the no-Ponzi-game condition
lim
t→∞
Bt
t∏
s=0
1
rs
≥ 0.
.
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Hence, the Lagrangian can be written as follows:
Λ = E
∞∑
t=0
{
βtat
[
log(ct − hct−1)− χ l
1+η
t
1 + η
]
− βtλt
[
ct + it + Sj(·, ·) + Bt/rt
Pt
− Bt−1
Pt
− Wtlt
Pt
− Qtkt
Pt
− Dt
Pt
]
− βtψt[kt+1 − (1− δ)kt − xtit]
}
.
The ﬁrst-order conditions are obtained by setting the partial derivatives of
Λ with respect to ct, lt, Bt, kt+1, it, λt, and ψt equal to zero, yielding
Λct = at(ct − hct−1)−1 − hβEt[at+1(ct+1 − hct)−1]− λt = 0, (4.5)
Λlt = λt
Wt
Pt
− atχlηt = 0, (4.6)
ΛBt = rtβEt
(
λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
)
− λt = 0, (4.7)
and, concerning the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Sj(·, ·),
– S1(it−1, it):
Λkt+1 = ψt − βEt
(
λt+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
)
− βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)] = 0, (4.8)
Λit = λt + λt
[
φ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)(
it
it−1
)
+
φ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
− ψtxt − βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
it
− 1
)(
it+1
it
)2]}
= 0,
(4.9)
– S2(it, kt):
Λkt+1 = ψt + βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
2
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)2]}
− βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)(
it+1
kt+1
)]}
− βEt
(
λt+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
)
− βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)] = 0,
(4.8′)
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Λit = ψtxt − λt − λt
[
φ
(
it
kt
− δ
)]
= 0, (4.9′)
– S3(it, kt):
Λkt+1 = ψt − βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)(
it+1
kt+1
)2]}
− βEt
(
λt+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
)
− βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)] = 0,
(4.8′′)
Λit = ψtxt − λt − λtφ
(
it
kt
− δ
)(
it
kt
)
− λtφ
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2
= 0,
(4.9′′)
as well as
Λλt = ct + it + S(·, ·) +
Bt/rt
Pt
− Bt−1
Pt
− Wtlt
Pt
− Qtkt
Pt
− Dt
Pt
= 0, (4.10)
and
Λψt = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt − xtit = 0. (4.11)
Finally, we impose the standard transversality conditions to guarantee that
bonds and capital do not grow too quickly:
lim
t→∞
βtλt
Bt
Pt
= 0,
lim
t→∞
βtλtkt+1 = 0.
• Finished goods-producing ﬁrms:
The representative ﬁnished goods-producing wants to maximize its proﬁts
Ptyt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di
subject to the constant returns to scale technology
yt ≤
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
.
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Hence, the ﬁrm’s optimization problem can be written as
max
yt(i)
Πt = Pt
[∫ 1
0
yt(i)
(θ−1)/θdi
]θ/(θ−1)
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)yt(i)di,
which leads to the following ﬁrst-order condition characterizing the demand
for intermediate goods:
∂Πt
∂yt(i)
= yt(i)−
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt = 0.
By substituting this expression into the constant elasticity of substitution
aggregator of intermediate goods, we derive the price aggregator
Pt =
[ ∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
]1/(1−θ)
.
• Intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms:
Each intermediate goods-producing ﬁrm maximizes its present discounted
value of proﬁts
E
∞∑
t=0
βtλt[Dt(i)/Pt],
by choosing {lt(i), kt(i), yt(i), Pt(i)}∞t=0 subject to the Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology constraint
yt(i) ≤ kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α
and the demand for intermediate goods outlined above
yt(i) =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt.
We can use the latter expression to rewrite the real value of dividends
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
yt(i)−
[
Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
]
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt
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as
Dt(i)
Pt
=
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt −
[
Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
]
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt.
(4.12)
Accordingly, the Lagrangian for the ﬁrms’ intertemporal optimization prob-
lem can be written as:
Λ = E
∞∑
t=0
(
βtλt
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]1−θ
yt −
[
Wtlt(i) +Qtkt(i)
Pt
]
− φP
2
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
]2
yt
}
−βtξt
{[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt − kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α
})
.
By setting the partial derivatives of Λ with respect to lt(i), kt(i), Pt(i), and
ξt equal to zero we have the ﬁrst-order conditions:
Λlt(i) =
λtWtlt(i)
Pt
− (1− α)ξtkt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α = 0, (4.13)
Λkt(i) =
λtQtkt(i)
Pt
− αξtkt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α = 0, (4.14)
ΛPt(i) = φPλt
[
Pt(i)
πPt−1(i)
− 1
][
Pt
πPt−1(i)
]
− (1− θ)λt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
− θξt
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ−1
− βφPEt
{
λt+1
[
Pt+1(i)
πPt(i)
− 1
][
Pt+1(i)Pt
πPt(i)2
](
yt+1
yt
)}
= 0,
(4.15)
and
Λξt =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]−θ
yt − kt(i)α[ztlt(i)]1−α = 0. (4.16)
• The monetary authority sets the gross nominal interest rate according to
the Taylor-type rule:
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+(1−ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ln(υt). (4.17)
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H.2 The Nonlinear System
H.2.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
Each version Mj of the model is characterized by a nonlinear system of 17 equa-
tions, namely:
• M1 : (4.1)− (4.7), (4.8), (4.9), (4.10)− (4.17),
• M2 : (4.1)− (4.7), (4.8′), (4.9′), (4.10)− (4.17), and
• M3 : (4.1)− (4.7), (4.8′′), (4.9′′), (4.10)− (4.17).
The model is closed through two additional steps. First, we focus on a symmetric
equilibrium where all intermediate goods-producing ﬁrms make identical decisions.
This assumption implies Pt(i) = Pt, yt(i) = yt, lt(i) = lt, kt(i) = kt, and Dt(i) =
Dt for all i ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2, .... Second, the market clearing condition for
the bond market Bt = Bt−1 = 0 must hold for all t = 0, 1, 2, .... By substituting
these conditions into (4.1)− (4.17) and deﬁning the average product of labor as
nt = yt/lt for each version Mj of the underlying model we obtain:
ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + εxt, (4.1)
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat, (4.2)
ln(zt) = (1− ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (4.3)
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt, (4.4)
at(ct − hct−1)−1 − hβEt[at+1(ct+1 − hct)−1] = λt, (4.5)
λt
Wt
Pt
= atχl
η
t , (4.6)
λt = rtβEt
(
λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
)
, (4.7)
ψt = βEt
(
λt+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
)
+ βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)], (4.8)
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ψtxt = λt + λt
[
φ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)(
it
it−1
)
+
φ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
− βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
it
− 1
)(
it+1
it
)2]}
,
(4.9)
βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)] = ψt + βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
2
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)2]}
− βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)(
it+1
kt+1
)]}
− βEt
(
λt+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
)
,
(4.8′)
ψtxt = λt + λt
[
φ
(
it
kt
− δ
)]
, (4.9′)
ψt = βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)(
it+1
kt+1
)2]}
+ βEt
(
λt+1
Qt+1
Pt+1
)
+ βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)],
(4.8′′)
ψtxt = λt + λtφ
(
it
kt
− δ
)(
it
kt
)
+ λt
φ
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2
,
(4.9′′)
yt = ct + it + Sj(·, ·) + φP
2
(
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
)2
yt, (4.10)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit, (4.11)
Dt
Pt
= yt − Wtlt +Qtkt
Pt
− φP
2
(
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
)2
yt, (4.12)
λt
Wt
Pt
lt = (1− α)ξtyt, (4.13)
λt
Qt
Pt
kt = αξtyt, (4.14)
φPλt
(
Pt
πPt−1
− 1
)(
Pt
πPt−1
)
= (1− θ)λt + θξt
+ βφPEt
[
λt+1
(
Pt+1
πPt
− 1
)(
Pt+1
πPt
)(
yt+1
yt
)]
,
(4.15)
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yt = k
α
t [ztlt]
1−α, (4.16)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ ln(υt), (4.17)
and
nt =
yt
lt
. (4.18)
H.2.2 Change of Variables
Let πt =
Pt
Pt−1
, wt =
Wt
Pt
, qt =
Qt
Pt
, and dt =
Dt
Pt
. Using these re-deﬁned variables the
nonlinear system encompassing (4.1)− (4.18) becomes:
ln(xt) = ρx ln(xt−1) + εxt, (4.1)
ln(at) = ρa ln(at−1) + εat, (4.2)
ln(zt) = (1− ρz) ln(z) + ρz ln(zt−1) + εzt, (4.3)
ln(υt) = ρυ ln(υt−1) + ευt, (4.4)
at(ct − hct−1)−1 − hβEt[at+1(ct+1 − hct)−1] = λt, (4.5)
λtwt = atχl
η
t , (4.6)
λt = rtβEt
(
λt+1
πt+1
)
, (4.7)
ψt = βEt
(
λt+1qt+1
)
+ βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)], (4.8)
ψtxt = λt + λt
[
φ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)(
it
it−1
)
+
φ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
− βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
it
− 1
)(
it+1
it
)2]}
,
(4.9)
βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)] = ψt + βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
2
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)2]}
− βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)(
it+1
kt+1
)]}
− βEt
(
λt+1qt+1
)
,
(4.8′)
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ψtxt = λt + λt
[
φ
(
it
kt
− δ
)]
, (4.9′)
ψt = βEt
{
λt+1
[
φ
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)(
it+1
kt+1
)2]}
+ βEt
(
λt+1qt+1
)
+ βEt[ψt+1(1− δ)],
(4.8′′)
ψtxt = λt + λtφ
(
it
kt
− δ
)(
it
kt
)
+ λt
φ
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2
,
(4.9′′)
yt = ct + it + Sj(·, ·) + φP
2
(πt
π
− 1
)2
yt, (4.10)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xtit, (4.11)
dt = yt − wtlt − qtkt − φP
2
(πt
π
− 1
)2
yt, (4.12)
λtwtlt = (1− α)ξtyt, (4.13)
λtqtkt = αξtyt, (4.14)
φPλt
(
πt
π
− 1
)(
πt
π
)
= (1− θ)λt + θξt
+ βφPEt
[
λt+1
(
πt+1
π
− 1
)(
πt+1
π
)(
yt+1
yt
)]
,
(4.15)
yt = k
α
t [ztlt]
1−α, (4.16)
ln
(
rt
r
)
= ρr ln
(
rt−1
r
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ωπ ln
(
πt
π
)
+ ωy ln
(
yt
y
)]
+ ln(υt), (4.17)
and
nt =
yt
lt
. (4.18)
H.3 Steady States
In absence of the four shocks, i.e., εxt = εat = εzt = εvt = 0 for all t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the
economy converges to a steady state, where each of the 18 variables is constant.
Due to the absence of adjustment costs of capital accumulation in the steady state,
the determination of the model’s steady state values is independent from a speciﬁc
form of adjustment costs. Therefore, the subsequent steady state computation can
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be undertaken using just one out of the three adjustment costs speciﬁcations under
consideration. We use (4.1), (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) to solve for
x = 1,
a = 1,
z = z,
v = 1.
Assuming that steady state (gross) inﬂation target π is determined by policy, (4.7)
can be used to solve for
r =
π
β
.
Next, (4.8) and (4.9) can be used to solve for
q =
1
β
− 1 + δ
and
ψ = λ.
Use (4.15) to solve for
ξ =
(
θ − 1
θ
)
λ.
Equation (4.5) can be used to solve for
c =
(
1− hβ
1− h
)(
1
λ
)
.
Use (4.10)-(4.16), and (4.18) to solve for
y =
[
1− δ
(
α
q
)(
θ − 1
θ
)]−1
c,
k =
(
α
q
)(
θ − 1
θ
)
y,
i = δk,
l =
(
1
z
)(
y
kα
) 1
1−α
,
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w = (1− α)
(
θ − 1
θ
)(
y
l
)
,
d = y − wl − qk,
and
n =
y
l
.
Finally, use (4.6) to solve for
λ =
χ
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(1−α)
(
θ−1
θ
)[
1−δ
(
α
q
)(
θ−1
θ
)]−1(
1−hβ
1−h
)
χ
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
η
1+η
(1− α)z
(
α
q
) α
1−α
(
θ−1
θ
) 1
1−α
.
H.4 The Linearized System
The nonlinear system (4.1) − (4.18) can be linearized by taking a log-linear ap-
proximation of the model at steady state values. For a detailed description of
logarithmic approximations we refer to Canova (2007), DeJong and Dave (2007),
and Zietz (2008). Let v̂art ≡ log
(
vart
var
)
denote the log-deviation of some variable
vart from its steady state var, where log
(
vart
var
) ≈ vart−var
var
. A ﬁrst-order Taylor
approximation of equation (4.1)− (4.18) at the steady state gives:
xˆt = ρxxˆt−1 + εxt, (4.1)
aˆt = ρaaˆt−1 + εat, (4.2)
zˆt = ρz zˆt−1 + εzt, (4.3)
vˆt = ρv vˆt−1 + εvt, (4.4)
(1− h)(1− hβ)λˆt = (1− h)(1− hβρa)aˆt + hcˆt−1 − (1 + h2β)cˆt + hβEtcˆt+1, (4.5)
λˆt + wˆt = aˆt + ηlˆt, (4.6)
λˆt = rˆt + Etλˆt+1 − Etπˆt+1, (4.7)
ψˆt = βqEtλˆt+1 + βqEtqˆt+1 + β(1− δ)Etψˆt+1, (4.8)
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ψˆt + xˆt = λˆt − φiˆt−1 + (1 + β)φiˆt − βφEtˆit+1, (4.9)
β(1− δ)Etψˆt+1 = ψˆt − βφ
(
i
k
)2
Etiˆt+1 + βφ
(
i
k
)2
kˆt+1 − βqEtλˆt+1 − βqEtqˆt+1,
(4.8′)
ψˆt + xˆt = λˆt + φ
(
i
k
)
iˆt − φ
(
i
k
)
kˆt, (4.9
′)
ψˆt = βφ
(
i
k
)(
i
k
)2
Etiˆt+1 − βφ
(
i
k
)3
kˆt+1
+ βqEtqˆt+1 + βqEtλˆt+1 + β(1− δ)Etψˆt+1,
(4.8′′)
ψˆt + xˆt = λˆt + φ
(
i
k
)2
iˆt − φ
(
i
k
)2
kˆt, (4.9
′′)
yyˆt = ccˆt + iˆit, (4.10)
kkˆt+1 = (1− δ)kkˆt + ixˆt + iˆit, (4.11)
ddˆt = yyˆt − wlwˆt − wllˆt − qkqˆt − qkkˆt, (4.12)
λˆt + wˆt + lˆt = ξˆt + yˆt, (4.13)
λˆt + qˆt + kˆt = ξˆt + yˆt, (4.14)
φP πˆt = (1− θ)λˆt + (θ − 1)ξˆt + βφPEtπˆt+1, (4.15)
yˆt = αkˆt + (1− α)zˆt + (1− α)lˆt, (4.16)
rˆt = ρrrˆt−1 + (1− ρr)(ωππˆt + ωyyˆt) + vˆt, (4.17)
and
nˆt = yˆt − lˆt. (4.18)
Appendix I
Solving the Model
According to Adjemian et al. (2011), the core of the DYNARE solution algorithm
for computing the solution of a linear rational expectations model is based on a
complex generalized Schur decomposition as presented in Klein (2000). Hence,
we give a brief description of how to solve the three model speciﬁcations under
consideration using this solution method. For a more detailed presentation of the
complex generalized Schur decomposition we refer to Golub and Van Loan (1996).
I.1 Klein’s method
Each model version Mj can be solved following the approach of Klein (2000)
outlined in appendix B.2. Therefore, each of the model’s speciﬁcations is brought
into the form:
AEts
0
t+1 = Bs
0
t + Cζt (4.19)
ζt = Pζt−1 + εt, (4.20)
where A, B, and C are coeﬃcient matrices, P contains the persistence param-
eters of the shocks, ζt consists of the model’s exogenous forcing variables, while
the serially and mutually uncorrelated innovations are included in εt. The vector
s0t can be separated into
s0t = [s
0
1t s
0
2t]
′,
letting s01t denote a vector of predetermined and s
0
2t a vector of non-predetermined
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variables, which implies that:
Etst+1 = [s
0
1t+1 Ets
0
2t+1]
′.
The solution technique relies on decoupling the system into unstable and stable
portions, using a complex generalized Schur decomposition, and then solving the
two components in turn. If, as set out in Blanchard and Kahn (1980), the number
of generalized eigenvalues with modulus larger than unity equals the number of
non-predetermined variables, a unique solution exits and system is said to be
saddle-path stable (see DeJong and Dave, 2007).1 Since the versions M2 andM3,
of the model diﬀer with respect to the number of predetermined variables from
M1, we need to subdivide the description of the solution method. The subsequent
sections follow the expositions in Klein (2000), DeJong and Dave (2007), and the
technical notes of Ireland (2011).2
I.2 Solving M2 and M3
Let
s0t =
[
cˆt−1 kˆt rˆt−1 λˆt wˆt lˆt πˆt ψˆt qˆt iˆt yˆt dˆt ξˆt nˆt cˆt
]′
,
ζt =
[
xˆt aˆt zˆt vˆt
]′
,
P =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρx 0 0 0
0 ρa 0 0
0 0 ρz 0
0 0 0 ρv
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
and
εt =
[
εxt εat εzt εvt
]′
.
1A detailed presentation of the Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions is given in appendix B.2.
2The technical notes of Ireland (2011) are available at
http://www.irelandp.com/progs/nkp.zip.
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Then the coeﬃcient matrices A, B, and C for the diﬀerent versions of the
model are:
• M2:
A =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−(1 + h2β) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 hβ
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −βφ ( i
k
)2
0 βq 0 0 0 β(1− δ) βq βφ ( i
k
)2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 βφP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
B =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−h 0 0 (1− h)(1− hβ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 −η 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 φ
(
i
k
)
0 −1 0 0 0 1 0 −φ ( i
k
)
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −i y 0 0 0 0
0 (1− δ)k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0
0 −qk 0 0 −wl −wl 0 0 −qk 0 y −d 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 −(1 − θ) 0 0 φP 0 0 0 0 0 −(θ − 1) 0 0
0 α 0 0 0 (1− α) 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρr 0 0 0 (1− ρr)ωπ 0 0 0 (1− ρr)ωy 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
and
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C =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 −(1− h)(1− hβρa) 0 0
0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− α) 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
• M3:
A =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−(1 + h2β) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 hβ
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −βφ ( i
k
)3
0 βq 0 0 0 β(1− δ) βq βφ ( i
k
)3
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 βφP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
B =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−h 0 0 (1− h)(1− hβ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 −η 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 φ
(
i
k
)2
0 −1 0 0 0 1 0 −φ ( i
k
)2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −i y 0 0 0 0
0 (1− δ)k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0
0 −qk 0 0 −wl −wl 0 0 −qk 0 y −d 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 −(1− θ) 0 0 φP 0 0 0 0 0 −(θ − 1) 0 0
0 α 0 0 0 (1− α) 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρr 0 0 0 (1− ρr)ωπ 0 0 0 (1− ρr)ωy 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
and
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C =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 −(1− h)(1− hβρa) 0 0
0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− α) 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Following Klein (2000), we apply the complex generalized Schur decomposition
of A and B, which is given by
QAZ = S
and
QBZ = T,
where Q and Z are unitary and S and T are upper triangular matrices. The
generalized eigenvalues of B and A can be recovered as the ratios of the diagonal
elements of T and S:
λ(B,A) = {tii/sii|i = 1, 2, ..., 15}.
The matrices Q,Z, S, and T can always be arranged so that the generalized
eigenvalues are ordered in increasing value in moving from left to right. Note that
the vector s0t comprises of three predetermined and twelve non-predetermined
variables.
We proceed under the case of saddle-path stability, assuming exactly twelve
generalized eigenvalues to lie outside the unit circle, and therefore allow for a
unique solution. The matrices Q,Z, S, and T are portioned, so that
Q =
[
Q1
Q2
]
,
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where Q1 is 3× 15 and Q2 is 12× 15 and
Z =
[
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
,
S =
[
S11 S12
0(12×3) S22
]
,
T =
[
T11 T12
0(12×3) T22
]
,
where Z11, S11, and T11 are 3×3 and Z12, S12, and T12 are 3×12, Z21 is 12×3,
and Z22, S22, and T22 are 12 × 12. To “triangularize” the system we ﬁrst deﬁne
the vector of auxiliary variables as
s1t = Z
Hs0t ,
letting ZH denote the conjugate transpose of matrix Z, so that
s1t =
[
s11t
s12t
]
,
where
s11t = Z
H
11
⎡⎢⎣ cˆt−1kˆt
rˆt−1
⎤⎥⎦+ ZH21
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
iˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.21)
is 3× 1 and
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s12t = Z
H
12
⎡⎢⎣ cˆt−1kˆt
rˆt−1
⎤⎥⎦+ ZH22
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
iˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.22)
is 12× 1.
Since Z is unitary, ZHZ = I or ZH = Z−1 and hence s0t = Zs
1
t . We use this
property to rewrite (4.19) as
AZEts
1
t+1 = BZs
1
t + Cζt.
Premultiplying this equation by Q gives[
S11 S12
0 S22
]
Et
[
s11t+1
s12t+1
]
=
[
T11 T12
0 T22
][
s11t
s12t
]
+
[
Q1
Q2
]
Cζt,
or in matrix partitions,
S11Ets
1
1t+1 + S12Ets
1
2t+1 = T11s
1
1t + T12s
1
2t +Q1Cζt (4.23)
and
S22Ets
1
2t+1 = T22s
1
2t +Q2Cζt. (4.24)
Since the generalized eigenvalues corresponding to the diagonal elements of
S22 and T22 all lie outside the unit circle, (4.24) can be solved forward to obtain
s12t = −T−122 Rζt,
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where the 12× 4 matrix R is given by “reshaping”3
vec(R) = vec
∞∑
j=0
(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j =
∞∑
j=0
vec[(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j]
=
∞∑
j=0
[P j ⊗ (S22T−122 )j ]vec(Q2C) =
∞∑
j=0
[P ⊗ (S22T−122 )]jvec(Q2C)
= [I(48×48) − P ⊗ (S22T−122 )]−1vec(Q2C).
Using this result together with equation (4.22) allows to solve for⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
iˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= −(ZH22)−1ZH12
⎡⎢⎣ cˆt−1kˆt
rˆt−1
⎤⎥⎦− (ZH22)−1T−122 Rζt. (4.25)
Under the assumption that Z is unitary, i.e.,[
ZH11 Z
H
21
ZH12 Z
H
22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ZH
[
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
=
[
I(3×3) 0(3×12)
0(12×3) I(12×12)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
,
we ﬁnd
ZH12Z11 + Z
H
22Z21 = 0,
3Following Hamilton (1994a) and DeJong and Dave (2007), the appearance of the vec oper-
ator accommodates the VAR speciﬁcation for ζt. We use the relationship between vec opera-
tor and Kronecker product: vec[(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j ] = [(P j)′ ⊗ (S22T−122 )j ]vec(Q2C). Note that
P ′ = P , since P is a diagonal matrix.
155
−(ZH22)−1ZH12 = Z21Z−111 ,
ZH12Z12 + Z
H
22Z22 = I,
and
(ZH22)
−1 = Z22 + (ZH22)
−1ZH12Z12 = Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12,
which allows to rewrite (4.25) as⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
iˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= M1
⎡⎢⎣ cˆt−1kˆt
rˆt−1
⎤⎥⎦+M2ζt, (4.25′)
with
M1 = Z21Z
−1
11
and
M2 = −[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 R.
Now we can solve (4.21) for s11t
s11t = (Z
H
11 + Z
H
21Z21Z
−1
11 )
⎡⎢⎣ cˆt−1kˆt
rˆt−1
⎤⎥⎦− ZH21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 Rζt,
using
ZH11Z11 + Z
H
21Z21 = I,
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ZH11 + Z
H
21Z21Z
−1
11 = Z
−1
11 ,
and
ZH21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12] = ZH21Z22 − ZH21Z21Z−111 Z12 = −Z−111 Z12,
so that
s11t = Z
−1
11
⎡⎢⎣ cˆt−1kˆt
rˆt−1
⎤⎥⎦+ Z−111 Z12T−122 Rζt.
If we plug this result into equation (4.23), we get⎡⎢⎣ cˆtkˆt+1
rˆt
⎤⎥⎦ = M3
⎡⎢⎣ cˆt−1kˆt
rˆt−1
⎤⎥⎦+M4ζt, (4.26)
where
M3 = Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11
and
M4 = Z11S
−1
11 (T11Z
−1
11 Z12T
−1
22 R +Q1C + S12T
−1
22 RP − T12T−122 R)− Z12T−122 RP.
Hence, the model’s solution can be written compactly in state space form by
combining (4.20), (4.25′) and (4.26) as
st+1 = Γ0st + Γ1εt+1, (4.27)
and
ft = Γ2st, (4.28)
where
st =
[
cˆt−1 kˆt rˆt−1 xˆt aˆt zˆt vˆt
]′
,
ft =
[
λˆt wˆt lˆt πˆt ψˆt qˆt iˆt yˆt dˆt ξˆt nˆt cˆt
]′
,
εt+1 =
[
εxt εat εzt εvt
]′
,
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Γ0 =
[
M3 M4
0(4×3) P
]
,
Γ1 =
[
0(3×4)
I(4×4)
]
,
and
Γ2 =
[
M1 M2
]
.
I.3 Solving M1
Let
s0t =
[
cˆt−1 kˆt rˆt−1 iˆt−1 λˆt wˆt lˆt πˆt ψˆt qˆt yˆt dˆt ξˆt nˆt cˆt iˆt
]′
,
ζt =
[
xˆt aˆt zˆt vˆt
]′
,
P =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρx 0 0 0
0 ρa 0 0
0 0 ρz 0
0 0 0 ρv
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
and
εt =
[
εxt εat εzt εvt
]′
.
Then the coeﬃcient matrices A, B and C for version M1 of the model are:
A =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−(1 + h2β) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 hβ 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 βq 0 0 0 β(1− δ) βq 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 (1 + β)φ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −βφ
c 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 k 0 −i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 βφP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
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B =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−h 0 0 0 (1− h)(1− hβ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 −η 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 φ −1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 y 0 0 0 0 0
0 (1− δ)k 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −qk 0 0 0 −wl −wl 0 0 −qk y −d 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 −1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −(1− θ) 0 0 φP 0 0 0 0 −(θ − 1) 0 0 0
0 α 0 0 0 0 (1− α) 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 ρr 0 0 0 0 (1− ρr)ωπ 0 0 (1− ρr)ωy 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
,
and
C =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 −(1− h)(1− hβρa) 0 0
0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 (1− α) 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Just as in the case of M2 and M3 we follow the approach of Klein (2000), and
perform a complex generalized Schur decomposition of A and B, which is given
by
QAZ = S
and
QBZ = T,
letting Q and Z denote unitary and S and T upper triangular matrices. The
generalized eigenvalues of B and A can be recovered as the ratios of the diagonal
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elements of T and S:
λ(B,A) = {tii/sii|i = 1, 2, ..., 16}.
Again, the matrices Q,Z, S, and T can be arranged so that the generalized
eigenvalues appear in ascending order. Note that there are four predetermined
variables and twelve non-predetermined variables in the vector s0t . We proceed
under the case of saddle-path stability and assume that there are exactly twelve
generalized eigenvalues that lie outside the unit circle, and therefore allow for a
unique solution. The matrices Q,Z, S, and T are portioned, so that
Q =
[
Q1
Q2
]
,
where Q1 is 4× 16 and Q2 is 12× 16 and
Z =
[
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
,
S =
[
S11 S12
0(12×4) S22
]
,
T =
[
T11 T12
0(12×4) T22
]
,
where Z11, S11, and T11 are 4×4 and Z12, S12, and T12 are 4×12, Z21 is 12×4,
and Z22, S22, and T22 are 12 × 12. To ”triangularize” the system we ﬁrst deﬁne
the vector of auxiliary variables as
s1t = Z
Hs0t ,
letting ZH denote the conjugate transpose of matrix Z, so that
s1t =
[
s11t
s12t
]
,
160
where
s11t = Z
H
11
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt−1
kˆt
rˆt−1
iˆt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+ ZH21
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
iˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.29)
is 4× 1 and
s12t = Z
H
12
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt−1
kˆt
rˆt−1
iˆt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+ ZH22
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
iˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(4.30)
is 12× 1.
Since Z is unitary, ZHZ = I or ZH = Z−1 and hence s0t = Zs
1
t . We use this
property to rewrite (4.19) as
AZEts
1
t+1 = BZs
1
t + Cζt.
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Premultiplying this equation by Q gives[
S11 S12
0 S22
]
Et
[
s11t+1
s12t+1
]
=
[
T11 T12
0 T22
][
s11t
s12t
]
+
[
Q1
Q2
]
Cζt,
or in terms of the matrix partitions,
S11Ets
1
1t+1 + S12Ets
1
2t+1 = T11s
1
1t + T12s
1
2t +Q1Cζt (4.31)
and
S22Ets
1
2t+1 = T22s
1
2t +Q2Cζt. (4.32)
Since the generalized eigenvalues corresponding to the diagonal elements of
S22 and T22 all lie outside the unit circle, (4.32) can be solved forward to obtain
s12t = −T−122 Rζt,
where the 12× 4 matrix R is given by “reshaping”
vec(R) = vec
∞∑
j=0
(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j =
∞∑
j=0
vec[(S22T
−1
22 )
jQ2CP
j]
=
∞∑
j=0
[P j ⊗ (S22T−122 )j ]vec(Q2C) =
∞∑
j=0
[P ⊗ (S22T−122 )]jvec(Q2C)
= [I(48×48) − P ⊗ (S22T−122 )]−1vec(Q2C).
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Using this result together with equation (4.30) allows to solve for⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
iˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= −(ZH22)−1ZH12
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ct−1
kt
rt−1
it−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦− (ZH22)−1T−122 Rζt. (4.33)
Under the assumption that Z is unitary, i.e.,[
ZH11 Z
H
21
ZH12 Z
H
22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ZH
[
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
=
[
I(4×4) 0(4×12)
0(12×4) I(12×12)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
,
we ﬁnd
ZH12Z11 + Z
H
22Z21 = 0,
−(ZH22)−1ZH12 = Z21Z−111 ,
ZH12Z12 + Z
H
22Z22 = I,
and
(ZH22)
−1 = Z22 + (ZH22)
−1ZH12Z12 = Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12,
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which allows to rewrite (4.33) as⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λˆt
wˆt
lˆt
πˆt
ψˆt
qˆt
yˆt
dˆt
ξˆt
nˆt
cˆt
iˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= M˜1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ct−1
kt
rt−1
it−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+ M˜2ζt, (4.33′)
with
M˜1 = Z21Z
−1
11
and
M˜2 = −[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 R.
Now we can solve (4.29) for s11t
s11t = (Z
H
11 + Z
H
21Z21Z
−1
11 )
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt−1
kˆt
rˆt−1
iˆt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦− ZH21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12]T−122 Rζt,
making use of
ZH11Z11 + Z
H
21Z21 = I,
ZH11 + Z
H
21Z21Z
−1
11 = Z
−1
11 ,
and
ZH21[Z22 − Z21Z−111 Z12] = ZH21Z22 − ZH21Z21Z−111 Z12 = −Z−111 Z12,
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so that
s11t = Z
−1
11
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt−1
kˆt
rˆt−1
iˆt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+ Z−111 Z12T−122 Rζt.
If we plug this result into equation (4.31) we get⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt
kˆt+1
rˆt
iˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ = M˜3
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt−1
kˆt
rˆt−1
iˆt−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦+ M˜4ζt, (4.34)
where
M˜3 = Z11S
−1
11 T11Z
−1
11
and
M˜4 = Z11S
−1
11 (T11Z
−1
11 Z12T
−1
22 R +Q1C + S12T
−1
22 RP − T12T−122 R)− Z12T−122 RP.
The model’s solution can be written compactly in state space form by com-
bining (4.20), (4.33′), and (4.34) as
s˜t+1 = Γ˜0s˜t + Γ˜1εt+1, (4.35)
and
f˜t = Γ˜2s˜t, (4.36)
where
s˜t =
[
cˆt−1 kˆt rˆt−1 iˆt−1 xˆt aˆt zˆt vˆt
]′
,
f˜t =
[
λˆt wˆt lˆt πˆt ψˆt qˆt yˆt dˆt ξˆt nˆt cˆt iˆt
]′
,
εt+1 =
[
εxt εat εzt εvt
]′
,
Γ˜0 =
[
M˜3 M˜4
0(4×4) P
]
,
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Γ˜1 =
[
0(4×4)
I(4×4)
]
,
and
Γ˜2 =
[
M˜1 M˜2
]
.
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Appendix J
Estimation
J.1 Empirical State Space Model
Since the model is estimated using an observed sample X including consumption,
investment, inﬂation and interest rates, we can deﬁne a sequence of observations
{Xt}Tt=1 with a measured data vector
Xt =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cˆt
iˆt
πˆt
rˆt
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
To distinguish the theoretical model from the empirical model, we rewrite (4.27)
and (4.28) as
st+1 = Ψ0st +Ψ1εt+1, (4.37)
and
Xt = Ψ2st, (4.38)
where Γo = Ψ0, Γ1 = Ψ1, and Ψ2 is formed from the rows (·) of Γ0 and Γ2 as
Ψ2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Γ0(1)
Γ2(7)
Γ2(4)
Γ0(3)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ,
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while (4.35) and (4.36) can be expressed as
s˜t+1 = Ψ˜0s˜t + Ψ˜1εt+1, (4.39)
and
Xt = Ψ˜2s˜t, (4.40)
where Γ˜o = Ψ˜0, Γ˜1 = Ψ˜1, and Ψ˜2 is formed from the rows (·) of Γ˜0 and Γ˜2 as
Ψ˜2 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Γ˜0(1)
Γ˜0(4)
Γ˜2(4)
Γ˜0(3)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
J.2 Kalman Filter
Bayesian estimation of a DSGE model in state space form requires the construc-
tion and evaluation of the likelihood function
L(μ|X) = p(X|μ) =
T∏
t=1
p(Xt|μ),
where X denotes the T observations of a vector of observable variables Xt and μ a
k× 1 vector of the model’s parameters. Following Hamilton (1994a), the Kalman
ﬁlter provides a way to calculate the likelihood function for a state space system.
As outlined in Canova (2007, p. 123), “. . . the likelihood function of a state space
model can be conveniently expressed in terms of one-step-ahead forecast errors,
conditional on the initial observations, and of their recursive variance, both of
which can be obtained with the Kalman ﬁlter.” Since a general and detailed
treatment of the Kalman ﬁlter can be found in Harvey (1993), Hamilton (1994a)
and Hamilton (1994b), we give a brief exemplary exposition of the Kalman ﬁlter
by applying the recursive algorithm originally developed by Kalman (1960) and
Kalman and Bucy (1961) to the empirical state space model formed by state
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equation (4.37) and observation equation (4.38)1:
st+1 = Ψ0st +Ψ1εt+1, (4.37)
Xt = Ψ2st. (4.38)
Recall that st is a vector of possibly unknown state variables, Xt denotes a vector
of observed variables, Ψ0,Ψ1, and Ψ2 depend on the structural parameters of the
model and the vector εt+1 comprises the serially uncorrelated innovations
εt+1 =
[
εxt+1 εat+1 εzt+1 εvt+1
]′
,
which are assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and diagonal co-
variance matrix
Σε = Eεt+1ε
′
t+1 =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ2x 0 0 0
0 σ2a 0 0
0 0 σ2z 0
0 0 0 σ2v
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
J.2.1 Kalman Filter Recursion
To analyze the Kalman ﬁlter recursion, we follow the expositions of Hamilton (1994a)
and Lu¨tkepohl (2005). Let
st|j = E(st|X1, ..., Xj),
Σs(t|j) = E(st − st|j)(st − st|j)′,
Xt|j = E(Xt|X1, ..., Xj),
ΣX(t|j) = E(Xt −Xt|j)(Xt −Xt|j)′.
Further, the initial state s0 and the conditional distribution of s given X are
assumed to be normally distributed with s0 ∼ N (μs0,Σ0) and (s|X) ∼ N (μs,Σ),
respectively. Given the previous conditions, the normality assumption implies
(st|X1, ..., Xt−1) ∼ N (st|t−1,Σs(t|t− 1)) for t = 2, ..., T,
(st|X1, ..., Xt) ∼ N (st|t,Σs(t|t)) for t = 1, ..., T,
(Xt|X1, ..., Xt−1) ∼ N (Xt|t−1,ΣX(t|t− 1)) for t = 2, ..., T.
1The Kalman ﬁlter recursion for the state equation (4.39) and observation equation (4.40)
would proceed in exactly the same way.
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As outlined in Lu¨tkepohl (2005), the conditional means and covariance matri-
ces can be obtained by the following Kalman ﬁlter recursions:
• Initialization:
s0|0 = μs0,Σs(0|0) = Σ0.
• Prediction step (1 ≤ t ≤ T ):
st|t−1 = Ψ0st−1|t−1,
Σs(t|t− 1) = Ψ0Σs(t− 1|t− 1)Ψ′0 +Ψ1ΣεΨ′1,
Xt|t−1 = Ψ2st|t−1,
ΣX(t|t− 1) = Ψ2Σs(t|t− 1)Ψ′2,
ut = Xt −Xt|t−1.
• Correction step (1 ≤ t ≤ T ):
st|t = st|t−1 +Υtut,
Σs(t|t) = Σs(t|t− 1)−ΥtΣX(t|t− 1)Υ′t,
where the Kalman gain Υt is deﬁned as
Υt = st|t−1Ψ′2ΣX(t|t− 1)−1 .
As described in Lu¨tkepohl (2005), the recursions proceed by performing the
prediction step for t = 1. Then, the correction step is performed for t = 1. Next,
the prediction and correction steps are repeated for t = 2 and so on.
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J.2.2 Log Likelihood Function
The observation vector estimation errors {ut}Tt=1 can be used to form the Gaussian
log likelihood function for {Xt}Tt=1 as
lnL(μ|X) =
T∑
t=1
ln p(Xt|μ)
= −4T
2
ln(2π)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
ln |ΣX(t|t− 1)| − 1
2
T∑
t=1
u′tΣX(t|t− 1)−1ut.
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Appendix K
Data Sources
• Euro area:
Real personal consumption: AWM database
Gross ﬁxed capital formation: AWM database
Consumer price index: AWM database
Interest rate (short term): AWM database
Population: RTDB
• US:
Real personal consumption: FRED database
Gross ﬁxed capital formation: FRED database
Consumer price index: FRED database
Interest rate (three-month money market rate): FRED database
Population: FRED database
173
174
Appendix L
Figures and Tables
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Figure L.7: Euro area: M1. Prior distributions (gray lines) and posterior distri-
butions (black lines) of the estimated parameters.
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Figure L.8: Euro area: M2. Prior distributions (gray lines) and posterior distri-
butions (black lines) of the estimated parameters.
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Figure L.9: Euro area: M3. Prior distributions (gray lines) and posterior distri-
butions (black lines) of the estimated parameters.
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Figure L.10: US: M1. Prior distributions (gray lines) and posterior distributions
(black lines) of the estimated parameters.
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Figure L.11: US: M2. Prior distributions (gray lines) and posterior distributions
(black lines) of the estimated parameters.
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Figure L.12: US: M3. Prior distributions (gray lines) and posterior distributions
of the estimated parameters.
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c i π r
σa 4.230E-28 0.113 4.490E-29 5.490E-21
σz 3.000E-54 3.030E-38 1.120E-114 2.000E-59
σx 7.190E-10 1.290E-76 0.756 4.860E-09
σv 1.150E-06 71.700 9.110E-08 5.350
ρr 2.840E-05 0.168 6.560E-39 1.770E-11
ρa 1.350E-04 0.289 4.550E-103 0.028
ρz 5.380E-50 2.280E-06 3.000 1.760E-19
ρx 3.390 3.560E-128 8.040 0.185
ρv 4.100E-26 92.800 2.860E-149 8.000E-146
h 8.280E-128 6.870E-20 8.700E-240 5.030E-45
α 5.050E-115 0.003 13.900 1.160
φP 9.220E-48 16.200 7.710E-134 1.920E-19
φ 1.220E-12 2.350E-46 0.002 7.080E-22
ωπ 0.348 1.210E-06 0.197 0.004
ωy 1.360 3.950E-89 2.490E-09 6.910E-148
ln(z) 15.000 9.360 26.100 28.500
Table L.2: Euro area: M1. Cells contain the p-values (in percent) of the Smirnov
two-sample test. Question answered by the test: “At what signiﬁcance level α
is the null hypothesis that fx˜j (μi|B) equals the respective posterior distribution
rejected?” Gray cells indicate p-values< 0.1%.
c i π r
σa 7.390E-32 4.110E-07 4.390E-47 0.070
σz 1.970E-29 1.040E-18 2.340E-71 3.010E-16
σx 1.440E-20 0.006 1.860E-61 2.140E-25
σv 3.300E-07 1.020E-20 0.083 0.011
ρr 2.220E-05 1.660E-05 1.150E-34 1.900E-21
ρa 1.280E-14 2.670E-73 4.820E-05 8.900E-18
ρz 5.160E-71 1.350E-04 0.055 0.564
ρx 4.450E-02 6.680E-201 1.160 1.500E-57
ρv 2.480E-21 15.300 5.040E-215 2.490E-85
h 9.310E-77 4.510E-22 6.580E-158 2.980E-29
α 6.710E-128 6.410E-18 10.400 22.700
φP 1.820E-32 6.860E-40 1.620E-220 2.340E-05
φ 8.590E-30 3.560 1.300E-57 4.870E-19
ωπ 0.017 1.370E-10 2.150E-10 0.271
ωy 1.690E-07 14.700 0.012 1.330E-70
ln(z) 78.700 0.516 30.500 71.000
Table L.3: Euro area: M2. Cells contain the p-values (in percent) of the Smirnov
two-sample test. Question answered by the test: “At what signiﬁcance level α
is the null hypothesis that fx˜j (μi|B) equals the respective posterior distribution
rejected?” Gray cells indicate p-values< 0.1%.
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c i π r
σa 9.490E-28 5.300E-05 3.030E-49 0.197
σz 1.060E-32 3.240E-08 1.730E-57 1.520E-22
σx 2.080E-28 0.003 1.560E-49 1.020E-20
σv 1.450E-11 2.090E-15 4.180E-05 0.002
ρr 3.160E-10 1.360E-05 2.930E-42 7.710E-27
ρa 2.240E-07 1.730E-59 0.002 8.180E-25
ρz 9.010E-75 2.150E-10 3.360E-10 6.720E-05
ρx 0.051 4.120E-162 3.390 1.810E-53
ρv 4.990E-26 0.142 5.160E-209 3.400E-75
h 2.770E-89 2.590E-18 2.040E-158 1.060E-32
α 9.040E-113 1.440E-20 1.260 0.298
φP 2.960E-31 3.630E-39 2.520E-226 3.240E-08
φ 5.830E-39 28.500 9.820E-59 3.230E-21
ωπ 0.005 3.940E-11 4.700E-06 5.480
ωy 5.480E-09 23.500 6.720E-06 3.180E-33
ln(z) 28.000 31.500 0.247 0.133
Table L.4: Euro area: M3. Cells contain the p-values (in percent) of the Smirnov
two-sample test. Question answered by the test: “At what signiﬁcance level α
is the null hypothesis that fx˜j(μi|B) equals the respective posterior distribution
rejected?” Gray cells indicate p-values< 0.1%.
c i π r
σa 5.540E-37 6.960E-18 3.040E-46 0.016
σz 63.000 2.610E-60 5.770E-19 1.920E-24
σx 2.340E-04 4.310E-09 1.450E-24 1.790E-07
σv 0.317 0.001 1.420E-06 50.200
ρr 4.240E-06 2.950E-06 3.030E-11 4.120E-16
ρa 5.010E-134 3.450E-05 2.100E-93 4.330E-68
ρz 7.080E-22 25.700 5.710E-17 2.770E-17
ρx 39.300 1.180E-96 7.440E-06 9.900E-25
ρv 8.680E-10 2.830E-11 8.590E-30 4.190E-04
h 2.570E-56 1.350E-13 4.120E-50 28.000
α 3.840E-188 6.110E-08 20.400 0.006
φP 13.900 4.140E-58 3.480E-19 2.770E-13
φ 3.790E-05 6.550E-21 4.990E-26 4.110E-07
ωπ 0.532 3.070E-04 1.470E-03 1.780E-04
ωy 0.006 5.100E-30 2.260E-155 6.680E-11
ln(z) 6.290 11.100 49.500 86.200
Table L.5: US: M1. Cells contain the p-values (in percent) of the Smirnov two-
sample test. Question answered by the test: “At what signiﬁcance level α is
the null hypothesis that fx˜j (μi|B) equals the respective posterior distribution
rejected?” Gray cells indicate p-values< 0.1%.
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c i π r
σa 2.050E-20 2.520E-32 2.760E-36 1.340E-08
σz 0.010 7.390E-05 9.590E-04 4.980E-29
σx 0.431 5.520E-124 2.920E-70 1.190E-08
σv 0.162 6.520E-15 5.880E-35 66.600
ρr 4.250E-13 1.830E-23 2.700E-14 6.860E-08
ρa 2.920E-101 2.070E-41 5.740E-69 1.060E-71
ρz 4.860E-44 4.920E-10 1.170E-13 4.070E-76
ρx 15.600 1.030E-99 0.548 1.340E-112
ρv 7.880E-12 89.500 8.720E-14 1.650
h 5.610E-31 7.26E-02 1.500E-57 17.500
α 1.910E-100 2.920 0.025 2.280E-08
φP 5.460E-04 2.300E-88 2.340E-71 5.480
φ 13.900 3.370E-121 9.150E-65 0.050
ωπ 60.100 3.070 9.270E-22 1.620E-09
ωy 0.002 3.960E-33 2.130E-220 6.220E-04
ln(z) 21.100 63.700 12.000 93.200
Table L.6: US: M2. Cells contain the p-values (in percent) of the Smirnov two-
sample test. Question answered by the test: “At what signiﬁcance level α is
the null hypothesis that fx˜j (μi|B) equals the respective posterior distribution
rejected?” Gray cells indicate p-values< 0.1%.
c i π r
σa 1.170E-16 2.770E-17 1.130E-40 1.890E-10
σz 1.430E-08 0.050 2.000E-07 2.230E-20
σx 0.002 3.060E-139 7.890E-88 0.001
σv 0.001 4.920E-10 4.980E-29 61.500
ρr 1.450E-11 1.380E-14 2.810E-18 4.120E-16
ρa 1.530E-92 1.400E-42 4.390E-67 1.600E-63
ρz 5.610E-31 1.350E-04 2.810E-04 8.920E-93
ρx 50.200 2.620E-105 0.756 2.160E-104
ρv 1.270E-16 74.500 7.880E-12 13.100
h 2.720E-30 28.000 5.400E-57 7.690
α 4.720E-111 0.898 1.990 9.790E-05
φP 2.580E-05 2.770E-66 1.130E-90 16.900
φ 1.650 1.280E-137 8.570E-83 1.440
ωπ 78.000 0.337 1.900E-21 9.690E-20
ωy 1.490E-06 4.080E-31 4.540E-199 12.500
ln(z) 83.200 70.300 2.440 10.800
Table L.7: US: M3. Cells contain the p-values (in percent) of the Smirnov two-
sample test. Question answered by the test: “At what signiﬁcance level α is
the null hypothesis that fx˜j (μi|B) equals the respective posterior distribution
rejected?” Gray cells indicate p-values< 0.1%.
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Standard Deviations (Percent)
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Data 0.80 2.37 0.22 0.25
M1 2.59 6.35 0.32 0.23
M2 2.35 3.10 0.28 0.21
M3 2.43 3.10 0.27 0.21
Autocorrelations (First-order)
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Data 0.84 0.87 0.21 0.87
M1 0.98 0.98 0.59 0.81
M2 0.98 0.92 0.50 0.82
M3 0.98 0.92 0.51 0.82
Table L.8: Euro area: Selected second moments.
Standard Deviations (Percent)
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Data 1.05 6.32 0.22 0.34
M1 4.43 10.79 0.30 0.39
M2 3.45 6.69 0.28 0.36
M3 3.46 6.60 0.28 0.37
Autocorrelations (First-order)
Consumption Investment Inﬂation Interest Rate
Data 0.88 0.82 0.45 0.83
M1 0.99 0.94 0.53 0.81
M2 0.99 0.84 0.51 0.81
M3 0.99 0.84 0.53 0.82
Table L.9: US: Selected second moments.
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Figure L.37: Euro area: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state)
to a one standard deviation preference shock for 20 quarters; M1 (solid lines),
M2 (dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Figure L.38: Euro area: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state)
to a one standard deviation marginal eﬃciency of investment shock for 20 quarters;
M1 (solid lines), M2 (dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Figure L.39: Euro area: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state)
to a one standard deviation technology shock for 20 quarters; M1 (solid lines),
M2 (dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Figure L.40: Euro area: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state)
to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock for 20 quarters; M1 (solid
lines), M2 (dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Figure L.41: US: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state) to a
one standard deviation preference shock for 20 quarters; M1 (solid lines), M2
(dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Figure L.42: US: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state) to a
one standard deviation marginal eﬃciency of investment shock for 20 quarters;
M1 (solid lines), M2 (dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Figure L.43: US: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state) to a
one standard deviation technology shock for 20 quarters; M1 (solid lines), M2
(dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Figure L.44: US: Impulse responses (log-deviations from the steady state) to a
one standard deviation monetary policy shock for 20 quarters; M1 (solid lines),
M2 (dashed lines), M3 (dotted lines).
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Fraction of the Variance Due to
Variable Preference Shock Investment Shock Technology Shock Monetary Policy Shock
One-Year Horizon
Output 1.33 2.89 91.88 3.91
Consumption 6.6 0.63 87.98 4.79
Investment 5.33 33.38 59.83 1.47
Hours 13.5 17.11 31.12 38.27
Inﬂation 22.07 5.69 5.54 66.7
Interest Rate 62.51 16.01 15.11 6.38
Three-Year Horizon
Output 0.54 1.6 96.49 1.36
Consumption 3.28 0.99 93.49 2.23
Investment 2.84 10 86.64 0.52
Hours 11.37 14.73 42.04 31.86
Inﬂation 20.24 5.49 12.88 61.39
Interest Rate 56.32 16.53 21.49 5.66
Infinite Horizon
Output 0.29 0.90 98.17 0.64
Consumption 1.29 1.20 96.71 0.80
Investment 1.92 7.03 90.70 0.35
Hours 10.09 13.62 48.22 28.07
Inﬂation 18.76 5.12 19.27 56.85
Interest Rate 49.89 15.07 30.03 5.01
Table L.10: Euro area: M1. Forecast error variance decomposition.
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Fraction of the Variance Due to
Variable Preference Shock Investment Shock Technology Shock Monetary Policy Shock
One-Year Horizon
Output 0.15 1.79 94.53 3.53
Consumption 2.18 1.32 93.44 3.06
Investment 6.63 48.40 42.53 2.44
Hours 3.26 23.51 4.77 68.46
Inﬂation 19.31 5.71 0.54 74.44
Interest Rate 75.10 20.52 2.11 2.27
Three-Year Horizon
Output 0.08 1.85 96.63 1.45
Consumption 0.92 0.81 97.02 1.26
Investment 4.39 36.69 57.50 1.43
Hours 3.18 25.75 4.84 66.22
Inﬂation 19.71 6.52 1.20 72.57
Interest Rate 73.14 22.66 2.23 1.97
Infinite Horizon
Output 0.07 2.55 96.68 0.70
Consumption 0.47 2.15 96.79 0.59
Investment 2.91 25.18 70.97 0.94
Hours 3.18 25.78 4.99 66.05
Inﬂation 19.39 6.58 2.65 71.38
Interest Rate 72.72 22.76 2.57 1.95
Table L.11: Euro area: M2. Forecast error variance decomposition.
223
Fraction of the Variance Due to
Variable Preference Shock Investment Shock Technology Shock Monetary Policy Shock
One-Year Horizon
Output 0.21 1.89 94.53 3.37
Consumption 2.26 1.27 93.51 2.96
Investment 6.37 51.62 39.84 2.18
Hours 4.40 24.37 6.22 65.01
Inﬂation 21.47 5.86 0.55 72.12
Interest Rate 75.80 19.27 2.65 2.28
Three-Year Horizon
Output 0.10 2.01 96.52 1.37
Consumption 0.94 0.80 97.05 1.20
Investment 4.23 39.92 54.58 1.28
Hours 4.29 26.82 6.09 62.79
Inﬂation 21.90 6.71 0.97 70.42
Interest Rate 73.63 21.42 2.98 1.97
Infinite Horizon
Output 0.08 2.9 96.37 0.65
Consumption 0.47 2.34 96.63 0.56
Investment 2.74 27.19 69.25 0.82
Hours 4.29 26.89 6.14 62.68
Inﬂation 21.63 6.81 2.04 69.53
Interest Rate 72.93 21.44 3.69 1.95
Table L.12: Euro area: M3. Forecast error variance decomposition.
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Fraction of the Variance Due to
Variable Preference Shock Investment Shock Technology Shock Monetary Policy Shock
One-Year Horizon
Output 2.78 22.63 72.62 1.97
Consumption 13.17 2.23 82.40 2.20
Investment 0.86 74.47 23.97 0.69
Hours 10.03 55.59 27.64 6.74
Inﬂation 17.91 29.53 21.96 30.60
Interest Rate 17.54 39.75 22.53 20.18
Three-Year Horizon
Output 0.88 9.44 89.03 0.65
Consumption 4.37 4.28 90.61 0.74
Investment 0.62 38.95 60.04 0.40
Hours 9.23 52.10 32.25 6.42
Inﬂation 17.93 29.54 22.00 30.53
Interest Rate 16.55 42.29 22.24 18.91
Infinite Horizon
Output 0.31 3.75 95.70 0.23
Consumption 0.98 3.48 95.36 0.18
Investment 0.42 27.77 71.53 0.27
Hours 8.65 50.30 35.04 6.02
Inﬂation 16.27 27.66 28.37 27.70
Interest Rate 13.93 37.67 32.50 15.90
Table L.13: US: M1. Forecast error variance decomposition.
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Fraction of the Variance Due to
Variable Preference Shock Investment Shock Technology Shock Monetary Policy Shock
One-Year Horizon
Output 1.18 15.01 80.87 2.94
Consumption 7.60 3.38 87.12 1.91
Investment 1.67 73.46 22.86 2.02
Hours 6.80 66.83 10.95 15.43
Inﬂation 18.81 28.17 12.23 40.79
Interest Rate 24.48 43.60 15.06 16.86
Three-Year Horizon
Output 0.47 8.48 89.89 1.16
Consumption 2.59 2.40 94.33 0.67
Investment 1.26 61.00 36.25 1.50
Hours 6.68 67.06 11.10 15.16
Inﬂation 17.99 27.10 15.90 39.01
Interest Rate 21.83 41.90 21.50 14.77
Infinite Horizon
Output 0.22 6.22 93.02 0.54
Consumption 1.04 4.52 94.16 0.27
Investment 1.01 48.94 48.85 1.20
Hours 6.65 66.96 11.29 15.10
Inﬂation 16.39 25.15 22.91 35.55
Interest Rate 18.48 36.21 32.81 12.50
Table L.14: US: M2. Forecast error variance decomposition.
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Fraction of the Variance Due to
Variable Preference Shock Investment Shock Technology Shock Monetary Policy Shock
One-Year Horizon
Output 1.47 16.49 79.38 2.65
Consumption 7.65 3.12 87.38 1.85
Investment 1.30 77.72 19.39 1.59
Hours 7.67 66.41 13.18 12.73
Inﬂation 19.36 28.54 14.96 37.14
Interest Rate 23.73 42.21 17.34 16.72
Three-Year Horizon
Output 0.58 9.54 88.83 1.05
Consumption 2.60 2.44 94.31 0.65
Investment 1.00 66.27 31.53 1.20
Hours 7.54 66.82 13.10 12.55
Inﬂation 18.32 27.15 19.38 35.15
Interest Rate 20.85 40.05 24.68 14.42
Infinite Horizon
Output 0.27 7.52 91.72 0.48
Consumption 1.06 5.34 93.33 0.27
Investment 0.81 53.88 44.34 0.97
Hours 7.52 66.78 13.18 12.52
Inﬂation 16.45 24.98 26.99 31.58
Interest Rate 17.47 34.43 36.02 12.08
Table L.15: US: M3. Forecast error variance decomposition.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
During the last three decades there has been a remarkable progress in the de-
velopment of DSGE models. Starting with the inﬂuential work of Kydland and
Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983), DSGE models rapidly attracted
increasing interest among the profession thus becoming a centrepiece of modern
macroeconomics. Among the vast body of literature that evolved in recent years
two main categories can be identiﬁed:
i) Research, primarily dealing with the empirical implementation of DSGEmod-
els and
ii) literature with a particular focus on the exact speciﬁcation of the underlying
theoretical model.
Contributing to both categories, this thesis builds on the remarkable progress
achieved in the DSGE research program so far, but also points out important
problems and challenges that need to be addressed in the future.
Chapter 2 starts by presenting the general setup of DSGE models as well as
techniques that enable their empirical implementation. For the sake of clarity,
we focus on a standard New Keynesian model and expound the structure and
solution for this prototype model. Further, we brieﬂy introduce three common
strategies used in the empirical analysis of DSGE models: calibration, maximum
likelihood estimation, and Bayesian estimation. The objective of this chapter is
to lay out the core features of the models used in the subsequent chapters and to
introduce the estimation techniques employed.
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In chapter 3, we apply an extended version of the standard New Keynesian
model to French, German, Italian, and Spanish data and test for parameter sta-
bility over time. The model is estimated employing a maximum likelihood ap-
proach. Parameter instabilities are identiﬁed by the ESS procedure of Inoue and
Rossi (2011). This procedure aims at detecting the parameters of a speciﬁc model
that have changed at an unknown break date, overcoming the drawbacks known
from “one at a time approaches” by allowing all parameters to be time-varying
but, at the same time, avoids size distortions. For France, Germany, and Italy we
ﬁnd structural breaks in the mid-1990s after the beginning of the second stage of
EMU, while the estimates for Spain show a signiﬁcant break just before the start
of the third stage of EMU in 1998. Concerning monetary policy behavior, France,
Italy, and Spain show signiﬁcant changes after the break dates, whereas monetary
policy in Germany turns out to be stable over time. Moreover, France, Italy,
and Spain exhibit a signiﬁcant decline in capital and price adjustment costs after
the break. Further, we ﬁnd at least four out of the ﬁve shocks to be either con-
stant or declining after the break date for all economies under consideration. The
identiﬁcation of changes in both policy and structural parameters might let the
DSGE framework appear to be vulnerable to the Lucas (1976) critique. However,
as outlined in Inoue and Rossi (2011, p. 1195), “. . . the deﬁnition of structural
parameters (in the sense of the Lucas critique) is that these parameters are policy
invariant, not necessarily time invariant.” Therefore, future research faces an im-
portant challenge in developing techniques able to extract the factors responsible
for parameter instabilities, allowing to assess the applicability of the respective
DSGE setting for policy analysis and forecasting.
In chapter 4 we use a Bayesian approach to analyze the impact of distinct
ad hoc speciﬁcations of adjustment costs on the ﬁt and the dynamics of a New
Keynesian model using both euro area and US data. Particularly, we consider
three diﬀerent theoretical speciﬁcations of quadratic adjustment costs of capital
accumulation frequently used in the literature: an investment adjustment cost
speciﬁcation and two forms of capital adjustment costs. Our ﬁndings suggest that
caution should be exercised when using estimated DSGE models with quadratic
costs of capital accumulation for policy analysis, since the results could be af-
fected by the choice of either investment or capital adjustment costs both being
modeling shortcuts. Hence, our analysis provides further evidence for encour-
aging the eﬀorts of a rigorous microfoundation of adjustment costs for capital
229
accumulation.
230
Bibliography
Adjemian, Ste´phane, Houtan Bastani, Michel Juillard, Ferhat Mihoubi,
George Perendia, Marco Ratto, and Se´bastien Villemot, “Dynare: Ref-
erence Manual, Version 4,” Dynare Working Papers, April 2011, (1).
, Matthieu Darracq Parie`s, and Ste´phane Moyen, “Optimal Monetary
Policy in an Estimated DSGE for the Euro Area,” ECB Working Paper Series,
August 2007, (803).
Adolfson, Malin, Jesper Linde´, and Mattias Villani, “Bayesian Analysis
of DSGE Models - Some Comments,” Econometric Reviews, August 2007, 26
(2-4), 173–185.
, Stefan Lase´en, Jesper Linde´, and Mattias Villani, “Empirical Proper-
ties of Closed- and Open-Economy DSGE Models of the Euro Area,” Macroe-
conomic Dynamics, April 2008, 12 (1), 2–19.
Altug, Sumru, “Time-to-Build and Aggregate Fluctuations: Some New Evi-
dence,” International Economic Review, November 1989, 30 (4), 889–920.
A´lvarez, Luis J., Emmanuel Dhyne, Marco Hoeberichts, Claudia
Kwapil, Herve´ Le Bihan, Patrick Lu¨nnemann, Fernando Martins,
Roberto Sabbatini, Harald Stahl, Philip Vermeulen, and Jouko Vil-
munen, “Sticky Prices in the Euro Area: A Summary of New Micro-evidence,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, April 2006, 4 (2-3), 575–584.
Ambler, Steve, “The Costs of Inﬂation in New Keynesian Models,” Bank of
Canada Review, 2007, pp. 5–14.
An, Sungbae, “Bayesian Estimation of DSGE Models: Lessons from Second-
Order Approximations,” May 2007. Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania.
231
232
and Frank Schorfheide, “Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models,” Econometric
Reviews, August 2007, 26 (2-4), 113–172.
Anderson, Gary and George Moore, “A Linear Algebraic Procedure for Solv-
ing Linear Perfect Foresight Models,” Economics Letters, 1985, 17 (3), 247–252.
Andrews, Donald W. K. and Ray C. Fair, “Inference in Nonlinear Econo-
metric Models with Structural Change,” Review of Economic Studies, October
1988, 55 (184), 615–639.
Andrews, Donald W.K., “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural
Change with Unknown Change Point,” Econometrica, July 1993, 61 (4), 821–
856.
Andre´s, Javier, J. David Lope´z-Salido, and Javier Valle´s, “Money in an
Estimated Business Cycle Model of the Euro Area,” Economic Journal, April
2006, 116 (511), 457–477.
Angeloni, Ignazio and Michael Ehrmann, “The Euro and the Transmission
of Monetary Policy,” in Lawrence R. Klein, ed., Long-Run Growth and Short-
Run Stabilization: Essays in Memory of Albert Ando, Elgar, 2006, pp. 161–206.
Aruoba, S. Boragan, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, and Juan F.
Rubio-Ramirez, “Comparing Solution Methods for Dynamic Equilibrium
Economies,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, December 2006, 30
(12), 2477–2508.
Ascari, Guido, Efrem Castelnuovo, and Lorenza Rossi, “Calvo vs. Rotem-
berg in a Trend Inﬂation World: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, November 2011, 35 (11), 1852–1867.
Blanchard, Olivier J. and Charles M. Kahn, “The Solution of Linear Dif-
ference Models under Rational Expectations,” Econometrica, July 1980, 48 (5),
1305–1311.
and Jordi Gal´ı, “Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, February 2007, 39, 35–65.
233
Bouakez, Hafedh, Emanuela Cardia, and Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia,
“Habit Formation and the Persistence of Monetary Shocks,” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, September 2005, 52 (6), 1073–1088.
Brooks, Stephen P. and Andrew Gelman, “General Methods for Monitoring
Convergence of Iterative Simulations,” Journal of Computational and Graphical
Statistics, December 1998, 7 (4), 434–455.
Browne, Frank, Gabriel Fagan, and Jerome Henry, “Money Demand in
EU Countries: A Survey,” Macroeconomics 0503004, EconWPA March 2005.
Buiter, Willem H. and Anne C. Sibert, “Deﬂationary Bubbles,” Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics, September 2007, 11 (4), 431–454.
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio T. Rebelo, “Labor
Hoarding and the Business Cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, April 1993,
101 (2), 245–273.
Burriel, Pablo, Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, and Juan Rubio-Ramı´rez,
“MEDEA: A DSGE Model for the Spanish Economy,” SERIEs - Journal of the
Spanish Economic Association, March 2010, 1 (1), 175–243.
Calvo, Guillermo A., “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, September 1983, 12 (3), 383–398.
Cameron, A. Colin and Pravin K. Trivedi, Microeconometrics: Methods and
Applications, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Canova, Fabio, “Monetary Policy and the Evolution of the US Economy,” CEPR
Discussion Papers, July 2006, (5467).
, Methods for Applied Macroeconomic Research, Princeton University Press,
2007.
, “What Explains the Great Moderation in the U.S.? A Structural Analysis,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, June 2009, 7 (4), 697–721.
and Filippo Ferroni, “Multiple Filtering Devices for the Estimation of Cycli-
cal DSGE Models,” Quantitative Economics, March 2011, 2 (1), 73–98.
234
and , “The Dynamics of US Inﬂation: Can Monetary Policy Explain the
Changes?,” Journal of Econometrics, March 2012, 167 (1), 47–60.
Casares, Miguel, “The New Keynesian Model and the Euro Area Business
Cycle,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, April 2007, 69 (2), 209–
244.
Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan, “New Keynesian
Models: Not Yet Useful for Policy Analysis,” American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics, January 2009, 1 (1), 242–66.
Cho, Seonghoon and Antonio Moreno, “A Small-Sample Study of the New-
Keynesian Macro Model,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, September
2006, 38 (6), 1461–1481.
Christensen, Ian and Ali Dib, “The Financial Accelerator in an Estimated
New Keynesian Model,” Review of Economic Dynamics, January 2008, 11 (1),
155–178.
Christiano, Lawrence J. and Martin Eichenbaum, “Current Real-Business-
Cycle Theories and Aggregate Labor-Market Fluctuations,” American Eco-
nomic Review, June 1992, 82 (3), 430–450.
, , and Charles L. Evans, “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Eﬀects
of a Shock to Monetary Policy,” Journal of Political Economy, February 2005,
113 (1), 1–45.
, Mathias Trabandt, and Karl Walentin, “DSGEModels for Monetary Pol-
icy Analysis,” in Benjamin M. Friedman and Michael Woodford, eds., Handbook
of Monetary Economics, 1 ed., Vol. 3, Elsevier, 2010, pp. 285–367.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gal´ı, and Mark Gertler, “The Science of Mone-
tary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature,
December 1999, 37 (4), 1661–1707.
, , and , “Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence
and Some Theory,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2000, 115 (1),
147–180.
235
, , and , “A Simple Framework for International Monetary Policy Analy-
sis,” Journal of Monetary Economics, July 2002, 49 (5), 879–904.
Coenen, Gu¨nter and Volker Wieland, “A Small Estimated Euro Area Model
with Rational Expectations and Nominal Rigidities,” European Economic Re-
view, July 2005, 49 (5), 1081–1104.
Cogley, Timothy and Takeshi Yagihashi, “Are DSGE Approximating Models
Invariant to Shifts in Policy?,” The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2010, 10
(1).
Conover, William J., Practical Nonparametric Statistics, 3 ed., Wiley and Sons,
1999.
Cukierman, Alex and Francesco Lippi, “Labour Markets and Monetary
Union: A Strategic Analysis,” Economic Journal, July 2001, 111 (473), 541–
565.
Danthine, Jean Pierre and John B. Donaldson, “Methodological and Em-
pirical Issues in Real Business Cycle Theory,” European Economic Review, Jan-
uary 1993, 37 (1), 1–35.
DeJong, David N. and Chetan Dave, Structural Macroeconometrics, Prince-
ton University Press, 2007.
and , Structural Macroeconometrics, 2 ed., Princeton University Press, 2011.
, Beth F. Ingram, and Charles H. Whiteman, “A Bayesian Approach to
Calibration,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, January 1996, 14
(1), 1–9.
, , and , “Keynesian Impulses versus Solow Residuals: Identifying Sources
of Business Cycle Fluctuations,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, May 2000a,
15 (3), 311–329.
, , and , “A Bayesian Approach to Dynamic Macroeconomics,” Journal
of Econometrics, October 2000b, 98 (2), 203–223.
236
Del Negro, Marco and Frank Schorfheide, “Forming Priors for DSGE Mod-
els (And How It Aﬀects the Assessment of Nominal Rigidities),” Journal of
Monetary Economics, October 2008, 55 (7), 1191–1208.
and , “Bayesian Macroeconometrics,” in Gary Koop John Geweke and Her-
man van Dijk, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Bayesian Econometrics, Oxford
University Press, 2011.
Dellas, Harris, “Monetary Shocks and Inﬂation Dynamics in the New Keynesian
Model,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, March 2006, 38 (2), 543–551.
Dhyne, Emmanuel, Luis J. A´lvarez, Herve´ Le Bihan, Giovanni
Veronese, Daniel Dias, Johannes Hoﬀmann, Nicole Jonker, Patrick
Lu¨nnemann, Fabio Rumler, and Jouko Vilmunen, “Price Changes in the
Euro Area and the United States: Some Facts from Individual Consumer Price
Data,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2006, 20 (2), 171–192.
DiCecio, Riccardo and Edward Nelson, “An Estimated DSGE Model for the
United Kingdom,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July 2007, 89 (4),
215–231.
Doan, Thomas, Robert Litterman, and Christopher A. Sims, “Forecast-
ing and Conditional Projection Using Realistic Prior Distributions,” Economet-
ric Reviews, 1984, 3 (1), 1–100.
Efron, Bradley and Robert J. Tibshirani, An Introduction to the Bootstrap,
Chapman & Hall/CRC, 1993.
European Commission, EMU@10: Successes and Challenges After 10 Years of
Economic and Monetary Union, Oﬃce for Oﬃcial Publications of the European
Communities, 2008.
Fagan, Gabriel, Je´roˆme Henry, and Ricardo Mestre, “An Area-Wide
Model for the Euro Area,” Economic Modelling, January 2005, 22 (1), 39–59.
Farmer, Roger E. A., The Macroeconomics of Self-fulfilling Prophecies, MIT
Press, 1999.
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Jesu´s, “The Econometrics of DSGE Models,” SERIEs
- Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, March 2010, 1 (1), 3–49.
237
and Juan F. Rubio-Ramı´rez, “Comparing Dynamic Equilibrium Models to
Data: A Bayesian Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, November 2004, 123
(1), 153–187.
and , “Our Research Agenda: Estimating DSGE Models,” Newsletter of the
Review of Economic Dynamics, November 2006, 8 (1).
, Pablo Guerro´n-Quintana, and Juan F. Rubio-Ramı´rez, “The New
Macroeconometrics: A Bayesian Approach,” in Tony O’Hagan and Mike West,
eds., The Oxford Handbook of Applied Bayesian Analysis, Oxford University
Press, 2010, pp. 366–397.
Fischer, Christoph, “Price Convergence in the EMU? Evidence from Micro
Data,” European Economic Review, May 2012, 56 (4), 757–776.
Fratzscher, Marcel and Livio Stracca, “The Political Economy Under Mon-
etary Union: Has the Euro Made a Diﬀerence?,” Economic Policy, April 2009,
24 (58), 307–348.
Gabriel, Vasco, Paul Levine, Joseph Pearlman, and Bo Yang, “An Esti-
mated DSGE Model of the Indian Economy,” in Chetan Ghate, ed., The Oxford
Handbook of the Indian Economy, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 835–890.
Gal´ı, Jordi, “Technology, Employment, and the Business Cycle: Do Technology
Shocks Explain Aggregate Fluctuations?,” American Economic Review, March
1999, 89 (1), 249–271.
, “New Perspectives on Monetary Policy, Inﬂation, and the Business Cycle,”
NBER Working Paper Series, February 2002, (8767).
, Introduction to Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle: An In-
troduction to the New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press, 2008.
and Mark Gertler, “Macroeconomic Modeling for Monetary Policy Evalua-
tion,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007, 21 (4), 25–45.
and Pau Rabanal, “Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations:
How Well Does the Real Business Cycle Model Fit Postwar U.S. Data?,”
NBER/Macroeconomics Annual, October 2004, 19, 225–288.
238
Gelain, Paolo, Diego Rodr´ıguez-Palenzuela, and Bala´zs Vila´gi, “An Es-
timated Euro-area DSGE Model with Financial Frictions: Empirical Investi-
gation of the Financial Accelerator Mechanism,” ECB Working Paper Series,
2012. Forthcoming.
Gelman, Andrew, John B. Carlin, Hal S. Stern, and Donald B. Rubin,
Bayesian Data Analysis, 2 ed., Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2003.
Gerali, Andrea, Stefano Neri, Luca Sessa, and Federico M. Signoretti,
“Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, September 2010, 42, 107–141.
Geweke, John, “Using Simulation Methods for Bayesian Econometric Models:
Inference, Development, and Communication,” Econometric Reviews, February
1999, 18 (1), 1–73.
, Contemporary Bayesian Econometrics and Statistics, Wiley and Sons, 2005.
Giglioli, Nicla, Andrea Saltelli, and Stefano Tarantola, “Global Uncer-
tainty and Sensitivity Analysis and Neighbourhoods,” in Andris Buikis, Rai-
mondas Ciegis, and Alistair D. Fitt, eds., Progress in Industrial Mathematics
at ECMI 2002, Vol. 5 of Mathematics in Industry, Springer, 2004, pp. 277–283.
Gill, Jeﬀ and Gary King, “Numerical Issues Involved in Inverting Hessian Ma-
trices,” in Micah Altman, Jeﬀ Gill, and Michael P. McDonald, eds., Numerical
Issues in Statistical Computing for the Social Scientist, Wiley and Sons, 2003,
chapter 6, pp. 143–176.
Golub, Gene H. and Charles F. Van Loan, Matrix Computations, 3 ed.,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.
Goodfriend, Marvin, “Monetary Policy in the New Neoclassical Synthesis: A
Primer,” International Finance, 2002, 5 (2), 165–191.
and Robert G. King, “The New Neoclassical Synthesis and the Role of
Monetary Policy,” NBER/Macroeconomics Annual, October 1997, 12 (1), 231–
283.
239
Greenwood, Jeremy, Zvi Hercowitz, and Gregory W. Huﬀman, “Invest-
ment, Capacity Utilization, and the Real Business Cycle,” American Economic
Review, June 1988, 78 (3), 402–417.
Groth, Charlotta and Hashmat Khan, “Investment Adjustment Costs: An
Empirical Assessment,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, December 2010,
42 (8), 1469–1494.
Hamilton, James D., Time Series Analysis, Princeton University Press, 1994a.
, “State-Space Models,” in Robert F. Engle and Daniel L. McFadden, eds.,
Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 4, Elsevier, 1994b, pp. 3039–3080.
Harvey, Andrew C., Time Series Models, 2 ed., MIT Press, 1993.
Heer, Burkhard and Alfred Maussner, Dynamic General Equilibrium Mod-
eling: Computational Methods and Applications, 2 ed., Springer, 2009.
Hughes Hallett, Andrew and Christian Richter, “Has There Been Any
Structural Convergence in the Transmission of European Monetary Policies?,”
International Economics and Economic Policy, July 2009, 6 (2), 85–101.
Ingram, Beth F., Narayana R. Kocherlakota, and N. Eugene Savin, “Ex-
plaining Business Cycles: A Multiple-Shock Approach,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, December 1994, 34 (3), 415–428.
Inoue, Atsushi and Barbara Rossi, “Identifying the Sources of Instabilities in
Macroeconomic Fluctuations,” Review of Economics and Statistics, November
2011, 93 (4), 1186–1204.
Ireland, Peter N., “A Small, Structural, Quarterly Model for Monetary Policy
Evaluation,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, December
1997, 47, 83–108.
, “Interest Rates, Inﬂation, and Federal Reserve Policy since 1980,” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, August 2000, 32 (3), 417–434.
, “Sticky-price Models of the Business Cycle: Speciﬁcation and Stability,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, February 2001, 47 (1), 3–18.
240
, “Endogenous Money or Sticky Prices?,” Journal of Monetary Economics,
November 2003, 50 (8), 1623–1648.
, “Technology Shocks in the New Keynesian Model,” Review of Economics and
Statistics, November 2004, 86 (4), 923–936.
, “Changes in the Federal Reserve’s Inﬂation Target: Causes and Conse-
quences,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, December 2007, 39 (8), 1851–
1882.
, “A New Keynesian Perspective on the Great Recession,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, February 2011, 43 (1), 31–54.
Iskrev, Nikolay, “Local Identiﬁcation in DSGE Models,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, March 2010, 57 (2), 189–202.
Jarocinski, Marek, “Responses to Monetary Policy Shocks in the East and the
West of Europe: A Comparison,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, August
2010, 25 (5), 833–868.
Jeﬀreys, Harold, Theory of Probability, 3 ed., Oxford University Press, 1961.
Jerger, Ju¨rgen, “Socially Optimal Monetary Policy Institutions,” European
Journal of Political Economy, November 2002, 18 (4), 761–781.
and Oke Ro¨he, “Testing for Parameter Stability in DSGE Models. The Cases
of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain,” BGPE Discussion Papers, 2012, (118).
Judd, Kenneth L., Numerical Methods in Economics, MIT Press, 1998.
Juillard, Michel, Ondra Kamenik, Michael Kumhof, and Douglas Lax-
ton, “Optimal Price Setting and Inﬂation Inertia in a Rational Expectations
Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, August 2008, 32 (8),
2584–2621.
, Philippe Karam, Douglas Laxton, and Paolo Pesenti, “Welfare-based
Monetary Policy Rules in an Estimated DSGE Model of the US Economy,”
ECB Working Paper Series, April 2006, (613).
241
Justiniano, Alejandro, Giorgio E. Primiceri, and Andrea Tambalotti,
“Investment Shocks and Business Cycles,” NBER Working Paper Series, De-
cember 2009, (15570).
, , and , “Investment Shocks and Business Cycles,” Journal of Monetary
Economics, March 2010, 57 (2), 132–145.
Kalman, Rudolf E., “A New Approach to Linear Filtering and Prediction Prob-
lems,” Journal of Basic Engineering, March 1960, 82 (1), 35–45.
and Richard S. Bucy, “New Results in Linear Filtering and Prediction
Theory,” Journal of Basic Engineering, March 1961, 83 (1), 95–107.
Karagedikli, O¨zer, Troy Matheson, Christie Smith, and Shaun P. Va-
hey, “RBCs and DSGEs: The Computational Approach to Business Cycle
Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Economic Surveys, February 2010, 24 (1),
113–136.
Kass, Robert E. and Adrian E. Raftery, “Bayes Factors,” Journal of the
American Statistical Association, June 1995, 90 (430), 773–795.
Keynes, John M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money,
Macmillan, 1936.
Kim, Jinill, “Monetary Policy in a Stochastic Equilibrium Model with Real
and Nominal Rigidities,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series provided
by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), 1998, (1998-02).
, “Constructing and Estimating a Realistic Optimizing Model of Monetary Pol-
icy,” Journal of Monetary Economics, April 2000, 45 (2), 329–359.
and Sunghyun Henry Kim, “Spurious Welfare Reversals in International
Business Cycle Models,” Journal of International Economics, August 2003, 60
(2), 471–500.
, Sunghyun Kim, Ernst Schaumburg, and Christopher A. Sims, “Cal-
culating and Using Second-Order Accurate Solutions of Discrete Time Dynamic
Equilibrium Models,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, November
2008, 32 (11), 3397–3414.
242
King, Robert G. and Mark W. Watson, “System Reduction and Solution Al-
gorithms for Singular Linear Diﬀerence Systems under Rational Expectations,”
Computational Economics, October 2002, 20 (1-2), 57–86.
, Charles I. Plosser, and Sergio T. Rebelo, “Production, Growth and
Business Cycles: I. The Basic Neoclassical Model,” Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, March 1988, 21 (2/3), 195–232.
Klein, Paul, “Using the Generalized Schur Form to Solve a Multivariate Linear
Rational Expectations Model,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
September 2000, 24 (10), 1405–1423.
Kremer, Jana, Giovanni Lombardo, Leopold von Thadden, and Thomas
Werner, “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models as a Tool for Policy
Analysis,” CESifo Economic Studies, December 2006, 52 (4), 640–665.
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott, “Time to Build and Aggregate
Fluctuations,” Econometrica, November 1982, 50 (6), 1345–1370.
and , “The Computational Experiment: An Econometric Tool,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 1996, 10 (1), 69–85.
Leeper, Eric M. and Christopher A. Sims, “Toward a Modern Macroe-
conomic Model Usable for Policy Analysis,” NBER/Macroeconomics Annual,
June 1994, 9, 81–118.
Levin, Andrew T., Alexei Onatski, John C. Williams, and Noah
Williams, “Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty in Micro-Founded Macroe-
conometric Models,” NBER/Macroeconomics Annual, October 2005, 20 (1),
229–287.
Litterman, Robert B., “Techniques for Forecasting with Vector Autoregres-
sions.” Ph.d. thesis, University of Minnesota 1980.
Lombardo, Giovanni and David Vestin, “Welfare Implications of Calvo vs.
Rotemberg-pricing Assumptions,” Economics Letters, August 2008, 100 (2),
275–279.
Long, John B. and Charles I. Plosser, “Real Business Cycles,” Journal of
Political Economy, February 1983, 91 (1), 39–69.
243
Lubik, Thomas and Frank Schorfheide, “A Bayesian Look at New Open
Economy Macroeconomics,” NBER/Macroeconomics Annual, October 2005, 20
(1), 313–366.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr., “Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique,” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, January 1976, 1, 19–46.
Lu¨tkepohl, Helmut, New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis,
Springer, 2005.
McCallum, Bennett T. and Edward Nelson, “An Optimizing IS-LM Speci-
ﬁcation for Monetary Policy and Business Cycle Analysis,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, August 1999, 31 (3), 296–316.
McCandless, George, The ABCs of RBCs: An Introduction to Dynamic
Macroeconomic Models, Harvard University Press, 2008.
Neiss, Katharine S. and Edward Nelson, “The Real-Interest-Rate Gap as
an Inﬂation Indicator,” Macroeconomic Dynamics, April 2003, 7 (2), 239–262.
Obstfeld, Maurice, “Exchange Rates and Adjustment: Perspectives from the
New Open- Economy Macroeconomics,” Monetary and Economic Studies, De-
cember 2002, 20 (S1), 23–46.
Otrok, Christopher, “On Measuring the Welfare Cost of Business Cycle,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, February 2001, 47 (1), 61–92.
Pappenberger, Florian, Keith J. Beven, Marco Ratto, and Patrick Mat-
gen, “Multi-Method Global Sensitivity Analysis of Flood Inundation Models,”
Advances in Water Resources, January 2008, 31 (1), 1–14.
Peersman, Gert and Roland Straub, “Putting the New Keynesian Model to
a Test,” IMF Working Papers, May 2006, (06/135).
Plosser, Charles I., “Understanding Real Business Cycles,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 1989, 3 (3), 51–77.
Popov, Alexander and Steven Ongena, “Interbank Market Integration, Loan
Rates, and Firm Leverage,” Journal of Banking & Finance, March 2011, 35 (3),
544–559.
244
Primiceri, Giorgio E., Ernst Schaumburg, and Andrea Tambalotti, “In-
tertemporal Disturbances,” NBER Working Paper Series, May 2006, (12243).
Rabanal, Pau, “Does Inﬂation Increase after a Monetary Policy Tightening?
Answers Based on an Estimated DSGEModel,” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, March 2007, 31 (3), 906–937.
, “Inﬂation Diﬀerentials between Spain and the EMU: A DSGE Perspective,”
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, September 2009, 41 (6), 1141–1166.
and Juan F. Rubio-Ramı´rez, “Comparing New Keynesian Models in the
Euro Area: A Bayesian Approach,” Spanish Economic Review, March 2008, 10
(1), 23–40.
Raftery, Adrian E., Michael A. Newton, Jaya M. Satagopan, and
Pavel N. Krivitsky, “Estimating the Integrated Likelihood via Posterior Sim-
ulation Using the Harmonic Mean Identity,” in Jose´ M. Bernardo, M.J. Bayarri,
James O. Berger, A. Philip Dawid, David Heckerman, Adrian F. M. Smith, and
Mike West, eds., Bayesian Statistics 8, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 1–45.
Ratto, Marco, “Analysing DSGE Models with Global Sensitivity Analysis,”
Computational Economics, March 2008, 31 (2), 115–139.
, Sensitivity Analysis Toolbox for DYNARE, European Commission, Joint Re-
search Centre, 2009.
, Werner Roeger, and Jan in ’t Veld, “QUEST III: An Estimated Open-
Economy DSGE Model of the Euro Area with Fiscal and Monetary Policy,”
Economic Modelling, January 2009, 26 (1), 222–233.
Rebelo, Sergio T., “Real Business Cycle Models: Past, Present and Future,”
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, June 2005, 107 (2), 217–238.
Riggi, Marianna and Massimiliano Tancioni, “Nominal vs Real Wage Rigidi-
ties in New Keynesian Models with Hiring Costs: A Bayesian Evaluation,”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, July 2010, 34 (7), 1305–1324.
Robert, Christian P., The Bayesian Choice: From Decision-Theoretic Founda-
tions to Computational Implementation, Springer, 2001.
245
Roberts, Gareth O., Andrew Gelman, and Walter R. Gilks, “Weak Con-
vergence and Optimal Scaling of RandomWalk Metropolis Algorithms,” Annals
of Applied Probability, February 1997, 7 (1), 110–120.
Roberts, John M., “New Keynesian Economics and the Phillips Curve,” Jour-
nal of Money, Credit and Banking, November 1995, 27 (4), 975–984.
Rotemberg, Julio J., “Sticky Prices in the United States,” Journal of Political
Economy, December 1982, 90 (6), 1187–1211.
and Michael Woodford, “An Optimization-Based Econometric Framework
for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy,” NBER/Macroeconomics Annual, Oc-
tober 1997, 12 (1), 297–346.
Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J., “Methods to Estimate Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium Models,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, August
2007, 31 (8), 2599–2636.
Sahuc, Jean-Guillaume and Frank Smets, “Diﬀerences in Interest Rate Pol-
icy at the ECB and the Fed: An Investigation with a Medium-Scale DSGE
Model,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, March 2008, 40 (2/3), 505–
521.
Saltelli, Andrea, “Sensitivity Analysis for Importance Assessment,” Risk Anal-
ysis, June 2002, 22 (3), 579–590.
, Marco Ratto, Terry Andres, Francesca Campolongo, Jessica Cari-
boni, Debora Gatelli, Michaela Saisana, and Stefano Tarantola, Global
Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer, Wiley and Sons, 2008.
, Stefano Tarantola, Francesca Campolongo, and Marco Ratto, Sensi-
tivity Analysis in Practice: A Guide to Assessing Scientific Models, Wiley and
Sons, 2004.
Sargent, Thomas J., “Interpreting Economic Time Series,” Journal of Political
Economy, April 1981, 89 (2), 213–248.
Sbordone, Argia M., Andrea Tambalotti, Krishna Rao, and Kieran
Walsh, “Policy Analysis Using DSGE Models: An Introduction,” Economic
Policy Review, October 2010, 16 (2), 23–43.
246
Schmitt-Grohe´, Stephanie and Mart´ın Uribe, “Optimal Fiscal and Mone-
tary Policy in a Medium-Scale Macroeconomic Model,” NBER/Macroeconomics
Annual, October 2005, 20 (1), 383–425.
and , “What’s News in Business Cycles,” NBER Working Paper Series,
August 2008, (14215).
Schorfheide, Frank, “Loss Function-Based Evaluation of DSGE Models,” Jour-
nal of Applied Econometrics, November 2000, 15 (6), 645–670.
, “DSGE Model-Based Estimation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,” Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly, 2008, 94 (4), 397–433.
, “Estimation and Evaluation of DSGE Models: Progress and Challenges,”
NBER Working Paper Series, February 2011, (16781).
Shea, John, “What Do Technology Shocks Do?,” NBER/Macroeconomics An-
nual, October 1998, 13 (1), 275–322.
Sims, Christopher A., “Macroeconomics and Reality,” Econometrica, January
1980, 48 (1), 1–48.
, “Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models,” Computational Economics,
October 2002, 20 (1-2), 1–20.
Smets, Frank and Raf Wouters, “An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area,” Journal of the European Economic
Association, September 2003, 1 (5), 1123–1175.
and , “Comparing Shocks and Frictions in US and Euro Area Business
Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, March
2005, 20 (2), 161–183.
and , “Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE
Approach,” American Economic Review, June 2007, 97 (3), 586–606.
, Kai Christoﬀel, Gu¨nter Coenen, Roberto Motto, and Massimo Ros-
tagno, “DSGE Models and Their Use at the ECB,” SERIEs: Journal of the
Spanish Economic Association, February 2010, 1 (1), 51–65.
247
Sobol’, Ilya M., “On Quasi-Monte Carlo Integrations,” Mathematics and Com-
puters in Simulation, August 1998, 47 (2-5), 103–112.
Spear, Robert C. and George M. Hornberger, “Eutrophication in Peel
Inlet–II. Identiﬁcation of Critical Uncertainties via Generalized Sensitivity
Analysis,” Water Research, 1980, 14 (1), 43–49.
Taylor, John B., “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts,” Journal of
Political Economy, February 1980, 88 (1), 1–23.
, “Discretion Versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy, December 1993, 39 (1), 195–214.
Tovar, Camilo E., “DSGE Models and Central Banks,” Economics: The Open-
Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, May 2009, 3 (2009-16).
Uhlig, Harald, “A Toolkit for Analyzing Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic Models
Easily,” in Ramon Marimon and Andrew Scott, eds., Computational Methods
for the Study of Dynamic Economies, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 30–61.
von Hagen, Ju¨rgen, “Macroeconomic Consequences of the EMU,” Empirica,
December 1999, 26 (4), 359–374.
Walsh, Carl E., “Commentary: Using Models for Monetary Policy Analysis,”
International Journal of Central Banking, March 2010, 6 (1), 259–270.
Wang, Pengfei and Yi Wen, “Hayashi Meets Kiyotaki and Moore: A Theory
of Capital Adjustment Costs,” Review of Economic Dynamics, April 2012, 15
(2), 207–225.
Woodford, Michael, Interest and Prices, Princeton University Press, 2003.
, “How Important Is Money in the Conduct of Monetary Policy?,” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, December 2008, 40 (8), 1561–1598.
Young, Peter C., Stuart Parkinson, and Matthew Lees, “Simplicity Out
of Complexity in Environmental Modelling: Occam’s Razor Revisited,” Journal
of Applied Statistics, June 1996, 23 (2/3), 165–210.
248
Zanetti, Francesco, “A Non-Walrasian Labor Market in a Monetary Model of
the Business Cycle,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, July 2007,
31 (7), 2413–2437.
Zietz, Joachim, “A Clarifying Note on Converting to Log-Deviations from the
Steady State,” Economics Bulletin, 2008, 3 (50), 1–15.
Zubairy, Sarah, “On Fiscal Multipliers: Estimates from a Medium Scale DSGE
Model,” Bank of Canada Workingpaper, November 2010, (10-30).
